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Anti-collusion codes can be used to construct ngerprints resistant to collusion
attacks on multimedia contents, and colluder tracing algorithms can be used to iden-
tify or trace the sources of pirate copies of copyrighted multimedia contents. Cheng
and Miao [17] introduced the notion of an anti-collusion code called separable code
(t-SC) against the averaging collusion attack on multimedia content, and designed
colluder tracing algorithm based on such codes to identify colluders. However, the
power of such codes is limited by some constraints, such as the maximum size of
the code and the computational complexity of the tracing algorithm based on such
a code.
This thesis introduces three new types of anti-collusion codes, called strong sepa-
rable code (t-SSC), multimedia identiable parent property code (t-MIPPC), strong
multimedia identiable parent property code (t-SMIPPC), to resist the averaging
collusion attack on multimedia content. We then design the colluder tracing algo-
rithms based on these new codes.
Catch Colluders Complexity
Binary t-SC ([17]) all O(nM t)
Binary t-SSC all O(nM)
Binary t-MIPPC at least one O(nM t)
Binary t-SMIPPC at least one O(nM)
The above table describes the traceability of the four types of codes described in
this thesis including separable codes and our three newly introduced codes. For
example, any binary t-SC can be used to identify all colluders with computational
complexity O(nM t) when the number of colluders in the averaging collusion attack
is at most t, where n is the length of the code and M is the number of authorized
users. In addition, an important point which is not revealed in the table is that the
maximum number of the codewords of a t-MIPPC (or a t-SMIPPC, respectively) is
more than that of a t-SC (or a t-SSC, respectively).
From the above results, we know that these four types of codes can be used in
dierent scenarios where requirements are dierent. In this thesis, we also construct
these four types of codes via Combinatorics, Graph Theory, and Finite Geometries
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such as generalized packings, bipartite graphs, projective planes, generalized quad-
rangles, and dierence matrices. Furthermore, by investigating the upper bounds
on the size of these codes, we show that some of the codes constructed in this thesis
are optimal.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Multimedia contents, such as video, audio, image, can be copied and distributed
easily, especially in the Internet age. This damages the interests of copyright own-
ers and distributors. It is desired to devise techniques for copyright protection of
multimedia contents.
Cryptographic approaches are such techniques to ensure that only authorized
users are able to use copyrighted contents. Unfortunately, cryptographic approach-
es are limited in that once the content is decrypted, it can potentially be copied and
redistributed freely. Fingerprinting techniques which by providing unique identi-
cation of data in a certain manner can be used to ght against illegal redistribution
of copyrighted contents.
The main purpose of this thesis is to construct anti-collusion codes and discuss
their tracing algorithms for multimedia ngerprinting.
1.1 Related work
Similar to human ngerprints, which are unique and can be used to identify their
owner in the case of a criminal act, multimedia ngerprints uniquely identify a
piece of multimedia data and allow the content to be traced to their rightful owner.
If a naive purchaser redistributed his copy illegally, the ngerprint embedded in
that copy will allow the distributor to identify the malicious user and proceed with
an appropriate legal action. Hence, any authorized user would not like to sent
his/her decrypted content to any unauthorized user. So, nowadays ensuring the
appropriate use of multimedia content is no longer a traditional security issue with
a single adversary. The global nature of the Internet has also brought adversaries
closer to each other, and it is easy for a group of authorized users with dierently
marked versions of the same content to mount attacks against the ngerprints.
These attacks, which are known as collusion attacks, can provide a cost-eective
approach for attenuating each of the colluders' ngerprints. An improperly designed
embedding and identication scheme may be vulnerable in the sense that a small
coalition of colluders can successfully produce a new version of the content with no
detectable traces. It is desirable, therefore, to design ngerprints that can resist
collusion and identify the colluders, thereby discouraging attempts at collusion by
the authorized users.
The problem of designing ngerprints that can withstand collusion and allow for
the identication of colluders has been studied extensively in recent years. One of
the rst works on such problem was presented by Boneh and Shaw [12]. This work
considered the problem of ngerprinting generic data that satised an underlying
principle referred to as the marking assumption. They assumed a ngerprint to be
a collection of n marks, each mark has q possible values, which are embedded in
some places of the content unknown to users. Given any two ngerprints, positions
in which the corresponding marks dier are termed detectable marks and these can
be modied. A feasible set is the set of ngerprints spanned by a coalition taking
into account all the detectable positions. A coalition of users is capable of creating
a ngerprint, which could be any ngerprint from the feasible set.
Under their collusion framework, Boneh and Shaw introduced a frameproof code
which is ngerprinting code that can be used to prevent any coalition from framing
any user not in the coalition, and proposed a construction of t-frameproof codes with
error-correcting codes in which no coalition of t users can frame someone outside the
group. Frameproof codes and their applications have been then studied extensively,
see for instance, [10, 20, 46, 48]. Boneh and Shaw in their work also showed that it is
not possible to construct totally t-secure codes, which are ngerprinting codes that
are capable of tracing at least one colluder out of a coalition of at most t colluders.
Instead, they used randomization techniques to construct codes that are able to
capture at least one colluder out of a coalition of at most t colluders with arbitrarily
high probability.
Chor et al. presented a similar work in [18]. This work is concerned with the
distribution of large amounts of contents, such as pay-per-view television broadcast,
CD ROM distribution of data and online databases. The data supplier will encrypt
the data and distribute a decoder which contains a set of keys needed to decrypt
data to each authorized user. A coalition of colluders might create a pirate decoder
that consists of keys from some of the colluders' decoders and redistribute to an
unauthorized user. The authors designed a traitor tracing scheme which will reveal
at least one colluder on the conscation of a pirate decoder once the unauthorized
user decrypt data using the pirate decoder.
In these cases described above for generic data, the ability to trace a colluder
relied on the marking assumption that the identifying information cannot be blind-
ly altered by coalition. However, Boneh and Shaw's marking assumption is not
well suited for the multimedia domain since there are distinct embedding approach-
es. Engle [24] pointed out whether the marking assumption holds or not depends
on the embedding ngerprinting approach. Fortunately, the marking assumption
which corresponds to the spread spectrum embedding approach signicantly limits
the capability of colluders to conduct attacks. Selectively manipulating parts in
a ngerprinting code is not directly possible, and instead other forms of attacks,
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such as the averaging collusion attack, must be used by adversaries to attempt to
subvert a multimedia ngerprinting. This suggests that by jointly considering the
encoding, embedding, and detection processes involved with ngerprinting multime-
dia, we have the potential to substantially enhance the performance of multimedia
ngerprinting.
In order to resist the averaging collusion attack based on spread spectrum em-
bedding technology, Trappe et al. [51, 52] introduced the notion of an AND anti-
collusion code (AND-ACC) where the logical AND operation is exploited to identify
colluders. Furthermore, they constructed AND-ACCs by using the bit complemen-
t of the incidence matrix of a combinatorial structure called balanced incomplete
block design. Projective geometries were used to construct such anti-collusion codes
in [23]. Constructions via other mathematical structures such as cover-free fami-
lies can be found in [38]. Li and Trappe [39] also investigated collusion-resistant
ngerprints from sequence sets satisfying the Welch bound equality.
Recently, Cheng and Miao [17] introduced a new concept of t-resilient logical
anti-collusion code (LACC), where not only the logical AND operation but also
the logical OR operation is exploited to identify colluders. LACCs have weaker
requirements than AND-ACCs but they have the same traceability as AND-ACCs
do. They also found an equivalence between an LACC and a binary separable code
(SC). Constructions for LACCs and SCs were presented in [16, 17, 27].
1.2 Multimedia ngerprinting
In this section, we give a brief review on the basic concepts of multimedia nger-
printing, collusion and detection. The interested reader is referred to [17, 40] for
more detailed information.
Fingerprints for multimedia data can be embedded through a variety of water-
marking techniques prior to their authorized distribution. One of the widely em-
ployed robust embedding techniques is spread-spectrum additive embedding, which
can survive collusion attacks to trace and identify colluders [21, 43]. In spread-
spectrum embedding, a watermarked signal, often represented by a linear combina-
tion of noise-like orthonormal basis signals, is added to the host signal. Let x be the
host multimedia signal, fui j 1  i  ng be an orthonormal basis of noise-like sig-
nals, and fwj = (wj(1);wj(2); : : : ;wj(n)) =
Pn
i=1 bijui j 1  j Mg, bij 2 f0; 1g,
be a family of scaled watermarks to achieve the imperceptibility as well as to control
the energy of the embedded watermark. Each authorized user Uj , 1  j M , who
has purchased the rights to access x, is then assigned with a watermarked version
of the content
yj = x+wj : (1.1)
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The ngerprint wj assigned to Uj can be represented uniquely by a vector (called
codeword) bj = (b1j ; b2j ; : : : ; bnj)
T 2 f0; 1gn because of the linear independence of
the basis fui j 1  i  ng.
Collusion attacks can be broadly classied into linear and nonlinear attacks un-
derlying spread-spectrum embedding. These two types of collusion attacks were
investigated in [26, 35, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 57]. A set of typical nonlinear collision
attacks, such as minimum/maximum/median attack, minmax attack, modied neg-
ative attack, randomized negative attack, were considered in [57]. For the detailed
information, the interested reader is referred to [57]. Furthermore, Wang et al. [54]
showed that all manipulations of nonlinear collusion attacks can be explained by
linear collusion attacks with noise.
Now let us consider linear attacks which is one of the most feasible way to perform
a collusion attack. When t authorized users, say Uj1 ; Uj2 ; : : : ; Ujt , who have the same
host content but distinct ngerprints come together, we assume that they have no
way of manipulating the individual orthonormal signals, that is, the underlying
codeword needs to be taken and proceeded as a single entity, but they can carry on
a linear collusion attack to generate a pirate copy from their t ngerprinted contents,
so that the venture traced by the pirate copy can be attenuated. For ngerprinting
through additive embedding, this is done by linearly combining the t ngerprinted
contents
Pt
l=1 jlyjl , where the weights fjl 2 R+ j 1  l  tg satisfy the conditionPt
l=1 jl = 1 to maintain the average intensity of the original multimedia signal. In
such a collusion attack, the energy of each of the watermarks wjl is reduced by a
factor of 2jl , therefore, the trace of Ujl 's ngerprint becomes weaker and thus Ujl
is less likely to be caught by the detector. In fact, since normally no colluder is
willing to take more of a risk than any other colluder, the ngerprinted signals are
typically averaged with an equal weight for each user. Averaging attack choosing
jl = 1=t, 1  l  t, is the most fair choice for each colluder to avoid detection,
as claimed in [49, 52]. Furthermore, this attack also makes the pirate copy have
better perceptional quality that it can be more similar to the host signal than the
ngerprinted signals are.
Any circulated copy of the host multimedia content may experience an additional
distortion z before it is tested for the existence of a ngerprint. This additional
noise z could be due to the eects of unintentional signal processing or from attacks
mounted by adversaries in an attempt to hinder the detection of the watermark.
Based on the averaging attack model, the observed content y after collusion is
y =
1
t
tX
l=1
yjl + z =
1
t
tX
l=1
wjl + x+ z =
tX
l=1
nX
i=1
bijl
t
ui + x+ z; (1.2)
where z is usually assumed to follow an i.i.d. Gaussian N (0; 2z). Then from
the detection theory [44], the optimum detector is the correlation vector T =
4
(T(1);T(2);    ;T(n)), where T(i) = 1z hy   x;uii, 1  i  n, and hy   x;uii
is the inner product of y   x and ui. It is straightforward to check that
T =
1
tz
BT +
1
z
(hz;u1i; : : : ; hz;uni); (1.3)
where B = (bij), 1  i  n, 1  j M , and the vector 2 f0; 1gM indicates collud-
ers via the location of the coordinates whose value is 1. The parameter z depends
on the embedded watermark-to-noise ratio (WNR), and is assumed known. Without
loss of generality, let z = 1, then (hz;u1i; : : : ; hz;uni)=z follows an N (0n;1n=t)
distribution.
Thus, the model (1.2) can be equivalently presented as a null hypothesis testing
H0 : f(T j  = 0) = N (0n;1n);
H1 : f(T j ) = N (1
t
BT ;1n);
(1.4)
where we refer the reader back to (1.2) and (1.3) to arrive at this result.
Our goal is to eciently estimate  for any given colluded vector T.
1.3 Outline of this thesis
This thesis focuses on the constructions of anti-collusion codes and the design of
tracing algorithms for multimedia contents under the averaging collusion attack.
The high-level idea of the structure in this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 consid-
ers the optimality of t-separable codes (t-SCs), which were introduced in [17] to
resist the averaging collusion attack; Chapters 3-5 introduce three types of codes
resistant to the averaging attack for dierent models, consider the colluder tracing
algorithms based on them, and investigate the optimality of these codes by com-
binatorial methods. Concatenation construction, as mentioned in [1], is a powerful
method to construct innite families of codes with a required property and long
length by combining a seed code with the property and short length, together
with an appropriate code with long length. This makes the study of seed codes
interesting. In fact, the constructions in this thesis are all for seed codes with
short length.
In Chapter 2, we investigate 2-SCs of length 2 from the standpoint of graph
theory, and derive an upper bound on the size of a 2-SC of length 2 by considering
the bounds of maximum size of bipartite graphs with girth 6. We then construct
several innite series of such codes by projective planes, some of which meet the
derived upper bounds. This means that we construct several innite series of optimal
2-SCs of length 2. These results improve the best bounds so far on 2-SCs of length
2 in [16]. We also consider 2-SCs of length 4 in this chapter. The combinatorial
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properties of 2-SCs of length 4 are investigated, and a construction of such codes is
presented by means of incomplete squares, in which some entries are missing.
In Chapter 3, we want to decrease the computational complexity of the tracing
algorithm based on t-SCs but keep catching all colluders. Rather than devising
better algorithms for t-SCs, we introduce a new notion of a strong separable code
(t-SSC). We show that any binary t-SSC can be used to identify, as a t-SC does, all
colluders when the number of colluders in the averaging attack is at most t. The
computational complexity of such algorithm is O(nM), which is obviously more
ecient than the computational complexity O(nM t) of the algorithm based on a t-
SC, where n is the length of the code andM is the number of authorized users. Then
we derive optimal 2-SSCs of length 2 by discussing the relationships between SSCs
and SCs. We also investigate 2-SSCs of length 3 from a combinatorial viewpoint,
and give a construction of such codes.
In the next chapter, Chapter 4, we concern with a new model guaranteeing
exact identication of at least one member of the pirate coalition of size at most
t, and introduce a new concept of a multimedia identiable parent property code
(t-MIPPC). Although t-MIPPCs can not be used to identify all the colluders when
the size of the coalition is at most t, nevertheless they can be used to identify at
least one colluder, thereby helping stop the proliferation of the fraudulent content
in digital marketplace. The advantage of a t-MIPPC is the maximum number of
the codewords, which corresponds to the number of authorized users. We show
that the maximum number of the codewords of a t-MIPPC is more than that of
a t-SC. By considering bipartite graphs with girth at least 8, we derive a tight
bound on the size of a 3-MIPPC of length 2. We also construct several series of
(asymptotically) optimal 3-MIPPCs of length 2 from a geometric structure called
generalized quadrangle.
In Chapter 5, in order to improve the computational complexity of the algorithm
for t-MIPPCs, we introduce a new notion of a strong multimedia identiable parent
property code (t-SMIPPC). Then we state that any binary t-SMIPPC can be used to
identify, as a t-MIPPC does, at least one colluder when the number of colluders in the
averaging attack is at most t with computational complexity O(nM), which is more
ecient than the computational complexity O(nM t) of the algorithm based on a t-
MIPPC. According to the relationships between SMIPPCs and other ngerprinting
codes, such as SCs and MIPPCs, we derive optimal q-ary t-SMIPPCs of length 2
with t = 2; 3. The highlight of this chapter is the constructions of optimal q-ary
2-SMIPPCs of length 3 with q  0; 1; 2; 5 (mod 6).
Finally, we give a brief summary of this thesis and some interesting open prob-
lems in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Separable Codes
Separable codes (t-SCs) were introduced in [17] to construct logical anti-collusion
codes (LACCs), which can be used to construct ngerprints resistant to the averag-
ing collusion attack on multimedia contents. In this chapter, we pay our attention to
the constructions of separable codes. We rst recall the known results on separable
codes in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we provide an improved upper bound on the size
of a 2-SC of length 2 by a graph theoretical approach, and a lower bound on the size
of such a code by deleting suitable points and lines from a projective plane, which
coincides with the improved upper bound in some places. These correspond to the
bounds of maximum size of bipartite graphs with girth 6 and a construction of such
maximal bipartite graphs. In Section 2.3, we show the forbidden congurations of
2-SCs of length 4, and then give a construction of 2-SCs of length 4.
2.1 Known results on separable codes
Let n;M and q be positive integers, and Q an alphabet with jQj = q. A set C =
fc1; c2; : : : ; cMg  Qn is called an (n;M; q) code and each c = (c(1); c(2); : : : ; c(n))T
in C is called a codeword. Without loss of generality, we may assume Q = f0; 1; : : : ;
q  1g. When Q = f0; 1g, we also use the word binary. Given an (n;M; q) code C,
the incidence matrix M(C) is the nM matrix on Q in which the columns are the
M codewords in C. Often, we make no dierence between an (n;M; q) code and its
incidence matrix unless otherwise stated.
For any code C  Qn, we dene the set of i-th coordinates of C as
C(i) = fc(i) 2 Q j c = (c(1); c(2); : : : ; c(n))T 2 Cg
for any 1  i  n. For any subset of codewords C0  C, we dene the descendant
code (or feasible set) of C0 as
desc(C0) = f(x(1);x(2); : : : ;x(n))T 2 Qn j x(i) 2 C0(i); 1  i  ng; (2.1)
that is,
desc(C0) = C0(1) C0(2)     C0(n):
The set desc(C0) consists of the n-tuples that could be produced by a coalition
holding the codewords in C0 .
Example 2.1.1 Consider the following (4; 3; 2) code C:
c1 c2 c3
C =
0BBB@
0 1 0
0 0 0
1 0 0
1 1 1
1CCCA
Obviously,
desc(fc1g) = f(0; 0; 1; 1)T g = fc1g;
desc(fc2g) = f(1; 0; 0; 1)T g = fc2g;
desc(fc3g) = f(0; 0; 0; 1)T g = fc3g:
Consider the descendant codes of 2-subsets.
fc1; c2g(1) = f0; 1g; fc1; c2g(2) = f0g;
fc1; c2g(3) = f0; 1g; fc1; c2g(4) = f1g:
Hence
desc(fc1; c2g) = fc1; c2g(1) fc1; c2g(2) fc1; c2g(3) fc1; c2g(4)
= f0; 1g  f0g  f0; 1g  f1g
= f(0; 0; 0; 1)T ; (0; 0; 1; 1)T ; (1; 0; 0; 1)T ; (1; 0; 1; 1)T g:
Similarly,
desc(fc1; c3g) = f(0; 0; 0; 1)T ; (0; 0; 1; 1)T g;
desc(fc2; c3g) = f(0; 0; 0; 1)T ; (1; 0; 0; 1)T g:
Denition 2.1.2 Let C be an (n;M; 2) code with Q = f0; 1g and t  2 be an
integer.
(1) C is a t-resilient AND anti-collusion code, or t-AND-ACC(n;M; 2), if for any
two distinct C1; C2  C with 1  jC1j  t and 1  jC2j  t, we have the
following inequality: ^
c2C1
c 6=
^
c2C2
c;
where
V
is the bitwise logical operator AND.
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(2) C is a t-resilient logical anti-collusion code, or t-LACC(n;M; 2), if for any two
distinct C1; C2  C with 1  jC1j  t and 1  jC2j  t, we have at least one of
the following inequalities:_
c2C1
c 6=
_
c2C2
c;
^
c2C1
c 6=
^
c2C2
c;
where
W
is the bitwise logical operator OR.
Example 2.1.3 Consider the following (3; 4; 2) code C:
c1 c2 c3 c4
C =
0B@ 1 1 0 01 0 1 0
0 1 1 0
1CA
Then
c1
W
c2 = (1; 1; 1)
T ; c1
W
c3 = (1; 1; 1)
T ; c1
W
c4 = (1; 1; 0)
T ;
c2
W
c3 = (1; 1; 1)
T ; c2
W
c4 = (1; 0; 1)
T ; c3
W
c4 = (0; 1; 1)
T :
However,
c1
V
c2 = (1; 0; 0)
T ; c1
V
c3 = (0; 1; 0)
T ; c2
V
c3 = (0; 0; 1)
T ;
c1
V
c4 = (0; 0; 0)
T ; c2
V
c4 = (0; 0; 0)
T ; c3
V
c4 = (0; 0; 0)
T :
Therefore, by performing these twelve logical operations, we can know that C is a
2-LACC(3; 4; 2), although is not a 2-AND-ACC(3; 4; 2).
The notions of AND-ACCs and LACCs were introduced in [52] and [17], respec-
tively, for protecting multimedia contents, which, with code modulation, can be used
to construct families of ngerprints with the ability to survive collusion and trace
colluders. From these denitions, we immediately know that a t-AND-ACC(n;M; 2)
is also a t-LACC(n;M; 2), and a t-LACC of length n surpasses a t-AND-ACC of
the same length in the number of codewords assigned to distinct authorized users
of the multimedia content. The authors [17] also showed that any t-LACC(n;M; 2)
can be used to identify all colluders when the number of colluders in the averaging
attack is at most t.
We now pay our attention to the colluder tracing algorithm based on a t-LACC.
In the multimedia scenario, for any set of colluders holding codewords C0  C and
for any index 1  i  n, their detection statistics T(i) mentioned in Section 1.2
possesses the whole information on C0(i); namely, we have T(i) = 1 if and only
if C0(i) = f1g, T(i) = 0 if and only if C0(i) = f0g, and 0 < T(i) < 1 if and
only if C0(i) = f0; 1g. Therefore, we can capture a set R = C0(1)      C0(n) 
C(1)     C(n) in the multimedia scenario from the detection statistics T.
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Theorem 2.1.4 ([17]) Under the assumption that the number of colluders in the
averaging attack is at most t, any t-LACC(n;M; 2) can be used to identify all the
colluders with computational complexity O(nM t).
Algorithm 2.1: LACCTraceAlg(R)
Given R;
Find C0  C satisfying jC0j  t and R = desc(C0);
output C0 as the set of colluders.
In order to construct LACCs, they introduced the notion of a separable code
dened as follows.
Denition 2.1.5 ([17]) Let C be an (n;M; q) code and t  2 be an integer. C is
a t-separable code, or t-SC(n;M; q), if for any C1; C2  C such that 1  jC1j  t,
1  jC2j  t and C1 6= C2, we have desc(C1) 6= desc(C2), that is, there is at least one
coordinate i, 1  i  n, such that C1(i) 6= C2(i).
Example 2.1.6 Consider the following (3; 3; 2) code C:
c1 c2 c3
C =
0B@ 0 1 00 0 1
0 0 0
1CA
We can directly obtain that
desc(fc1g) = f0g  f0g  f0g;
desc(fc2g) = f1g  f0g  f0g;
desc(fc3g) = f0g  f1g  f0g;
desc(fc1; c2g) = f0; 1g  f0g  f0g;
desc(fc1; c3g) = f0g  f0; 1g  f0g;
desc(fc2; c3g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0g:
Obviously, desc(fc1g), desc(fc2g), desc(fc3g), desc(fc1; c2g), desc(fc1; c3g) and
desc(fc2; c3g) are all distinct. This is sucient to show that C is a 2-SC(3; 3; 2).
In fact, a t-SC(n;M; 2) and a t-LACC(n;M; 2) are equivalent.
Theorem 2.1.7 ([17]) Let C be an (n;M; 2) code. Then C is a t-LACC if and only
if it is a t-SC(n;M; 2).
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In other words, any binary t-SC can be used to identify all colluders when the
number of colluders in the averaging attack is at most t from Theorems 2.1.4 and
2.1.7.
Let MSC(t; n; q) = maxfM j there exists a t-SC(n;M; q)g. A t-SC(n;M; q) is
said to be optimal ifM = MSC(t; n; q), and asymptotically optimal if lim
q!1
M
MSC(t;n;q)
= 1. Cheng et al. [16] derived the following upper bound.
Theorem 2.1.8 ([16]) MSC(t; n; q)  qn 1 + q(q 1)2 holds for any t  2.
The following concatenation construction can be used to derive SCs with long
length from SCs with short length, and makes the study of SCs with short length
interesting.
Lemma 2.1.9 ([17]) If there exist both a t-SC(n1;M; q) and a t-SC(n2; q; 2), then
there also exists a t-SC(n1n2;M; 2).
Several constructions on separable codes can be found in [16], and we only list
the main results here.
Theorem 2.1.10 ([17]) For any positive integer q, MSC(2; 2; q)  qk + h, where
k = b1+
p
4q 3
2 c, and
h =
(
b q(q 1 k2+k)2k c; if k2   k + 1  q  k2;
b qk
(k+1)2 q c; if k2 + 1  q  k2 + k:
Furthermore, MSC(2; 2; q) = qk+h if q = k
2  k+1 for any prime power k  1  2
and q = k2 + k for any prime power k  2.
Theorem 2.1.11 ([17]) There exists an optimal 2-SC(3; q2 + q(q 1)2 ; q) for any in-
teger q.
2.2 2-SCs of length 2
In this section, we improve the results in Theorem 2.1.10. In fact, we obtain a tighter
upper bound on MSC(2; 2; q) via graph theoretical approach. By using projective
geometrical terminologies, we also obtain a lower bound on MSC(2; 2; q), parts of
which agree with the new derived upper bound. In other words, we construct several
innite series of optimal 2-SC(2;M; q)s.
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2.2.1 Related combinatorial objects
In this subsection, we recall several combinatorial structures related to 2-SCs of
length 2.
For any (n;M; q) code C on Q = f0; 1; : : : ; q  1g, we dene the following short-
ened code Aji for i 2 Q and 1  j  n:
Aji = f(c(1); : : : ; c(j   1); c(j + 1); : : : ; c(n))T j (c(1); : : : ; c(n))T 2 C; c(j) = ig:
Obviously, for any (2;M; q) code, A1i  Q holds for any i 2 Q, and jA10j + jA11j +
  + jA1q 1j = M .
Denition 2.2.1 Let K be a subset of non-negative integers, and v; b be two positive
integers. A generalized (v; b;K; 1) packing is a pair (X;B) where X is a set of v
elements and B is a set of b subsets of X called blocks that satisfy
(1) jBj 2 K for any B 2 B;
(2) every pair of distinct elements of X occurs in at most one block of B.
Example 2.2.2 Let X = f0; 1; 2; 3; 4g be the element set. Then (X;B) forms a
generalized (5; 5; f2; 3g; 1) packing, where
B = ff0; 4g; f1; 3g; f3; 4g; f0; 2; 3g; f1; 2; 4gg:
Cheng et al. [16] showed a relationship between separable codes and generalized
packings.
Lemma 2.2.3 ([16]) There exists a 2-SC(2;M; q) dened on Q = f0; 1; : : : ; q   1g
if and only if there exists a generalized (q; q;K; 1) packing (Q; fA10;A11; : : : ;A1q 1g),
with K = fjA10j; jA11j; : : : ; jA1q 1jg, and M = jA10j+ jA11j+   + jA1q 1j.
Example 2.2.4 Construct a 2-SC(2; 13; 5) from the generalized (5; 5; f2; 3g; 1) pack-
ing mentioned in Example 2.2.2. Let
B0 = f0; 4g; B1 = f1; 3g; B2 = f3; 4g; B3 = f0; 2; 3g; B4 = f1; 2; 4g:
For any i 2 X = f0; 1; 2; 3; 4g and any element x 2 Bi, we construct a codeword
(i; x)T . Then we can obtain a code
C =
 
0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4
0 4 1 3 3 4 0 2 3 1 2 4
!
:
We can directly check that C is a 2-SC(2; 13; 5).
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Note that balanced incomplete block designs [52] and packing designs [38] which
were used to construct AND-ACC are special classes of generalized packings, so they
can only be used to construct some special classes of 2-SCs of length 2.
A generalized (q; q; fkg; 1) packing can be constructed by developing a near dif-
ference set. A (q; k; 1) near dierence set dened on an additively written group G of
order jGj = q is a k-subset F of G such that the dierences fx  y j x; y 2 F; x 6= yg
contains k(k   1) distinct elements of G.
Example 2.2.5 Let F = f0; 1; 3g be a subset of Z7. Then the dierences fx  
y j x; y 2 F; x 6= yg = f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6g. This implies that F is a (7; 3; 1) near
dierence set dened on Z7.
Lemma 2.2.6 For any integer k  2, let q  k2   k + 1. If there exists a (q; k; 1)
near dierence set, then there exists a generalized (q; q; fkg; 1) packing.
Proof: Let F be a (q; k; 1) near dierence set dened on an additively written group
G. For any g 2 G, dene F + g = fx+ g j x 2 Fg and B = fF + g j g 2 Gg. Then
(G;B) is the desired generalized (q; q; fkg; 1) packing. 
Near dierence sets are not easy to construct. However, a (k2 + k+1; k; 1) near
dierence set always exists [45] for any prime power k. This Singer dierence set
generates a generalized (k2 + k + 1; k2 + k + 1; fkg; 1) packing, which corresponds
to an optimal 2-SC(2; (k + 1)(k2 + k + 1); k2 + k + 1) described in Theorem 2.1.10.
2.2.2 Basic concepts in Graph Theory
In order to investigate 2-SCs of length 2, we need some basic concepts in Graph
Theory.
Let V be a nite set, and E(V ) = ffu; vg j u; v 2 V; u 6= vg.
Denition 2.2.7 A pair G = (V;E) with E  E(V ) is called a (simple) graph (on
V ). The elements of V are the vertices of G and those of E the edges of G. Given
a graph G, the vertex set of G is denoted by V (G) and its edge set by E(G). The
number jV (G)j is called the order of G, and jE(G)j is the size of G.
A graph H is a subgraph of a graph G, if V (H)  V (G) and E(H)  E(G).
Example 2.2.8 Consider the following graphs:
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Figure 2.1: Graphs
Then V (G) = fv1; v2; v3; v4g and E(G) = ffv1; v2g; fv1; v3g; fv2; v3g; fv2; v4gg.
The order and the size of G are jV (G)j = 4 and jE(G)j = 4, respectively. H1 and
H2 are subgraphs of G.
Denition 2.2.9 For a graph G = (V;E), vertices u and v are adjacent if fu; vg 2
E. The neighbourhood of a vertex v 2 V is the set
NG(v) = fu 2 G j fu; vg 2 Eg:
The degree of v, denoted by degG(v), is the number of its neighbours, that is,
degG(v) = jNG(v)j.
From the above denition and Example 2.2.8, it is easy to see that degG(v1) =
degG(v3) = 2, degG(v2) = 3 and degG(v4) = 1.
Denition 2.2.10 Given a graph G, we call (v1; v2; : : : ; vh) a cycle of length h  3,
denoted by Ch, if fvi; vi+1g 2 E(G) for all 1  i  h   1, fv1; vhg 2 E(G), and
vj 6= vk for 1  j < k  h.
Figure 2.2: Cycles
Denition 2.2.11 Two graphs G and H are isomorphic if there exists a bijection
Let f : V (G)! V (H) such that
fu; vg 2 E(G), ff(u); f(v)g 2 E(H)
for all u; v 2 V (G).
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In fact, two isomorphic graphs enjoy the same graph theoretical properties.
Example 2.2.12 The following graphs are isomorphic.
Figure 2.3: Isomorphic graphs
Indeed, the required isomorphism is given by v1 ! u1, v2 ! u3, v3 ! u4,
v4 ! u2, v5 ! u5.
The graph G is the complete graph, if every two vertices are adjacent. All
complete graphs of order n are isomorphic with each other, and they will be denoted
by Kn. A clique in a graph G is a subgraph of G such that every two vertices are
adjacent, that is, a complete subgraph of G.
Figure 2.4: Complete graphs
Denition 2.2.13 A graph G is called bipartite, denoted by GX;Y , if V (G) has a
partition to two subsets X and Y such that each edge in E(G) connects a vertex of
X and a vertex of Y .
A bipartite graph G is a complete (m; k)-bipartite graph, if jXj = m, jY j = k,
and fu; vg 2 E(G) for all u 2 X and v 2 Y . All complete (m; k)-bipartite graphs
are isomorphic. Let Km;k denote such a graph.
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Figure 2.5: Complete bipartite graphs
Given a generalized (v; b;K; 1) packing (Q;B), we can dene its associated
element-block graph as the bipartite graph GQ;B with vertex partition Q and B
such that x 2 Q is adjacent to B 2 B if and only if x 2 B. It is clear that the
corresponding element-block graph of a generalized (v; b;K; 1) packing (Q;B) is a
C4-free subgraph (that is, a subgraph containing no C4) of the complete bipartite
graph Kv;b, because any pair of distinct elements of Q can occur in at most one
block of B. In other words, the girth of this bipartite graph is at least 6, where the
girth of a graph is the length of a shortest cycle contained in the graph.
Example 2.2.14 Consider the generalized (5; 5; f2; 3g; 1) packing mentioned in Ex-
ample 2.2.2. Let
B0 = f0; 4g; B1 = f1; 3g; B2 = f3; 4g; B3 = f0; 2; 3g; B4 = f1; 2; 4g:
Then its associated element-block graph is as follows.
Figure 2.6: GX;B
Zarankiewicz numbers [56] involve bounds on the maximum number of edges in
a bipartite graph without a particular subgraph. We denote by z(m;n; s; t), m  n
and s  t, the maximum number of edges in a subgraph of Km;n that does not
contain a subgraph isomorphic to Ks;t. In particular, when m = n and s = t,
simply put z(n; t) = z(n; n; t; t). It is clear that z(q; 2), which is the maximum size
of a C4-free bipartite subgraph of Kq;q, is equal to MSC(2; 2; q) by Lemma 2.2.3.
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Meanwhile, García-Vázquez et al. [28] stated that any C4-free bipartite subgraph
of Kq;q with size z(q; 2) must have girth 6. Therefore, our problem is equivalent to
nding the maximum size of bipartite graphs with girth 6, and constructing such
maximal bipartite graphs.
We can see our problem in one more way. Given a generalized (q; q;K; 1) packing
(Q;B), if we dene two elements of Q are adjacent in B 2 B if they occur in the
same block B, then each block can be seen as a clique of order jBj belonging to K.
Since each pair of distinct elements of Q occurs in a block of B at most once, this
generalized (q; q;K; 1) packing can be viewed as a packing of the complete graph
Kq by q cliques of orders belonging to K, where a packing of a graph G is a set of
subgraphs of G such that their edge sets are pairwise disjoint. Therefore, in order
to evaluate z(q; 2) = MSC(2; 2; q), it is sucient to pack Kq by q cliques so that the
sum of order of the q cliques is maximum.
It is well known [11] that z(q; 2)  q+q
p
4q 3
2 and the equality holds when q =
k2 + k + 1 for any prime power k. Goddard et al. [29] found the exact values of
z(q; 2) for q  10. Theorem 2.1.10 is an improvement of the results made by Cheng
et al. [16]. It is also known [11] that if q is suciently large then
q3=2   q4=3 < z(q; 2)  q + q
p
4q   3
2
;
In particular, lim
q!1
z(q;2)
q3=2
= 1.
2.2.3 Upper bound
Bipartite graphs with high girth and their related graphs have been extensively
investigated, see, e.g., [7, 14, 25, 28, 30, 33, 37, 36, 41, 42, 55]. We start this section
with the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2.15 ([13]) Suppose (X;B) is a generalized (v; b; fk; k + 1g; 1) packing,
for some k, with B = fB1; B2; : : : ; Bbg. If
 
v
2
  Pbi=1  jBij2  < k, then GX;B, the
element-block graph of (X;B), is a C4-free subgraph of Kv;b with maximum size.
If Kq can be packed by q cliques Kx1 ;Kx2 ; : : : ;Kxq with leave L (a set of the
edges which are not covered by the q cliques), where xi  xj for 1  i < j  q, then
we say Kq admits a feasible (x1; x2; : : : ; xq) packing with leave L. For convenience,
we replace (x1; x2; : : : ; xq) packing by (k
q h; (k + 1)h) packing when
k = x1 =    = xq h and xq h+1 =    = xq = k + 1
for some k 2 N and 1  h  q. For any (kq h; (k + 1)h) packing P of Kq, we have
q

k
2

 (q   h)

k
2

+ h

k + 1
2



q
2

;
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which implies k  1+
p
4q 3
2 . In order to maximize
Pq
i=1 xi which subjects to an
(x1; x2; : : : ; xq) packing, Lemma 2.2.15 promises to consider a feasible (k
q h; (k+1)h)
packing with k = b1+
p
4q 3
2 c and jLj < k. Therefore, our objective is to nd the
maximum index h. Note that k = b1+
p
4q 3
2 c implies k2   k + 1  q < k2 + k + 1.
In this subsection, we investigate z(q; 2) by xing the index k and then classifying
q, from k2   k + 1 to k2 + k, into several cases. The following Theorem 2.2.16 is
contained in Theorem 2.1.10.
Theorem 2.2.16 ([11, 16]) For any prime power k   1  2, z(k2   k + 1; 2) =
k3   k2 + k. For any prime power k  2, z(k2 + k; 2) = k3 + 2k2.
Theorem 2.2.17 For any k2 + 1  q  k2 + k   2 and k  2, we have
z(q; 2)  qk +

(k   1)q
(k + 1)2   (q + 1)

:
Proof: Let q = k2+k s, s = 2; 3; : : : ; k 1. Assume P is a (kq h; (k+1)h) packing
of Kq, where 0  h  q   1. We claim by contradiction that h  b (k 1)q(k+1)2 (q+1)c.
That is, suppose h > b (k 1)q
(k+1)2 (q+1)c.
For i  0, let ri be the number of vertices that is contained in exactly i cliques of
order k+1 in P. Since the degree of each vertex is k2+k s 1, trivially ri = 0 for all
i > k. We now claim rk = 0. Suppose not, that is, there exists a vertex v contained in
exactly k cliques of order k+1, say C(1); C(2); : : : ; C(k). Let A = fvg[Ski=1 V (C(i))
and B = V (Kq) nA. Since there is no other subgraph isomorphic to Kk+1 out of A
except C(1); C(2); : : : ; C(k), each of the remaining cliques of order k+1 must contain
at least one vertex in B. That is, each of such cliques needs at least k edges between
A and B. Therefore, we have at most k + b (k2+1)(k s 1)k c cliques of order k + 1.
Thus,
k(k   s)  k + b(k
2 + 1)(k   s  1)
k
c  h > b (k   1)q
(k + 1)2   (q + 1)c:
This implies ks2   ks   k + s < 0, so ks(s   1)  k   s < k, that is, s(s   1) < 1,
which contradicts 2  s  k   1. So rk = 0.
Consider the number of ordered pairs (v; C), where v is a vertex in the clique
C of order k + 1 in P. Under our assumption, there are exactly h cliques of order
k + 1, then
h(k + 1) = (k   1)rk 1 + (k   2)rk 2 +   + (k   s)rk s +   + r1: (2.2)
This implies that
h(k + 1)  (k   1)(rk 1 +   + rk s+1) + (k   s)(q   (rk 1 +   + rk s+1));
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so
h(k + 1)  q(k   s)
s  1  rk 1 +   + rk s+1: (2.3)
Now, we delete all the h cliques of order k + 1 from Kq. Denote by G the
remaining subgraph. We again consider the number of ordered pairs (v0; C 0), where
v0 is a vertex in the clique C 0 of order k in P. On one hand there are exactly q   h
cliques of order k, and on the other hand there are exactly ri vertices of degree
q   1   ki, for i = 0; 1; : : : ; k   1. Since the vertex of degree q   1   ki can be
contained in at most q 1 kik 1 cliques of order k, we have
(q  h)k  rk 1 +2rk 2 +   + (s  1)rk s+1 + (s+1)rk s+   + (k+1)r0: (2.4)
Combining (2.2) and (2.4) we have
h(k + 1) + (q   h)k  k(rk 1 +   + rk s+1) + (k + 1)(q   (rk 1 +   + rk s+1));
and thus
rk 1 +   + rk s+1  q   h: (2.5)
Finally, (2.3) and (2.5) imply that h  q(k 1)k+s = (k 1)q(k+1)2 (q+1) , a contradiction to
the hypothesis. Thus we complete the proof. 
Theorem 2.2.18 For any q = k2 with k  2, we have
z(q; 2)  qk + b(3k
2 + k   1) p5k4 + 6k3   k2   2k + 1
2
c:
Proof: Assume P is a (kq h; (k + 1)h) packing of Kq. For i  0, let ri be the
number of vertices that is contained in exactly i cliques of order k + 1 in P. Since
q = k2, we have ri = 0 for all i  k. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2.2.17, we rst
consider the number of ordered pairs (v; C), where v is a vertex in the clique C of
order k + 1 in P. Then after deleting those cliques of order k + 1, we consider the
number of ordered pairs (v0; C 0), where v0 is a vertex in the clique C 0 of order k in
P. Note that in the remaining graph after deleting h cliques of order k + 1, there
are exactly ri vertices of degree k
2   ik   1. Then we have(
h(k + 1) = (k   1)rk 1 +   + 2r2 + r1
(q   h)k  rk 1 +   + (k   2)r2 + (k   1)r1 + (k + 1)r0
which implies h  r0. This concludes that the h cliques of order k + 1 are out of at
most k2   h vertices somewhere in P. We immediately have
h

k + 1
2



k2   h
2

:
That is,
h2 + (1  k   3k2)h+ (k4   k2)  0:
Since h  k2, we have h  (3k2+k 1) 
p
5k4+6k3 k2 2k+1
2 . Hence we complete the
proof. 
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Theorem 2.2.19 For any k2 k+2  q  k2 1 and k  2, we have z(q; 2)  qk.
Proof: Let q = k2   s, where s = 1; 2; : : : ; k   2. Assume P is a (kq h; (k + 1)h)
packing of Kq. Suppose h  1. Dene G to be the graph by deleting one of the
cliques of order k + 1, say bK, from Kq. Let A  V (G) be the collection of vertices
whose degree is equal to q   1   k, and B = V (G) n A. Note that jAj = k + 1
and jBj = q   k   1. Now, consider the number of ordered pairs (v; C), where v
is a vertex in the clique C in P dierent from bK. Notice that for each v 2 A,
degG(v) = k
2   s  1  k = (k   1)2 + (k   s  2). Then v is contained in at most
k   1 cliques dierent from bK. Similarly, each vertex in B can be contained in at
most k cliques. By counting the number of pairs (v; C), we have
(h  1)(k + 1) + (q   h)k  (k + 1)(k   1) + (q   k   1)k:
This implies that h  0, a contradiction occurs. Thus the result follows. 
2.2.4 Lower bound
Now we derive a lower bound on z(q; 2) = MSC(2; 2; q) via projective planes. A
projective plane P consists of a set of lines, a set of points, and a relation between
points and lines called incidence, having the following properties:
(1) Given any two distinct points, there is exactly one line incident with both of
them.
(2) Given any two distinct lines, there is exactly one point incident with both of
them.
(3) There are four points such that no line is incident with more than two of them.
For a projective plane P , there is a positive integer k such that any line of P has
exactly k + 1 points. This number k is the order of P . Clearly, a projective plane
of order k is a generalized (k2 + k + 1; k2 + k + 1; fk + 1g; 1) packing (X;B) in
which every pair of distinct elements of X occurs in exactly one block of B. It is
well-known [31] that a projective plane of order k always exists for any prime power
k.
Theorem 2.2.20 For any prime power k  2, let k2   1  q  k2 + k   1. Then
there exists a generalized (q; q; fk; k + 1g; 1) packing, (X 0;B0), with jX 0j = jB0j = q
such that exactly k3   k2   k   qk + 2q + 1 blocks out of B0 are of size k. That is,
z(q; 2)  2qk   k3 + k2 + k   q   1:
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Proof: We start from a projective plane of order k, (X;B). Note that jXj = jBj =
k2 + k + 1, and for any B 2 B, jBj = k + 1. Pick an arbitrary point a 2 X and
an arbitrary line B = fx1; x2; : : : ; xk+1g 2 B which does not contain the point a.
For each i = 1; : : : ; k + 1, let Bi 2 B be the line containing the points a and xi.
Let 2  s  k + 2. Deleting s lines B; B1; : : : ; Bs 1 and s points a; x1; : : : ; xs 1
from (X;B), we obtain a generalized (q; q; fk; k + 1g; 1) packing, (X 0;B0), with q =
k2 + k + 1   s, X 0 = X n fa; x1; : : : ; xs 1g, B0 = B n fB; B1; : : : ; Bs 1g, having
 = (s  1)(k  1)+ (k+1  s+1) = k3  k2  k  qk+2q+1 blocks of size k and
k2 + k + 1   s blocks of size k + 1. Therefore, z(q; 2)  k+ (k + 1)(k2 + k +
1   s) = 2qk   k3 + k2 + k   q   1. 
Applying Theorems 2.1.10, 2.2.17 and 2.2.19, we immediately have the following
result.
Corollary 2.2.21 For any prime power k  2, z(k2   1; 2) = k3   k, z(k2 + k  
2; 2) = k3 + 2k2   4k + 1, z(k2 + k   1; 2) = k3 + 2k2   2k.
In Corollary 2.2.21, when q = k2 + k   2, k2 + k   1, the same results are also
obtained independently by G. Damaásdi et al. [22]. It is also easy to verify that
the corresponding 2-SC(2;M; q)s constructed in Theorem 2.2.20 are asymptotically
optimal for all k2   1  q  k2 + k   1 with prime power k. The lower bound
described in Theorem 2.2.20 is better than q3=2   q4=3 described in [11] for any
prime power k.
2.2.5 Summary
The main results in the previous subsections can be summarized in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.2.22 For any positive integer q, MSC(2; 2; q)  qk + h, where k =
b1+
p
4q 3
2 c, and
h =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if k2   k + 1  q  k2   1;
b (3k2+k 1) 
p
5k4+6k3 k2 2k+1
2 c if q = k2;
b (k 1)q
(k+1)2 (q+1)c if k2 + 1  q  k2 + k   2;
k2   k if q = k2 + k   1;
k2 if q = k2 + k:
Furthermore,MSC(2; 2; q) = qk+h if q 2 fk2 1; k2+k 2; k2+k 1; k2+k; k2+k+1g
for any prime power k  2.
This is in fact the main results of this section. The following Figures 2.7 and 2.8
illustrate our improvement on the upper bound of MSC(2; 2; q). Figure 2.7 depicts
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the known upper bound given in [16] and the new upper bound given in Theorem
2.2.22 when k = 12, while Figure 2.8 depicts those upper bounds when q = k2. It
can be seen that our new upper bound is much tighter than the known upper bound.
Figure 2.7: Bounds for k = 12
Figure 2.8: Bounds for q = k2
2.3 2-SCs of length 4
Theorem 2.1.11 shows that optimal 2-SCs of length 3 always exit, and thus we
investigate 2-SCs of length 4 in this section. We in fact derive the forbidden cong-
urations of 2-SCs of length 4, and construct an innite family of such codes, which
are asymptotically optimal.
For any (n;M; q) code C with n > 2 over Q = f0; 1; : : : ; q 1g, we dene another
shortened code Aj1;j2i;k for i; k 2 Q and 1  j1 < j2  n as follows:
Aj1;j2i;k = f(c(1); : : : ; c(j1 1); c(j1+1); : : : ; c(j2 1); c(j2+1); : : : ; c(n))T j
(c(1); : : : ; c(n))T 2 C; c(j1) = i; c(j2) = kg.
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Obviously, Aj1;j2i;k  Qn 2 and jAj1;j20;0 j + jAj1;j20;1 j + : : : + jAj1;j2q 1;q 1j = M always
hold for any integers j1; j2, where 1  j1 < j2  n.
Theorem 2.3.1 A (4;M; q) code C is a 2-SC(4;M; q) on Q if and only if the fol-
lowing two conditions hold.
(1) jAj1i1
TAj1i2 j  1 holds for any positive integers j1 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g and distinct
i1; i2 2 Q.
(2) jAj1;j2i1;k1
TAj1;j2i2;k2 j  1 holds for any vector (j1; j2) 2 f(1; 2); (1; 3); (1; 4)g and
i1; i2; k1; k2 2 Q, where i1 6= i2 and k1 6= k2.
Proof: First, let C be a 2-SC(4;M; q).
(I) Suppose that there exist j1 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g and distinct i1; i2 2 Q, such that
jAj1i1
TAj1i2 j  2. Without loss of generality, we may assume j1 = 1. Let aT1
and aT2 be two distinct elements of A1i1\A1i2 , then desc(f(i1;a1)T ; (i2;a2)T g) =
desc(f(i1;a2)T ; (i2;a1)T g), which is a contradiction to the denition of a t-SC
with t = 2.
(II) Suppose that there exist (j1; j2) 2 f(1; 2); (1; 3); (1; 4)g and i1; i2; k1; k2 2 Q,
where i1 6= i2 and k1 6= k2, such that jAj1;j2i1;k1
TAj1;j2i2;k2 j  2. Without loss of
generality, we may assume (j1; j2) = (1; 2). Let fbT1 ;bT2 g  A1;2i1;k1\A
1;2
i2;k2
, then
desc(f(i1; k1;b1)T ; (i2; k2;b2)T g) = desc(f(i1; k1;b2)T ; (i2; k2;b1)T g), which
is a contradiction to the denition of a t-SC with t = 2.
Conversely, suppose that conditions (1) and (2) always hold. We want to show that
C is a 2-SC(4;M; q). Assume that C is not a 2-SC(4;M; q). Then at least one of the
following cases should occur. However, we can prove none of them is possible.
(I) There exist two distinct codewords of C, say a = (a1; a2; a3; a4)T and b =
(b1; b2; b3; b4)
T , such that desc(fag) = desc(fbg). Then a1 = b1, a2 = b2,
a3 = b3 and a4 = b4, which implies that a = b, a contradiction. So this case
is impossible.
(II) There exist two distinct codewords of C, say a = (a1; a2; a3; a4)T and b =
(b1; b2; b3; b4)
T , such that desc(fa;bg) = desc(fag). Then fa1; b1g = fa1g,
fa2; b2g = fa2g, fa3; b3g = fa3g and fa4; b4g = fa4g, that is, a1 = b1, a2 = b2,
a3 = b3 and a4 = b4, which implies that a = b, a contradiction. So this case
is also impossible.
(III) There exist three distinct codewords of C, say a = (a1; a2; a3; a4)T , b =
(b1; b2; b3; b4)
T and c = (c1; c2; c3; c4)
T , such that desc(fa;bg) = desc(fcg).
Then fa1; b1g = fc1g, fa2; b2g = fc2g, fa3; b3g = fc3g and fa4; b4g = fc4g,
that is, a1 = b1 = c1, a2 = b2 = c2, a3 = b3 = c3 and a4 = b4 = c4, which
implies that a = b = c, a contradiction. So this case is also impossible.
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(IV) There exist three distinct codewords of C, say a = (a1; a2; a3; a4)T , b =
(b1; b2; b3; b4)
T and c = (c1; c2; c3; c4)
T , such that desc(fa;bg) = desc(fb; cg).
Then fa1; b1g = fb1; c1g, fa2; b2g = fb2; c2g, fa3; b3g = fb3; c3g and fa4; b4g =
fb4; c4g, that is, a1 = c1, a2 = c2, a3 = c3 and a4 = c4, which implies that
a = c, a contradiction. This case is again impossible.
(V) There exist four distinct codewords of C, say a = (a1; a2; a3; a4)T , b = (b1; b2;
b3; b4)
T , c = (c1; c2; c3; c4)
T and d = (d1; d2; d3; d4)
T , such that desc(fa;bg) =
desc(fc;dg). Then fa1; b1g = fc1; d1g, fa2; b2g = fc2; d2g, fa3; b3g = fc3; d3g
and fa4; b4g = fc4; d4g. This can be divided into the following subcases:
(1) fa1; b1g = fc1; d1g:
(11) a1 = b1 = c1 = d1; (12) a1 6= b1; a1 = c1; b1 = d1;
(13) a1 6= b1; a1 = d1; b1 = c1.
(2) fa2; b2g = fc2; d2g:
(21) a2 = b2 = c2 = d2; (22) a2 6= b2; a2 = c2; b2 = d2;
(23) a2 6= b2; a2 = d2; b2 = c2.
(3) fa3; b3g = fc3; d3g:
(31) a3 = b3 = c3 = d3; (32) a3 6= b3; a3 = c3; b3 = d3;
(33) a3 6= b3; a3 = d3; b3 = c3.
(4) fa4; b4g = fc4; d4g:
(41) a4 = b4 = c4 = d4; (42) a4 6= b4; a4 = c4; b4 = d4;
(43) a4 6= b4; a4 = d4; b4 = c4.
So at least one of 81 subcases f(1i1); (2i2); (3i3); (4i4)g, i1; i2; i3; i4 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g,
should occur for a, b, c and d. It is readily checked that none of these 81
subcases is possible. For example, consider the subcase f(11); (21); (32); (43)g,
that is,
(11) a1 = b1 = c1 = d1; (21) a2 = b2 = c2 = d2;
(32) a3 6= b3; a3 = c3; b3 = d3; (43) a4 6= b4; a4 = d4; c4 = b4:
Then f(a1; a2; a3)T ; (a1; a2; b3)T g  A4a4 \A4b4 , a contradiction to the assump-
tion that jA4a4 \ A4b4 j  1, which means that this subcase is impossible. For
another example, consider the subcase f(12); (22); (33); (43)g, that is,
(12) a1 6= b1; a1 = c1; b1 = d1; (22) a2 6= b2; a2 = c2; b2 = d2;
(33) a3 6= b3; a3 = d3; c3 = b3; (43) a4 6= b4; a4 = d4; c4 = b4:
Then f(a3; a4)T ; (b3; b4)T g  A1;2a1;a2\A1;2b1;b2 , a contradiction to the assumption
that jA1;2a1;a2 \ A1;2b1;b2 j  1, which means that this subcase is impossible.
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Therefore, C is a 2-SC(4;M; q). 
Next, we are going to construct 2-SC(4;M; q)s by means of incomplete squares,
in which some entries are missing. Let s  q, and Bij = (a(ij)kx ), 1  j  s, be
incomplete squares, where ij ; k; x; a
(ij)
kx 2 Q. For each entry a
(ij)
kx 2 Q of the s
incomplete squares, we construct a codeword c = (ij ; k; x; a
(ij)
kx )
T 2 C, then we can
derive a (4;M; q) code C, where M is the number of nonempty entries of the s
incomplete squares.
Lemma 2.3.2 If there exist s incomplete squares satisfying the following conditions
(a)   (g), then there exists a 2-SC(4;M; q), where M is the number of nonempty
entries of the s incomplete squares.
(a) There exists at most one element in each position of each incomplete square.
(b) For any i; k; x1 6= x2 2 Q, a(i)kx1 6= a
(i)
kx2
.
(c) For any i; k1 6= k2; x 2 Q, a(i)k1x 6= a
(i)
k2x
.
(d) For any i1 6= i2; k; x 2 Q, a(i1)kx 6= a(i2)kx .
(e) For any i1 6= i2; k1 6= k2 2 Q, there exists at most one x 2 Q such that
a
(i1)
k1x
= a
(i2)
k2x
.
(f) For any i1 6= i2; x1 6= x2 2 Q, there exists at most one k 2 Q such that
a
(i1)
kx1
= a
(i2)
kx2
.
(g) For any i1 6= i2 2 Q and any (k1; x1) 6= (k2; x2) 2 Q2, (a(i1)k1x1 ; a
(i2)
k1x1
) 6=
(a
(i1)
k2x2
; a
(i2)
k2x2
).
Proof: We construct a (4;M; q) code as described above and show it is a 2-
SC(4;M; q) by Theorem 2.3.1.
(1) Suppose there exist distinct i1; i2 2 Q, such that jA1i1
TA1i2 j  2. Let
(k; x; y)T 2 A1i1
TA1i2 . Then (i1; k; x; y)T ; (i2; k; x; y)T 2 C, so a(i1)kx = a(i2)kx =
y. This is a contradiction to condition (d).
(2) Suppose there exist distinct k1; k2 2 Q, such that jA2k1
TA2k2 j  2. Let
(i; x; y)T 2 A2k1
TA2k2 . Then (i; k1; x; y)T ; (i; k2; x; y)T 2 C, so a(i)k1x = a(i)k2x =
y. This is a contradiction to condition (c).
(3) Suppose there exist distinct x1; x2 2 Q, such that jA3x1
TA3x2 j  2. Let
(i; k; y)T 2 A3x1
TA3x2 . Then (i; k; x1; y)T ; (i; k; x2; y)T 2 C, so a(i)kx1 = a(i)kx2 =
y. This is a contradiction to condition (b).
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(4) Suppose there exist distinct y1; y2 2 Q, such that jA4y1
TA4y2 j  2. Let
(i; k; x)T 2 A4y1
TA4y2 . Then (i; k; x; y1)T ; (i; k; x; y2)T 2 C. So there exist
two elements y1 and y2 in the k-th row and the x-th column of Bi, a contra-
diction to condition (a).
(5) Suppose there exist i1 6= i2; k1 6= k2 2 Q, such that jA1;2i1;k1
TA1;2i2;k2 j  2. Let
(x1; y1)
T 6= (x2; y2)T 2 A1;2i1;k1
TA1;2i2;k2 . Then (i1; k1; x1; y1)T ; (i1; k1; x2; y2)T ;
(i2; k2; x1; y1)
T ; (i2; k2; x2; y2)
T 2 C, so a(i1)k1x1 = a
(i2)
k2x1
= y1, a
(i1)
k1x2
= a
(i2)
k2x2
= y2.
1) If x1 = x2, according to a
(i1)
k1x1
= y1 and a
(i1)
k1x2
= y2, we can derive
y1 = y2, which implies (x1; y1)
T = (x2; y2)
T , a contradiction.
2) If x1 6= x2, then a(i1)k1x1 = a
(i2)
k2x1
= y1 and a
(i1)
k1x2
= a
(i2)
k2x2
= y2, a contra-
diction to condition (e)
(6) Suppose there exist i1 6= i2; x1 6= x2 2 Q, such that jA1;3i1;x1
TA1;3i2;x2 j  2. Let
(k1; y1)
T 6= (k2; y2)T 2 A1;3i1;x1
TA1;3i2;x2 . Then (i1; k1; x1; y1)T ; (i1; k2; x1; y2)T ;
(i2; k1; x2; y1)
T ; (i2; k2; x2; y2)
T 2 C, so a(i1)k1x1 = a
(i2)
k1x2
= y1, a
(i1)
k2x1
= a
(i2)
k2x2
= y2.
1) If k1 = k2, according to a
(i1)
k1x1
= y1, a
(i1)
k2x1
= y2, we can derive y1 = y2,
which implies (k1; y1)
T = (k2; y2)
T , a contradiction.
2) If k1 6= k2, then a(i1)k1x1 = a
(i2)
k1x2
= y1, a
(i1)
k2x1
= a
(i2)
k2x2
= y2, a contradiction
to condition (f).
(7) Suppose there exist i1 6= i2; y1 6= y2 2 Q, such that jA1;4i1;y1
TA1;4i2;y2 j  2. Let
(k1; x1)
T 6= (k2; x2)T 2 A1;4i1;y1
TA1;4i2;y2 . Then (i1; k1; x1; y1)T ; (i1; k2; x2; y1)T ;
(i2; k1; x1; y2)
T ; (i2; k2; x2; y2)
T 2 C, so (a(i1)k1x1 ; a
(i2)
k1x1
) = (a
(i1)
k2x2
; a
(i2)
k2x2
) = (y1; y2),
a contradiction to condition (g)
According to Theorem 2.3.1, C is a 2-SC(4;M; q). This completes the proof. 
Lemma 2.3.3 There exist q   2 incomplete squares satisfying conditions (a)  (g)
in Lemma 2.3.2 for any prime power q > 2 and M = (q   2)(q2   q).
Proof: Let Q = GF(q). We do the construction as follows. Let
Bi = (a
(i)
kx), where a
(i)
kx = (x  k)i+ k, x 6= k 2 GF(q), i 2 GF(q) n f0; 1g.
Then we check conditions (a)  (g) in Lemma 2.3.2.
(a) Obviously, condition (a) is satised.
(b) Suppose there exist i 2 GF(q) n f0; 1g, k; x1 6= x2 2 GF(q), such that k 6=
x1; k 6= x2, and a(i)kx1 = a
(i)
kx2
. Then (x1 k)i+k = (x2 k)i+k. So (x1 x2)i =
0. Since x1 6= x2; i 6= 0, then (x1   x2)i 6= 0. This is a contradiction.
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(c) Suppose there exist i 2 GF(q) n f0; 1g, k1 6= k2; x 2 GF(q), such that k1 6=
x; k2 6= x, and a(i)k1x = a
(i)
k2x
. Then (x   k1)i + k1 = (x   k2)i + k2. So
(k1   k2)(i  1) = 0. Since k1 6= k2; i 6= 1, then (k1   k2)(i  1) 6= 0. This is a
contradiction.
(d) Suppose there exist i1 6= i2 2 GF(q) n f0; 1g, k; x 2 GF(q), such that k 6= x
and a
(i1)
kx = a
(i2)
kx . Then (x k)i1+k = (x k)i2+k, that is (x k)(i1 i2) = 0.
Since x 6= k; i1 6= i2, then (x  k)(i1   i2) 6= 0. This is a contradiction.
(e) Suppose there exist i1 6= i2 2 GF(q)nf0; 1g, k1 6= k2 2 GF(q), such that there
exist x1 6= x2 2 GF(q) satisfying kh 6= xl; 1  h; l  2 , a(i1)k1x1 = a
(i2)
k2x1
and
a
(i1)
k1x2
= a
(i2)
k2x2
. Then (x1  k1)i1+ k1 = (x1  k2)i2+ k2 and (x2  k1)i1+ k1 =
(x2   k2)i2 + k2, which imply (x1   x2)(i1   i2) = 0. Since x1 6= x2; i1 6= i2,
then (x1   x2)(i1   i2) 6= 0. This is a contradiction.
(f) Suppose there exist i1 6= i2 2 GF(q) n f0; 1g, x1 6= x2 2 GF(q), such that
there exist k1 6= k2 2 GF(q) satisfying kh 6= xl; 1  h; l  2, a(i1)k1x1 = a
(i2)
k1x2
and
a
(i1)
k2x1
= a
(i2)
k2x2
. Then (x1  k1)i1+ k1 = (x2  k1)i2+ k1 and (x1  k2)i1+ k2 =
(x2   k2)i2 + k2, which imply (k1   k2)(i1   i2) = 0. Since k1 6= k2; i1 6= i2,
then (k1   k2)(i1   i2) 6= 0. This is a contradiction.
(g) Suppose there exist i1 6= i2 2 GF(q) n f0; 1g, (k1; x1) 6= (k2; x2) 2 GF(q) 
GF(q), such that kh 6= xl; 1  h; l  2, and (a(i1)k1x1 ; a
(i2)
k1x1
) = (a
(i1)
k2x2
; a
(i2)
k2x2
).
Then a
(i1)
k1x1
= a
(i1)
k2x2
and a
(i2)
k1x1
= a
(i2)
k2x2
. Then (x1 k1)i1+k1 = (x2 k2)i1+k2
and (x1   k1)i2 + k1 = (x2   k2)i2 + k2, that is, ((x1   x2) + (k2   k1))i1 +
(k1   k2) = 0 and ((x1   x2) + (k2   k1))i2 + (k1   k2) = 0. Let f(X) =
((x1   x2) + (k2   k1))X + (k1   k2) 2 GF(q)[X], then deg(f(X))  1. But
f(i1) = f(i2) = 0 and i1 6= i2, so f(X)  0. Then (x1   x2) + (k2   k1) = 0
and (k1   k2) = 0. So k1 = k2 and x1 = x2, then (k1; x1) = (k2; x2). This is a
contradiction.
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 2.3.4 There exists a 2-SC(4; (q 2)(q2 q); q) for any prime power q > 2.
Proof: The result comes from Lemmas 2.3.2 and 2.3.3. 
Applying Theorem 2.1.8 with n = 4, we can derive MSC(2; 4; q)  q3 + q(q 1)2 .
The 2-SC(4; q3 3q2+2q; q)s constructed above are not optimal, but asymptotically
optimal, for
lim
prime q!1
(q   2)(q2   q)
q3 + q(q 1)2
= lim
prime q!1
2q3   6q2 + 4q
2q3 + q2   q = 1:
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Chapter 3
Strong Separable Codes
As we can see from Theorem 2.1.4, the computational complexity O(nM t) of al-
gorithm LACCTraceAlg(R) based on t-LACCs (or binary t-SCs) is not ecient for
practical use, where n is the length of the code and M is the number of autho-
rized users. Therefore, it is desirable to nd some special SCs with ecient tracing
algorithm. This is the main reason that we introduce the new notion of a strong sep-
arable code (t-SSC) in this chapter. In fact, from Theorem 3.1.3, we know that any
binary t-SSC can be used to identify all colluders with computational complexity
O(nM) when the number of colluders in the averaging attack is at most t.
In Section 3.1, we introduce the concept of an SSC, and describe a colluder trac-
ing algorithm based on a binary SSC. We also show a concatenation construction
for binary SSCs from q-ary SSCs, which makes the study of q-ary SSCs with short
length important. In Section 3.2, we discuss the relationships between strong sep-
arable codes and other ngerprinting codes. We also derive several innite series
of optimal q-ary 2-SSCs of length 2 from the fact that a q-ary 2-SSC of length 2 is
equivalent to a q-ary 2-SC of length 2 in Section 3.2. Finally, combinatorial proper-
ties of q-ary 2-SSCs of length 3 are investigated and a construction for q-ary 2-SSCs
of length 3 is also presented in Section 3.3.
3.1 Tracing algorithm for strong separable codes
In this section, we rst introduce the concept of a strong separable code (t-SSC),
then we present a tracing algorithm based on a binary t-SSC with computational
complexity O(nM), which is more ecient than that of a t-SC, and nally we
describe a concatenation construction for binary SSCs from q-ary SSCs.
Denition 3.1.1 Let C be an (n;M; q) code and t  2 be an integer. C is a strong
t-separable code, or t-SSC(n;M; q), if for any C0  C, 1  jC0j  t, we haveT
C02S(C0) C
0
= C0, where S(C0) = fC0  C j desc(C0) = desc(C0)g.
From the denition above, it is clear that for any C0 2 S(C0) and C0 6= C0, we
have C0  C0 and jC0 j  t+ 1.
Example 3.1.2 Consider the following (3; 4; 2) code C:
c1 c2 c3 c4
C =
0B@ 0 1 0 00 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1CA
Then
desc(fc1g) = f0g  f0g  f0g;
desc(fc2g) = f1g  f0g  f0g;
desc(fc3g) = f0g  f1g  f0g;
desc(fc4g) = f0g  f0g  f1g;
desc(fc1; c2g) = f0; 1g  f0g  f0g;
desc(fc1; c3g) = f0g  f0; 1g  f0g;
desc(fc1; c4g) = f0g  f0g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc2; c3g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0g;
desc(fc2; c4g) = f0; 1g  f0g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc3; c4g) = f0g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc1; c2; c3g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0g;
desc(fc1; c2; c4g) = f0; 1g  f0g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc1; c3; c4g) = f0g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc2; c3; c4g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc1; c2; c3; c4g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g:
It is easy to check that
S(fc1g) = ffc1gg and
T
C02S(fc1g) C
0
= fc1g;
S(fc2g) = ffc2gg and
T
C02S(fc2g) C
0
= fc2g;
S(fc3g) = ffc3gg and
T
C02S(fc3g) C
0
= fc3g;
S(fc4g) = ffc4gg and
T
C02S(fc4g) C
0
= fc4g;
S(fc1; c2g) = ffc1; c2gg and
T
C02S(fc1;c2g) C
0
= fc1; c2g;
S(fc1; c3g) = ffc1; c3gg and
T
C02S(fc1;c3g) C
0
= fc1; c3g;
S(fc1; c4g) = ffc1; c4gg and
T
C02S(fc1;c4g) C
0
= fc1; c4g;
S(fc2; c3g) = ffc2; c3g; fc1; c2; c3gg and
T
C02S(fc2;c3g) C
0
= fc2; c3g;
S(fc2; c4g) = ffc2; c4g; fc1; c2; c4gg and
T
C02S(fc2;c4g) C
0
= fc2; c4g;
S(fc3; c4g) = ffc3; c4g; fc1; c3; c4gg and
T
C02S(fc3;c4g) C
0
= fc3; c4g:
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So the code C is a 2-SSC(3; 4; 2).
We now pay our attention to the tracing algorithm based on a binary strong
separable code.
Theorem 3.1.3 Under the assumption that the number of colluders in the averaging
attack is at most t, any t-SSC(n;M; 2) can be used to identify all the colluders with
computational complexity O(nM) by applying Algorithm 3.1.
Proof: Let C be the t-SSC(n;M; 2), and R be the descendant code derived from
the detection statistics T. Then by applying Algorithm 3.1, one can identify all the
colluders. The computational complexity is clearly O(nM).
According to Algorithm 3.1, by deleting all columns fc 2 C j 9 1  i  n;R(i) =
f1g; c(i) = 0; or R(i) = f0g; c(i) = 1g, we obtain a sub-matrix CL of C. Suppose
that C0 = fu1; u2; : : : ; urg, 1  r  t, is the set of colluders, and the codeword
ci is assigned to the colluder ui, 1  i  r, and C0 = fc1; c2; : : : ; crg. It is not
dicult to see that C0  CL. According to the denition of a t-SSC, we haveT
C02S(C0) C
0
= C0 6= ;, where S(C0) = fC0  C j desc(C0) = desc(C0) = Rg. We prove
this theorem in three steps.
(1) CL 2 S(C0), that is, desc(CL) = R. For any 1  j  n, we consider the
following cases.
(1.1) R(j) = f1g. For any c 2 CL, c(j) = 1 according to the processes deriving
CL. So CL(j) = f1g = R(j).
(1.2) R(j) = f0g. For any c 2 CL, c(j) = 0 according to the processes deriving
CL. So CL(j) = f0g = R(j).
(1.3) R(j) = f0; 1g. Since desc(C0) = R, we know that there exist c1; c2 2 C0 
CL such that c1(j) = 0 and c2(j) = 1, respectively. This implies CL(j) = f0; 1g =
R(j).
According to (1.1)-(1.3) above, for any 1  j  n, we have CL(j) = R(j), which
implies desc(CL) = R.
(2) We want to show that for any x 2 C0 =
T
C02S(C0) C
0
, there exists 1  j  n,
such that x(j) = 1 and c(j) = 0 for any c 2 CL n fxg, or x(j) = 0 and c(j) = 1
for any c 2 CL n fxg. Assume not. Then for any 1  j  n, x(j) = 1 implies that
there exists c1 2 CL n fxg such that c1(j) = 1, and x(j) = 0 implies that there
exists c2 2 CL n fxg such that c2(j) = 0. Then we have desc(CL) = desc(CL n fxg).
Since CL 2 S(C0) by (1), we can have CL n fxg 2 S(C0), and x =2
T
C02S(C0) C
0
, a
contradiction.
(3) At last, according to Algorithm 3.1 and (2), it suces to show that any user
u assigned with a codeword x 2 C0 =
T
C02S(C0) C
0
is a colluder. Assume that u is
not a colluder. Then for any C0 2 S(C0), we have C0 n fxg 2 S(C0), which implies
x =2 TC02S(C0) C0 , a contradiction.
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Algorithm 3.1: SSCTraceAlg(R)
Dene Ja, Jo to be the sets of indices where R(j) = f1g, R(j) = f0g,
respectively, and Ja = (Ja(1); : : : ;Ja(jJaj))T , Jo = (Jo(1); : : : ;Jo(jJoj))T to
be the vector representing R's coordinates where R(j) = f1g and R(j) = f0g,
respectively;
 = 1;
Ua = ;;
Uo = ;;
U = ;;
for k = 1 to jJaj do
j = Ja(k);
dene ej to be the jth row of C;
 =   ej ;
for k = 1 to jJoj do
j = Jo(k);
 =   ej ;
for k = 1 to n do
a =   ek;
o =   ek;
for i = 1 to M do
if a(i) = 1 then
Ua = fig
S
Ua;
if jUaj = 1 then
U = U
S
Ua;
for i = 1 to M do
if o(i) = 1 then
Uo = fig
S
Uo;
if jUoj = 1 then
U = U
S
Uo;
if jU j  t then
output U ;
else
output The set of colluders has size at least t+ 1."
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This completes the proof. 
Note that any user holding c 2 CL n C0 is not a colluder. In fact, if such c cor-
responds to a colluder, then according to the hypothesis in Theorem 3.1.3, we have
jC0
Sfcgj  t. In this case, desc(C0Sfcg) = desc(C0). Then C0 2 S(C0Sfcg),
while C0
Sfcg 6 C0, a contradiction to the denition of t-SSC.
A close look at the proof also shows an important fact that this tracing algorithm
is also valid for any linear attack, because the detection statistics T(i), 1  i  n,
for C0 possess the whole information on C0.
At the end of this section, we show a concatenation construction for binary t-
SSCs from q-ary t-SSCs, which makes the study of q-ary t-SSCs with short length,
say n = 2; 3, important.
Lemma 3.1.4 If there exists a t-SSC(n;M; q), then there exists a t-SSC(nq;M; 2).
Proof: Let C = fc1; c2; : : : ; cMg be a t-SSC(n;M; q) on Q = f0; 1; : : : ; q   1g,
and E = fe1; e2; : : : ; eqg, where ei is the i-th identity vector of length q. Let
f : Q ! E be a bijective mapping such that f(i) = ei+1. For any codeword
c = (c(1); c(2); : : : ; c(n))T 2 C, we dene f(c) = (f(c(1)); f(c(2)); : : : ; f(c(n)))T .
Obviously, f(c) is a binary vector of length nq. We dene a new (nq;M; 2) code
F = ff(c1); f(c2); : : : ; f(cM )g. We can show that F is a t-SSC.
For any F0  F , jF0j  t, we only need to show that for any F1  F , desc(F0) =
desc(F1) implies F0  F1. Suppose F0, F1 correspond to two codeword sets C0; C1 
C, respectively, such that jC0j = jF0j  t, where F0 = ff(c) j c 2 C0g and F1 =
ff(c) j c 2 C1g. Since desc(F0) = desc(F1), we have desc(C0) = desc(C1). Then
C0  C1, because C is a t-SSC(n;M; q). So, F0  F1.
This completes the proof. 
3.2 Relationships between strong separable codes and
other codes
In this section, we investigate the relationships between strong separable codes and
other ngerprinting codes, and derive several innite series of optimal q-ary 2-SSCs
of length 2.
Recall that, in any t-SSC(n;M; q) C, for any C0  C, 1  jC0j  t, and any
C0 2 S(C0), C0 6= C0, we have C0  C0 and jC0 j  t + 1. In other words, there
are no distinct subsets C1; C2  C with 1  jC1j  t, 1  jC2j  t, such that
desc(C1) = desc(C2). This implies the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2.1 Any t-SSC(n;M; q) is a t-SC(n;M; q).
The following example shows that the converse of Lemma 3.2.1 does not always
hold.
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Example 3.2.2 Consider the following (3; 5; 2) code C:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
C =
0B@ 0 1 0 0 10 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 1
1CA
We can directly check that C is a 2-SC(3; 5; 2). Now, we show that C is not a 2-SSC.
Let C0 = fc1; c5g and C0 = fc2; c3; c4g, then desc(C0) = desc(C0), while C0 6 C0 .
This implies that C is not a 2-SSC(3; 5; 2).
However, the following result shows that a 2-SSC(2;M; q) is always a 2-SC(2;M; q).
Theorem 3.2.3 Let C be a (2;M; q) code. Then C is a 2-SSC(2;M; q) if and only
if it is a 2-SC(2;M; q).
Proof: By Lemma 3.2.1, it suces to consider the suciency. Let C be a 2-
SC(2;M; q). Assume that C is not a 2-SSC(2;M; q). Then there exist C0; C0  C,
jC0j  2, such that desc(C0) = desc(C0) but C0 6 C0 . If jC0j = 1, then it is clear that
C0 = C0 , a contradiction. So jC0j = 2. Let C0 = fc1; c2g, ci = (ai; bi)T , where i =
1; 2. Since C is a 2-SC(2;M; q) and desc(C0) = desc(C0), we have C0  desc(C0)
T C
and jC0 j  3. We now consider the Hamming distance d(c1; c2) of c1 and c2, where
the Hamming distance of c1 and c2 is the number of positions where c1 and c2 have
dierent symbols.
(1) If d(c1; c2) = 1, without loss of generality, we may assume a1 = a2, b1 6= b2.
Then jdesc(C0)j = 2. So jC0 j  jdesc(C0)j = 2, a contradiction.
(2) If d(c1; c2) = 2, then a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and desc(C0) = fc1; c2; c3; c4g,
where c3 = (a1; b2)
T and c4 = (a2; b1)
T . Then jdesc(C0)
T Cj  3. Otherwise,
if jdesc(C0)
T Cj = 4, i.e., desc(C0)T C = fc1; c2; c3; c4g, then desc(fc1; c2g) =
desc(fc3; c4g), a contradiction to the denition of a 2-SC. Since C0  desc(C0)
T C
and jC0 j  3, we have jC0 j = 3. So we may assume, without loss of generality, that
C0 = fc1; c2; c3g, which implies C0  C0 , a contradiction.
This completes the proof. 
Therefore, the optimal SCs in Theorem 2.2.22 are, in fact, optimal SSCs from
the equivalence stated in Theorem 3.2.3.
Corollary 3.2.4 Let k  2 be a prime power. Then there is an optimal 2-SSC(2;M;
q) for any q 2 fk2   1; k2 + k   2; k2 + k   1; k2 + k; k2 + k + 1g.
Finally, we consider the relationship between strong separable codes and frame-
proof codes dened below.
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Denition 3.2.5 Let C be an (n;M; q) code and t  2 be an integer. C is a t-
frameproof code, or t-FPC(n;M; q), if for any C0  C such that jC0j  t, we have
desc(C0)T C = C0, that is, for any c = (c(1); : : : ; c(n))T 2 C n C0, there is at least
one coordinate i, 1  i  n, such that c(i) 62 C0(i).
Intuitively, an (n;M; q) code is a t-FPC if no coalition of size at most t can
frame another user not in the coalition in generic digital ngerprinting. Frameproof
codes were rst introduced to prevent a coalition from framing a user not in the
coalition in [12], but were widely considered as having no traceability for generic
digital data (see for example [48]). However, Cheng and Miao [17] showed that
frameproof codes actually have traceability for multimedia contents. This greatly
strengthens the importance of frameproof codes in ngerprinting.
Lemma 3.2.6 ([17]) Under the assumption that the number of colluders in the aver-
aging attack is at most t, any t-FPC(n;M; 2) can be used to identify all the colluders
with computational complexity O(nM) by using Algorithm 3.2 described in [17].
Lemma 3.2.7 Any t-FPC(n;M; q) is a t-SSC(n;M; q).
Proof: Let C be a t-FPC(n;M; q). We are going to show that for any C0  C,
jC0j  t, S(C0) = fC0  C j desc(C0) = desc(C0)g = fC0g. Assume that there exists
C0 2 S(C0) such that C0 6= C0.
(1) If jC0 j  jC0j, then there exists c 2 C0  C such that c =2 C0. Since
desc(C0) = desc(C0), we have c 2 desc(C0)
T C, while jC0j  t, a contradiction to the
denition of a t-FPC.
(2) If jC0 j < jC0j  t, then there exists c 2 C0  C such that c =2 C0 . Since
desc(C0) = desc(C0), we have c 2 desc(C0)
T C, while jC0 j < t, a contradiction to the
denition of a t-FPC.
According to the discussions above, we have S(C0) = fC0g. This implies thatT
C02S(C0) C
0
= C0. 
The following example shows that the converse of Lemma 3.2.7 does not always
hold.
Example 3.2.8 Consider the following (3; 4; 2) code C:
c1 c2 c3 c4
C =
0B@ 0 1 0 00 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
1CA
From Example 3.1.2, we know that C is a 2-SSC(3; 4; 2). Now, we show that C is not
a 2-FPC. For C0 = fc2; c3g, desc(C0)
T C = fc1; c2; c3g 6= C0. This is a contradiction
to the denition of a 2-FPC.
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Algorithm 3.2: FPCIdenAlg(R)
Dene Ja, Jo to be the sets of indices where R(j) = f1g, R(j) = f0g,
respectively, and Ja = (Ja(1); : : : ;Ja(jJaj))T , Jo = (Jo(1); : : : ;Jo(jJoj))T to
be the vector representing R's coordinates where R(j) = f1g and R(j) = f0g,
respectively;
 = 1;
U1 = ;;
for k = 1 to jJaj do
j = Ja(k);
dene ej to be the jth row of C;
 =   ej ;
for i = 1 to M do
if (i) = 1 then
U1 = fig
S
U1;
 = 1;
U2 = ;;
for k = 1 to jJoj do
j = Jo(k);
 =   ej ;
for i = 1 to M do
if (i) = 1 then
U2 = fig
S
U2;
U = U1
T
U2;
if jU j  t then
output U ;
else
output The set of colluders has size at least t+ 1."
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We would like to make some remarks here. The multimedia ngerprinting scheme
based on a t-FPC(n;M; 2) can have at most r  2dnt e +O(2dnt e 1) authorized users,
where r is the unique integer such that r 2 f1; 2; : : : ; tg and r = n (mod t) [10]. In
the case of large t, this number of users is too small to be of practical use. We can use
t-SSCs to overcome this shortcoming. On one hand, we know that t-SSC(n;M; 2)s
have the same traceability as t-FPC(n;M; 2)s from Theorem 3.1.3 and Lemma 3.2.6.
On the other hand, t-SSC(n;M; 2)s have weaker requirements than t-FPC(n;M; 2)s
from Lemma 3.2.7. Therefore, we can say that in some sense, the signicance of
t-SSC(n;M; 2)s relies on their maximum size.
3.3 Constructions for 2-SSCs of length 3
In this section, we investigate combinatorial properties of q-ary 2-SSCs of length 3,
and construct an innite series of such codes.
From Lemma 3.2.1, we know that any 2-SSC(3;M; q) is a 2-SC(3;M; q). There-
fore, we can start from 2-SC(3;M; q)s to investigate 2-SSC(3;M; q)s. At rst, we
derive forbidden congurations of a 2-SSC(3;M; q).
Lemma 3.3.1 Let C be a 2-SC(3;M; q). If there exist C0; C0  C, jC0j  2 such
that desc(C0) = desc(C0) and C0 6 C0, then C0 = fc1; c2g and the Hamming distance
d(c1; c2) =2 f0; 1; 2g.
Proof: If jC0j = 1, then it is clear that C0 = C0 , a contradiction. So jC0j = 2. Let
C0 = fc1; c2g, ci = (ai; bi; ei), c1 6= c2. Since C is a 2-SC(3;M; q) and desc(C0) =
desc(C0), we have C0  desc(C0)
T C and jC0 j  3.
(1) If d(c1; c2) = 1, we may assume, without loss of generality, that a1 = a2,
b1 = b2, e1 6= e2. Then jdesc(C0)j = 2. So jC0 j  jdesc(C0)j = 2, a contradiction.
(2) If d(c1; c2) = 2, we may assume, without loss of generality, a1 = a2,
b1 6= b2, e1 6= e2. Then desc(C0) = fc1; c2; c3; c4g, where c3 = (a1; b1; e2)T and
c4 = (a1; b2; e1)
T . Then jdesc(C0)
T Cj  3. Otherwise, if jdesc(C0)T Cj = 4, i.e.,
desc(C0)
T C = fc1; c2; c3; c4g, then desc(fc1; c2g) = desc(fc3; c4g), a contradiction
to the denition of a 2-SC. Since C0  desc(C0)
T C and jC0 j  3, we have jC0 j = 3.
So, we may assume, without loss of generality, that C0 = fc1; c2; c3g. This implies
C0  C0 , a contradiction.
This completes the proof. 
Lemma 3.3.2 Let C be a 2-SC(3;M; q). If there exist C0; C0  C, jC0j  2, such
that desc(C0) = desc(C0) and C0 6 C0 , then desc(C0)
T C is of one of the following
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four types:
Type I: Type II:0B@ a1 a2 a1 a1b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1
1CA ;
0B@ a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1
1CA ;
Type III: Type IV:0B@ a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b2 b1
e1 e2 e1 e1
1CA ;
0B@ a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1
1CA ;
where C0 = fc1; c2g, ci = (ai; bi; ei), i = 1; 2, and a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, e1 6= e2.
Proof: According to Lemma 3.3.1, we can only have C0 = fc1; c2g, ci = (ai; bi; ei)T ,
where i = 1; 2, a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2. Then desc(C0) = fc1; c2; c3; c4; c5; c6;
c7; c8g, where c3 = (a1; b1; e2)T , c4 = (a1; b2; e1)T , c5 = (a2; b1; e1)T , c6 = (a2; b2; e1)T ,
c7 = (a2; b1; e2)
T , c8 = (a1; b2; e2)
T .
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8
desc(C0) =
0B@ a1 a2 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a1b1 b2 b1 b2 b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1 e1 e2 e2
1CA
Let Bi = fci+2; ci+5g, where 1  i  3. Then for any 1  i  3, we have Bi 6
desc(C0)
T C. Otherwise, desc(C0) = desc(Bi), a contradiction to the denition of a
2-SC. Since C is a 2-SC(3;M; q) and desc(C0) = desc(C0), we have C0  desc(C0)
T C
and jC0 j  3.
If desc(C0)
T C = C0, then C0  C0, and thus jC0 j  jC0j = 2, a contradiction.
So desc(C0)
T C contains at least one of the words c3; c4; c5; c6; c7; c8. Without
loss of generality, we may assume c3 2 desc(C0)
T C. Then c6 =2 desc(C0)T C. If
desc(C0)
T C = fc1; c2; c3g, since C0  desc(C0)T C and jC0 j  3, we have C0 =
fc1; c2; c3g, which implies C0  C0 , a contradiction. So desc(C0)
T C should contain
at least one of the words c4; c5; c7; c8.
(1) If c4 2 desc(C0)
T C, then c7 =2 desc(C0)T C. We also have c8 =2 desc(C0)T C,
otherwise, desc(fc1; c8g) = desc(fc3; c4g), a contradiction. So, if c5 =2 desc(C0)
T C,
then desc(C0)
T C is of Type I, and if c5 2 desc(C0)T C, then desc(C0)T C is of Type
IV.
(2) If c5 2 desc(C0)
T C, then c8 =2 desc(C0)T C. We also have c7 =2 desc(C0)T C,
otherwise, desc(fc1; c7g) = desc(fc3; c5g), a contradiction. So, if c4 =2 desc(C0)
T C,
then desc(C0)
T C is of Type II, and if c4 2 desc(C0)T C, then desc(C0)T C is of
Type IV.
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(3) If c7 2 desc(C0)
T C, then c4 =2 desc(C0)T C. Also, c5 =2 desc(C0)T C,
otherwise, desc(fc1; c7g) = desc(fc3; c5g), a contradiction. We further have c8 =2
desc(C0)
T C, otherwise, desc(fc2; c3g) = desc(fc7; c8g), a contradiction. So, in this
case, desc(C0)
T C = fc1; c2; c3; c7g.
c1 c2 c3 c7
desc(C0)
T C =
0B@ a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b1
e1 e2 e2 e2
1CA
If c1 =2 C0 (or c2 =2 C0), then e1 =2 C0(3) (or b2 =2 C0(2)), which implies desc(C0) 6=
desc(C0). Hence c1; c2 2 C0 , which implies C0  C0 , a contradiction. So this case is
impossible.
(4) If c8 2 desc(C0)
T C, then c5 =2 desc(C0)T C. Also, c4 =2 desc(C0)T C,
otherwise, desc(fc1; c8g) = desc(fc3; c4g), a contradiction. We further have c7 =2
desc(C0)
T C, otherwise, desc(fc2; c3g) = desc(fc7; c8g), a contradiction. So, in this
case, desc(C0)
T C = fc1; c2; c3; c8g.
c1 c2 c3 c8
desc(C0)
T C =
0B@ a1 a2 a1 a1b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e2
1CA
If c1 =2 C0 (or c2 =2 C0), then e1 =2 C0(3) (or a2 =2 C0(1)), which implies desc(C0) 6=
desc(C0). Hence c1; c2 2 C0 , which implies C0  C0 , a contradiction. So this case is
impossible.
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 3.3.3 Let C be a 2-SC(3;M; q). Then C is a 2-SSC(3;M; q) if and only
if for any C0 = fc1; c2g = f(a1; b1; e1)T ; (a2; b2; e2)T g  C, where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2,
and e1 6= e2, we have that desc(C0)
T C is not of one of the following four types:
Type I: Type II:0B@ a1 a2 a1 a1b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1
1CA ;
0B@ a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1
1CA ;
Type III: Type IV:0B@ a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b2 b1
e1 e2 e1 e1
1CA ;
0B@ a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1
1CA :
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Proof: Suppose that C is a 2-SSC(3;M; q). Assume that there exists C0 = fc1; c2g =
f(a1; b1; e1)T ; (a2; b2; e2)T g  C, where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, such that
desc(C0)
T C is of one of the four types. For convenience, let c3 = (a1; b1; e2)T ,
c4 = (a1; b2; e1)
T , c5 = (a2; b1; e1)
T .
(1) If desc(C0)
T C is of type I, then desc(fc1; c2g) = desc(fc2; c3; c4g), while
fc1; c2g 6 fc2; c3; c4g, a contradiction to the denition of a 2-SSC. So this case is
impossible.
(2) If desc(C0)
T C is of type II, then desc(fc1; c2g) = desc(fc2; c3; c5g), while
fc1; c2g 6 fc2; c3; c5g, a contradiction to the denition of a 2-SSC. So this case is
impossible.
(3) If desc(C0)
T C is of type III, then desc(fc1; c2g) = desc(fc2; c4; c5g), while
fc1; c2g 6 fc2; c4; c5g, a contradiction to the denition of a 2-SSC. So this case is
impossible.
(4) If desc(C0)
T C is of type IV, then desc(fc1; c2g) = desc(fc3; c4; c5g), while
fc1; c2g 6 fc3; c4; c5g, a contradiction to the denition of a 2-SSC. So this case is
impossible.
So, desc(C0)
T C is not of one of the four types described above.
Conversely, suppose that C is a 2-SC(3;M; q), and for any C0 = fc1; c2g =
f(a1; b1; e1)T ; (a2; b2; e2)T g  C, where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, we have that
desc(C0)
T C is not of one of the four types. If C is not a 2-SSC(3;M; q), then there
exist C1  C, jC1j  2, and C0 2 S(C1) = fC0  C j desc(C0) = desc(C1)g, such that
C1 6 C0 . According to Lemma 3.3.2, C1 = fc01; c
0
2g = f(a
0
1; b
0
1; e
0
1)
T ; (a
0
2; b
0
2; e
0
2)
T g 
C, where a01 6= a
0
2, b
0
1 6= b
0
2, and e
0
1 6= e
0
2, such that desc(C1)
T C is of one of the four
types, a contradiction. So C is a 2-SSC(3;M; q). 
Now, we pay our attention to the construction of 2-SSCs of length 3 via the
discussion above. In order to describe our construction, we need s new elements
1i =2 Zq s, i 2 f0; 1; : : : ; s   1g  Zq s, such that for any g 2 Zq s and any
i 2 f0; 1; : : : ; s  1g,
g +1i =1i + g = g  1i =1i  g =1i:
Lemma 3.3.4 ([16]) A (3;M; q) code is a 2-SC(3;M; q) on Q if and only if
jAjg1
TAjg2 j  1 holds for any 1  j  3, and any distinct g1; g2 2 Q.
Lemma 3.3.5 Let C be a (3;M; q) code on Q. If for any C0  C, jC0j  2, we have
jdesc(C0)
T Cj  3, then C is a 2-SSC(3;M; q).
Proof: We rst show that C is a 2-SC(3;M; q). Assume not. According to Lemma
3.3.4, we may assume, without loss of generality, that there exist two distinct g1; g2 2
Q such that jA1g1
TA1g2 j  2. Suppose (b1; e1)T ; (b2; e2)T 2 A1g1 TA1g2 , where
(b1; e1)
T 6= (b2; e2)T . Then (g1; b1; e1)T ; (g2; b1; e1)T ; (g1; b2; e2)T ; (g2; b2; e2)T 2 C,
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which imply jdesc(f(g1; b1; e1)T ; (g2; b2; e2)T g)
T Cj  4, a contradiction to the hy-
pothesis. So C is a 2-SC(3;M; q). Next, we prove it is in fact a 2-SSC. Since for any
C0  C, jC0j  2, jdesc(C0)
T Cj  3 always holds, we know that desc(C0)T C can not
be of any of the four types mentioned in Theorem 3.3.3. So C is a 2-SSC(3;M; q)
from Theorem 3.3.3. 
Based on Lemma 3.3.5, we can construct 2-SSCs as follows.
Lemma 3.3.6 Suppose that q is a positive integer, s is a non-negative integer, where
0  s  q2 and q   s is odd. Then there exists a 2-SSC(3; q2 + sq   2s2; q).
Proof: Since q   s is odd and 0  s  q2 , we can construct a code C on Q =
f10;11; : : : ;1s 1g
S
Zq s as follows. Let
Ms =
0B@ 0 0    00 1    q   s  1
0 2    2(q   s  1)
1CA ; Mi =
0B@ 1i i 00 1i i
i 0 1i
1CA ;
i 2 f0; 1; : : : ; s  1g. Dene Dj = fc+ g j c 2Mj ; g 2 Zq sg, where 0  j  s, and
C = Ssj=0Dj . Then C is a (3; q2 + sq   2s2; q) code on Q.
According to Lemma 3.3.5, in order to prove that C is a 2-SSC(3; q2+sq 2s2; q),
it suces to check that jdesc(C0)
T Cj  3 always holds for any C0  C, jC0j  2. We
prove this lemma in two steps.
(1) At rst, we will prove that for any distinct g1; g2 2 Q, (g1; g2) 2 f10;11; : : : ;
1s 1g2
S
Z2q s, jAig1
TAig2 j = 0 always holds for any 1  i  3. We only need to
consider the case jA1g1
TA1g2 j = 0, because we can consider the other two cases in a
similar way.
(1.1) For any 0  i < j  s   1, we have A11i
TA11j = ;. Assume that
(b; e)T 2 A11i
TA11j . Then there exist b1; b2 2 Zq s, such that (b; e)T = (b1; b1 +
i)T = (b2; b2 + j)
T , which implies b1 = b2 = b, and i = j, a contradiction.
(1.2) For any distinct i; j 2 Zq s, we have A1i
TA1j = ;. Assume that (b; e)T 2
A1i
TA1j .
(1.2.A) If there exists 0  k  s   1 such that b = 1k, then (b; e)T = (1k; i  
k)T = (1k; j   k)T , which implies i = j, a contradiction.
(1.2.B) If there exists 0  k  s   1 such that e = 1k, then (b; e)T = (i +
k;1k)T = (j + k;1k)T , which implies i = j, a contradiction.
(1.2.C) If b; e =2 f10;11; : : : ;1s 1g, then there exist b1; b2 2 Zq s, such that
(b; e)T = (i+b1; i+2b1)
T = (j+b2; j+2b2)
T . Hence i+b1 = j+b2 and i+2b1 = j+2b2,
which imply b1 = b2 and i = j, a contradiction.
(2) According to (1), we know that for any distinct g1; g2 2 Q and any 1  i  3,
jAig1
TAig2 j  1 implies (g1; g2) 2 Zq sf10;11; : : : ;1s 1g. We are going to show
that jdesc(C0)
T Cj  3 always holds for any C0  C, jC0j  2. If jC0j = 1, then it is
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clear that jdesc(C0)
T Cj = jC0j = 1. Now, we consider the case jC0j = 2. Suppose
C0 = fc1; c2g = f(a1; b1; e1)T ; (a2; b2; e2)T g  C, where c1 6= c2. Consider the
Hamming distance of c1 and c2.
(2.1) If d(c1; c2) = 1, then it is clear that jdesc(C0)
T Cj = jC0j = 2.
(2.2) If d(c1; c2) = 2, without loss of generality, we may assume that a1 = a2,
b1 6= b2, e1 6= e2. Then desc(C0) = fc1; c2; c3; c4g, where c3 = (a1; b1; e2)T and
c4 = (a1; b2; e1)
T .
c1 c2 c3 c4
desc(C0) =
0B@ a1 a1 a1 a1b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1
1CA
Assume that jdesc(C0)
T Cj = 4, i.e. desc(C0)T C = fc1; c2; c3; c4g. Then jA3e1 TA3e2 j
 1, which implies that exactly one of e1 and e2 is 1i for some 0  i  s  1.
(2.2.A) If e1 = 1i, then c1 = c4, which implies jdesc(C0)
T Cj  3, a contradic-
tion.
(2.2.B) If e2 = 1i, then c2 = c3, which implies jdesc(C0)
T Cj  3, a contradic-
tion.
So, if d(c1; c2) = 2, jdesc(C0)
T Cj  3 always holds.
(2.3) If d(c1; c2) = 3, then a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, e1 6= e2, and desc(C0) =
fc1; c2; c3; c4; c5; c6; c7; c8g, where c3 = (a1; b1; e2)T , c4 = (a1; b2; e1)T , c5 = (a2; b1;
e1)
T , c6 = (a2; b2; e1)
T , c7 = (a2; b1; e2)
T , c8 = (a1; b2; e2)
T .
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8
desc(C0) =
0B@ a1 a2 a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a1b1 b2 b1 b2 b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1 e1 e2 e2
1CA
We are going to show that desc(C0)
T C contains at most one element of the set B =
fc3; c4; c5; c6; c7; c8g. Assume not. Then there exist two elements c0; c00 of B con-
tained in desc(C0)
T C, where fc0; c00g 2 ffc3; c4g; fc3; c5g; fc3; c6g; fc3; c7g; fc3; c8g;
fc4; c5g; fc4; c6g; fc4; c7g; fc4; c8g; fc5; c6g; fc5; c7g; fc5; c8g; fc6; c7g; fc6; c8g; fc7;
c8gg. However, we can prove none of them is possible.
(2.3.A) If fc0; c00g = fc3; c4g, then we have fc1; c2; c3; c4g  desc(C0)
T C.
c1 c2 c3 c40B@ a1 a2 a1 a1b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1
1CA
Then jA3e1
TA3e2 j  1 (from c1 and c3) and jA2b1 TA2b2 j  1 (from c1 and c4). Hence
there exist 0  i; j  s   1 such that exactly one of e1 and e2 is 1i, and exactly
one of b1 and b2 is 1j .
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(2.3.A.a) If e1 = 1i, then 1j =2 fb1; b2g from c1 and c4, a contradiction. So,
this case is impossible.
(2.3.A.b) If e2 = 1i, then 1j =2 fb1; b2g from c2 and c3, a contradiction. So,
this case is impossible.
Similarly, we can know that it is impossible for fc0; c00g 2 ffc3; c5g; fc4; c5g; fc6;
c7g; fc6; c8g; fc7; c8gg.
(2.3.B) If fc0; c00g = fc3; c6g, then we have fc1; c2; c3; c6g  desc(C0)
T C.
c1 c2 c3 c60B@ a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2
e1 e2 e2 e1
1CA
Then jA3e1
TA3e2 j  1 (from c1 and c3). Hence, without loss of generality, we may
assume that e1 2 Zq s and there exists 0  i  s  1 such that e2 = 1i. Then we
can derive that a1; a2; b1 = a1 + i; b2 = a2 + i 2 Zq s, which imply c1; c6 2 Ds. So
we can derive e1 = a1 + 2i = a2 + 2i, which implies a1 = a2, a contradiction. So
this case is impossible.
Similarly, it is impossible that fc0; c00g 2 ffc4; c7g; fc5; c8gg.
(2.3.C) If fc0; c00g = fc3; c7g, then we have fc1; c2; c3; c7g  desc(C0)
T C.
c1 c2 c3 c70B@ a1 a2 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b1
e1 e2 e2 e2
1CA
Then jA3e1
TA3e2 j  1 (from c1 and c3), jA2b1 TA2b2 j  1 (from c2 and c7), and
jA1a1
TA1a2 j  1 (from c3 and c7). Hence there exists 0  i; j; k  s   1 such
that exactly one of e1 and e2 is 1i, and 1j 2 fb1; b2g, 1k 2 fa1; a2g. Then at
least one of (a1; b1; e1)
T and (a2; b2; e2)
T contains at least two components from
f10;11; : : : ;1s 1g, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
Similarly, it is impossible that fc0; c00g 2 ffc3; c8g; fc4; c6g; fc4; c8g; fc5; c6g;
fc5; c7gg.
The conclusion then comes from Lemma 3.3.5. 
Theorem 3.3.7 There exists a 2-SSC(3; 18(9q
2  w2); q) for any positive integer q,
with m being the residue of q modulo 8, and
w =
(
4 m; if m  0 (mod 4);
minfm; 8 mg; otherwise:
Proof: According to Lemma 3.3.6, there exists a 2-SSC(3; q2 + sq   2s2; q) for any
positive integer q, where 0  s  q2 , and q   s is odd. Let q = 8r +m, where r is
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a non-negative integer, and f(s) = q2 + sq   2s2 =  2(s  q4)2 + 98q2. Now, we are
going to nd the maximum value of f(s), where 0  s  q2 and q   s is odd.
(1) If m = 0, then q is even. Since q4 = 2r is even, s = 2r   1 = q 44 is odd, we
can know q   s is odd, and f( q 44 ) = 18(9q2   42) is the maximum value of f(s).
(2) If m = 1, then q is odd and q4 = 2r +
1
4 . Since s = 2r =
q 1
4 is even, we can
know q   s is odd, and f( q 14 ) = 18(9q2   1) is the maximum value of f(s).
(3) If m = 2, then q is even and q4 = 2r +
2
4 . Since s = 2r + 1 =
q+2
4 is odd, we
can know q   s is odd, and f( q+24 ) = 18(9q2   22) is the maximum value of f(s).
(4) If m = 3, then q is odd and q4 = 2r +
3
4 . Since s = 2r =
q 3
4 is even, we can
know q   s is odd, and f( q 34 ) = 18(9q2   32) is the maximum value of f(s).
(5) If m = 4, then q is even. Since s = 2r + 1 = q4 is odd, we can know q   s is
odd, and f( q4) =
9
8q
2 is the maximum value of f(s).
(6) If m = 5, then q is odd and q4 = 2r +
5
4 . Since s = 2r + 2 =
q+3
4 is even, we
can know q   s is odd, and f( q+34 ) = 18(9q2   32) is the maximum value of f(s).
(7) If m = 6, then q is even and q4 = 2r +
6
4 . Since s = 2r + 1 =
q 2
4 is odd, we
can know q   s is odd, and f( q 24 ) = 18(9q2   22) is the maximum value of f(s).
(8) If m = 7, then q is odd and q4 = 2r +
7
4 . Since s = 2r + 2 =
q+1
4 is even, we
can know q   s is odd, and f( q+14 ) = 18(9q2   1) is the maximum value of f(s).
We can summarize the results obtained in (1)-(8) into the following table, from
which the conclusion comes.
m w s f(s)
0 4 14(q   4) 18(9q2   42)
1 1 14(q   1) 18(9q2   12)
2 2 14(q + 2)
1
8(9q
2   22)
3 3 14(q   3) 18(9q2   32)
4 0 q4
9
8q
2
5 3 14(q + 3)
1
8(9q
2   32)
6 2 14(q   2) 18(9q2   22)
7 1 14(q + 1)
1
8(9q
2   12)

As is well-known, for any 2-FPC(3;M; q), we have M  q2 (see for example [6]).
Theorem 3.3.7 shows that there is an innite series of 2-SSC(3;M
0
; q)s which have
more than 12:5% codewords than 2-FPC(3;M; q)s could have.
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Chapter 4
Multimedia Identiable Parent
Property Codes
In Chapter 2, we know that any binary t-SC can be used to identify all colluders
when the number of colluders in the averaging attack is at most t. However, in most
cases, the number of codewords in a t-SC which is corresponding to the number of
authorized users is still too small to be of practical use. Meanwhile, guaranteeing
exact identication of at least one member of the pirate coalition of size at most t
would bring enough pressure to bear on malicious authorized users to give up their
attempts at collusion.
In this chapter, we introduce a new anti-collusion code called multimedia identi-
able parent property code (t-MIPPC) to resist the averaging attack on multimedia
contents in a ngerprinting system with number of users beyond a t-SC could pro-
vide. Although t-MIPPCs can not be used to identify all the colluders when the size
of the coalition is at most t, nevertheless they can be used to identify at least one
colluder, thereby helping stop the proliferation of the fraudulent content in digital
marketplace.
In Section 4.1, we introduce the notion of an MIPPC, describe a colluder tracing
algorithm based on a binary MIPPC, and show a concatenation construction for
binary MIPPCs from q-ary MIPPCs. In Section 4.2, some upper bounds on the
size of an MIPPC are derived. We also investigate combinatorial properties of a
3-MIPPC of length 2, characterize such a code in terms of a bipartite graph, and
derive a tight upper bound on a 3-MIPPC of length 2 in Section 4.2. In Section
4.3, we characterize a 3-MIPPC of length 2 in terms of a generalized packing, and
construct several innite series of (asymptotically) optimal 3-MIPPCs of length 2.
4.1 Tracing algorithm for multimedia identiable parent
property codes
In this section, we rst introduce the notion of a multimedia identiable parent
property code (MIPPC). We then show a tracing algorithm based on this new code,
and present a concatenation construction for binary MIPPCs from q-ary MIPPCs.
Denition 4.1.1 Let C be an (n;M; q) code, and for any R  C(1) C(2)    
C(n), dene the set of parent sets of R as
Pt(R) = fC0  C j jC0 j  t; R = desc(C0)g:
We say that C is a code with the identiable parent property (IPP) for multimedia
ngerprinting, or a multimedia IPP code, denoted t-MIPPC(n;M; q), if\
C02Pt(R)
C0 6= ;
is satised for any R  C(1) C(2)     C(n) with Pt(R) 6= ;.
Intuitively, Pt(R) consists of all the sub-codes of C with size at most t that could
have produced all the words in R, and an (n;M; q) code C is a t-MIPPC(n;M; q) if
the following condition is satised: even if there are distinct sub-codes of C, each of
size at most t, could produce the same set R of words, we can track down at least
one parent of R which is contained in each parent set of R. In fact, any codeword
in
T
C02Pt(R) C
0
is a parent of R.
Example 4.1.2 Consider the following (3; 4; 2) code C:
c1 c2 c3 c4
C =
0B@ 0 1 1 11 0 1 0
1 0 0 1
1CA
Obviously
C(1) C(2) C(3) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g:
There are exactly two cases satisfying jP3(R)j  2, that is, R = f1g  f0; 1g 
f0; 1g; f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g. In the rst case,
P3(f1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g) = ffc3; c4g; fc2; c3; c4gg;
and
fc3; c4g
\
fc2; c3; c4g = fc3; c4g 6= ;:
In the second case,
P3(f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g) = ffc1; c2g; fc1; c2; c3g; fc1; c2; c4g; fc1; c3; c4gg;
and
fc1; c2g
\
fc1; c2; c3g
\
fc1; c2; c4g
\
fc1; c3; c4g = fc1g 6= ;:
So the code C is a 3-MIPPC(3; 4; 2)
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MIPPCs are a variation of IPP codes, which were introduced for the purpose
of protecting copyrighted digital contents, and a generalization of separable codes.
The notion of an IPP code was rst introduced in a special case in [32], investigated
in full generality in [2, 4, 5, 8, 46, 53], and surveyed in [9].
In Denition 4.1.1, if R is set to be a singleton set fdg, and the set of parent
sets be modied as
Pt(R) = fC0  C j jC0 j  t;d 2 desc(C0)g;
then we obtain a t-IPP code, while if we require that jPt(R)j = 1 for any R 
C(1) C(2)     C(n) with Pt(R) 6= ;, then we obtain a t-separable code.
Lemma 4.1.3 Any t-SC(n;M; q) is a t-MIPPC(n;M; q).
Using the tracing algorithm MIPPCTraceAlg(R) described in Theorem 4.1.5, we
know that by means of a binary MIPPC, we can capture a set R  C(1)  C(n) in
the multimedia scenario instead of an element d 2 R in the generic digital scenario,
and although binary t-MIPPCs can not identify all malicious users as binary t-
separable codes do when the size of the coalition is at most t, they can identify,
as IPP codes do in the generic digital scenario [3, 32], at least one such malicious
authorized user, thereby helping stop the proliferation of the fraudulent content in
digital marketplace.
Therefore, we can say that in some sense, the signicance of t-MIPPCs re-
lies on their maximum sizes. For t = 2, we will show in Lemma 4.1.4 that a
t-MIPPC(n;M; q) is in fact a t-SC(n;M; q), so they have the same maximum size.
For t > 2, the maximum size of a t-SC(n;M; q) is O(qdn=(t 1)e) (see [16]), while
the maximum size of a t-MIPPC(n;M; q) will be shown in Theorem 4.2.2 to be
O(q(t+1)n=(2t)), except for the case that t is even and n is odd, where the value is
O(q((t+1)n+1)=(2t)). This is a signicant improvement on the number of codewords,
which makes the notion of MIPPCs useful.
Lemma 4.1.4 Let C be an (n;M; q) code. Then C is a 2-MIPPC(n;M; q) if and
only if it is a 2-SC(n;M; q).
Proof: From Lemma 4.1.3, we only need to consider its necessity. Assume that
C is a 2-MIPPC(n;M; q) such that C1; C2  C, jC1j  2, jC2j  2, C1 6= C2, and
desc(C1) = desc(C2). Then C1
T C2 6= ;. Let a 2 C1T C2. There are two cases to be
considered.
(1) C1 = fag, C2 = fa;bg: Since desc(C1) = desc(C2), we have a = b, which
implies C1 = C2.
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(2) C1 = fa;bg, C2 = fa; cg: Let a = (a(1); : : : ;a(n))T , b = (b(1); : : : ;b(n))T
and c = (c(1); : : : ; c(n))T . Since desc(C1) = desc(C2), we have fa(i);b(i)g =
fa(i); c(i)g for any 1  i  n. Now, if b(i) = a(i), then c(i) = b(i). On the
other hand, if b(i) 6= a(i), then c(i) = b(i) since fa(i);b(i)g = fa(i); c(i)g.
Hence, c(i) = b(i) holds for any 1  i  n. This implies b = c and thus
C1 = C2.
So for any distinct C1; C2  C such that 1  jC1j  2, 1  jC2j  2, it always holds
that desc(C1) 6= desc(C2). This means that C is a 2-SC(n;M; q). 
Now we describe a tracing algorithm based on a binary MIPPC. The following
theorem shows that binary t-MIPPCs can be used to identify at least one colluder
in the averaging attack.
Theorem 4.1.5 Under the assumption that the number of colluders in the averaging
attack is at most t, any t-MIPPC(n;M; 2) can be used to identify at least one colluder
with computational complexity O(nM t) by applying Algorithm 4.1 described below.
Proof: Let C be the t-MIPPC(n;M; 2), and R  C(1)     C(n) be the captured
descendant code derived from the detection statistics T. Then by applying the
following tracing algorithm, Algorithm 4.1, we can identify at least one colluder.
Algorithm 4.1: MIPPCTraceAlg(R)
Given R;
Find Pt(R) = fC0  C j jC0 j  t; R = desc(C0)g;
Compute C0 =
T
C02Pt(R)
C0 ;
if jC0j  t then
output C0 as the set of colluders;
else
output the set of colluders has size at least t+ 1";
The computational complexity is obvious. We need only to show that any user
u assigned with a codeword c 2 C0 is a colluder. Since R is the captured descendant
code derived from the detection statistics T, it is clear that Pt(R) 6= ;. Therefore,
C0 =
\
C02Pt(R)
C0 6= ;
by the denition of a t-MIPPC. Assume that u is not a colluder. Then for any
C0 2 Pt(R), we have C0 n fcg 2 Pt(R), which implies c =2 C0, a contradiction. 
The following theorem is a simple concatenation construction for binary t-MIPPCs
from q-ary t-MIPPCs, which stimulates us to investigate q-ary t-MIPPCs with short
length.
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Lemma 4.1.6 If there exists a t-MIPPC(n;M; q), then there exists a t-MIPPC(nq;
M; 2).
Proof: Let C = fc1; c2; : : : ; cMg be the t-MIPPC(n;M; q) dened on Q = f0; 1; : : : ;
q 1g, and E = fe1; e2; : : : ; eqg, where ei is the i-th column identity vector, i.e., all its
coordinates are 0 except the i-th one being 1. Let f : Q  ! E be the bijective map-
ping such that f(i) = ei+1. For any codeword c = (c(1); c(2); : : : ; c(n))
T 2 C, we
dene f(c) = (f(c(1)); f(c(2)); : : : ; f(c(n)))T . Obviously, f(c) is a binary column
vector of length nq. We dene a new (nq;M; 2) code F = ff(c1); f(c2); : : : ; f(cM )g.
We are going to show that F is in fact a t-MIPPC.
Consider any S  F(1)     F(nq) with Pt(S) = fF1; : : : ;Frg 6= ;. Each Fi
corresponds to a subcode Ci  C such that jCij  t, where Fi = ff(c) j c 2 Cig.
Since desc(F1) = desc(F2) =    = desc(Fr), we immediately have desc(C1) =
desc(C2) =    = desc(Cr). Since C is a t-MIPPC(n;M; q), we have
Tr
i=1 Ci 6= ;.
Let c 2 Tri=1 Ci, then c 2 Ci for any 1  i  r, which implies f(c) 2 Fi for any
1  i  r, and thus f(c) 2 Tri=1Fi. Therefore, Tri=1Fi 6= ;. This completes the
proof. 
4.2 Upper bounds
In this section, we discuss the upper bound on the size of an MIPPC. We rst derive
a general upper bound on the size of a t-MIPPC(n;M; q), and then investigate 3-
MIPPCs in more detail. By investigating the combinatorial properties of 3-MIPPCs
of length 2, we further derive a tight upper bound for 3-MIPPCs of length 2.
4.2.1 A general upper bound
LetMMIPPC(t; n; q) = maxfM j there exists a t-MIPPC(n;M; q)g. A t-MIPPC(n;
M; q) is said to be optimal if M = MMIPPC(t; n; q), and asymptotically optimal if
lim
q!1
M
MMIPPC(t;n;q)
= 1. Let GX;Y = G(u; v) be a bipartite graph on u vertices in
the class X and v vertices in the class Y . Without loss of generality, we may assume
that u  v. Let e(G) denote the number of edges of G, that is, the size of G.
Lemma 4.2.1 ([37, 36]) If a bipartite graph G(u; v) contains no cycle of length less
than or equal to 2l, where u  v, then
e(G) 
8<: (uv)
l+1
2l + c(u+ v); l is odd;
v
1
2u
l+2
2l + c(u+ v); l is even;
where c is a constant depending only on l.
An application of Lemma 4.2.1 is the following theorem.
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Theorem 4.2.2 MMIPPC(t; n; q)  q n2 (q n2t + 2c) if n is even, and
MMIPPC(t; n; q) 
(
q
n
2 (q
n+1
2t + c(q
1
2 + q 
1
2 )); t is even;
q
n
2 (q
n
2t + c(q
1
2 + q 
1
2 )); t is odd
if n is odd, where c is a constant depending only on t.
Proof: Let C be a t-MIPPC(n;M; q) dened on Q. We prove this theorem in two
cases.
If n is even, we construct a bipartite graph G(q
n
2 ; q
n
2 ) as follows. Let X = Y =
Q
n
2 . An edge connects a 2 X and b 2 Y if and only if (a;b)T 2 C. Obviously,
M = e(G). Suppose that there exists a 2t0-cycle in G, where 2  t0  t. Let
(a1;b1;a2;b2; : : : ; at0 ;bt0) be the 2t0-cycle, where ai, 1  i  t0, are distinct ver-
tices in X, and bi, 1  i  t0, are distinct vertices in Y . Then (ai;bi)T 2 C for
1  i  t0, and (a1;bt0)T ; (ai;bi 1)T 2 C for 2  i  t0. Let C1 = f(ai;bi)T j 1 
i  t0g, C2 = f(a1;bt0)T g
Sf(ai;bi 1)T j 2  i  t0g. Then desc(C1) = desc(C2),
but C1
T C2 = ;, a contradiction to the fact that C is a t-MIPPC(n;M; q). So G
contains no cycle of length less than or equal to 2t. The conclusion then comes from
Lemma 4.2.1.
If n is odd, we construct a bipartite graph G(q
n+1
2 ; q
n 1
2 ) with X = Q
n+1
2 ; Y =
Q
n 1
2 . Similarly, we can show that G contains no cycle of length less than or equal
to 2t, and the conclusion follows by Lemma 4.2.1. 
4.2.2 An upper bound for 3-MIPPCs of length 2
In order to derive a tight upper bound on the size of a 3-MIPPC of length 2, we
present a combinatorial characterization of 3-MIPPCs. We rst prove the following
lemma on 2-separable codes.
Lemma 4.2.3 Let C be a (2;M; q) code on Q. Then C is a 2-SC(2;M; q) if and
only if jA1a1
TA1a2 j  1 holds in C for any distinct elements a1; a2 2 Q.
Proof: Let C be a 2-SC(2;M; q). Assume that there exist distinct elements a1; a2 2
Q satisfying jA1a1
TA1a2 j  2. Suppose b1; b2 2 A1a1 TA1a2 , b1 6= b2. Then (a1; b1)T ,
(a1; b2)
T , (a2; b1)
T , (a2; b2)
T 2 C. Let C1 = f(a1; b1)T , (a2; b2)T g and C2 = f(a1; b2)T ,
(a2; b1)
T g. Then C1 6= C2 and desc(C1) = desc(C2), a contradiction to the denition
of a 2-SC(2;M; q).
Now we consider its suciency. Suppose that jA1a1
TA1a2 j  1 holds in C for
any distinct elements a1; a2 2 Q, but C is not a 2-SC(2;M; q). This implies that
there exist C1; C2  C, C1 6= C2, 1  jC1j  2 and 1  jC2j  2, such that desc(C1) =
desc(C2).
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Let C1 = fc1; c2g, C2 = fc3; c4g, C1 6= C2, and ci = (ai; bi)T for 1  i  4. We
remark here that we allow c1 = c2 or c3 = c4. Since desc(C1) = desc(C2), then
C1(1) = C2(1) and C1(2) = C2(2). This implies that a1 = a2 (or a3 = a4) if and only
if a1 = a2 = a3 = a4, and b1 = b2 (or b3 = b4) if and only if b1 = b2 = b3 = b4.
Now, if a1 = a2, then a1 = a2 = a3 = a4. Since C1 6= C2, we have b1 6= b2.
By the fact that C1(2) = C2(2), we have fb1; b2g = fb3; b4g, and therefore C1 = C2,
a contradiction. On the other hand, if a1 6= a2, then a3 6= a4. Clearly, b1 6=
b2, otherwise we can use a similar argument to conclude that C1 = C2. Now, we
have fa1; a2g = fa3; a4g and fb1; b2g = fb3; b4g as set equalities. Without loss of
generality, we may assume a1 = a3 and a2 = a4. In this case, if b1 = b3, then
b2 = b4, and thus C1 = C2, a contradiction. Therefore, b1 = b4 and b2 = b3, which
implies that A1a1
TA1a2 = fb1; b2g, a contradiction. This completes the proof. 
Now we turn our attention to 3-MIPPCs.
Lemma 4.2.4 Let C be a 3-MIPPC(n;M; q) dened on Q. Then
(I) jA1a1
TA1a2 j  1 always holds for any distinct elements a1; a2 2 Q;
(II) There do not exist distinct elements a1; a2; a3 2 Q and distinct vectors b1;b2;
b3 2 Qn 1 such that b1;b2 2 A1a1, b2;b3 2 A1a2, b1;b3 2 A1a3.
Proof: (I) If there exist distinct elements a1; a2 2 Q satisfying that jA1a1
TA1a2 j 
2, say b1 6= b2 2 A1a1
TA1a2 , then (a1;b1)T ; (a1;b2)T ; (a2;b1)T ; (a2;b2)T 2 C.
Let C1 = f(a1;b1)T ; (a2;b2)T g and C2 = f(a1;b2)T ; (a2;b1)T g. Then desc(C1) =
desc(C2), but C1
T C2 = ;, a contradiction to the denition of a 3-MIPPC(n;M; q).
(II) If there exist distinct elements a1; a2; a3 2 Q and distinct vectors b1;b2;b3 2
Qn 1 such that b1;b2 2 A1a1 , b2;b3 2 A1a2 , b1;b3 2 A1a3 , then (a1;b1)T , (a1;b2)T ,
(a2;b2)
T , (a2;b3)
T , (a3;b1)
T , (a3;b3)
T 2 C. Let C1 = f(a1;b1)T , (a2;b2)T ,
(a3;b3)
T g, C2 = f(a1;b2)T , (a2;b3)T ; (a3;b1)T g. Then desc(C1) = desc(C2), but
C1
T C2 = ;, a contradiction to the denition of a 3-MIPPC(n;M; q). 
It is of interest to see that the converse of Lemma 4.2.4 is true when n = 2.
Lemma 4.2.5 Let C be a (2;M; q) code dened on Q. If C satises the following
two conditions:
(I) jA1a1
TA1a2 j  1 always holds for any distinct elements a1; a2 2 Q;
(II) There do not exist distinct elements a1; a2; a3 2 Q and distinct elements
b1; b2; b3 2 Q, such that b1; b2 2 A1a1, b2; b3 2 A1a2, b1; b3 2 A1a3.
Then C is a 3-MIPPC(2;M; q).
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Proof: Suppose C satises conditions (I) and (II). We prove this lemma in three
steps.
(1) At rst, we prove that if there exist C1; C2  C, C1 6= C2, jC1j  3, jC2j  3,
satisfying desc(C1) = desc(C2), then C1 and C2 should be of one of the following three
types:
Type I:
c1 c2 c3 
a1 a2 a1
b1 b2 b2
!
;
where C1 = fc1; c2g, C2 = fc1; c2; c3g, a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2;
Type II:
c1 c2 c3 c4 
a1 a2 a3 a1
b1 b1 b3 b3
!
;
where C1 = fc1; c2; c3g, C2 = fc2; c3; c4g, ak1 6= ak2 , 1  k1 < k2  3, b1 6= b3;
Type III:
c1 c2 c3 c4 
a1 a1 a3 a3
b1 b2 b3 b1
!
;
where C1 = fc1; c2; c3g, C2 = fc2; c3; c4g, a1 6= a3, bk1 6= bk2 , 1  k1 < k2  3.
(1.1) If jC1j  2, jC2j  2, then C is not a 2-SC(2;M; q). However, according to
condition (I) and Lemma 4.2.3, C is a 2-SC(2;M; q), a contradiction. So this case
is impossible.
(1.2) If jC1j = 1, jC2j = 3, let C1 = fc1g, C2 = fc2; c3; c4g, where ci = (ai; bi)T ,
1  i  4. Then a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 and b1 = b2 = b3 = b4 according to
desc(C1) = desc(C2), which implies c1 = c2 = c3 = c4, a contradiction. So this case
is not possible either.
(1.3) Consider the case jC1j = 2, jC2j = 3. Let jC1j = fc1; c2g, jC2j = fc3; c4; c5g,
where ci = (ai; bi)
T , 1  i  5.
(1.3.A) If a1 = a2, then a3 = a4 = a5 = a1. Since fb1; b2g = fb3; b4; b5g, there
must be two identical elements in fb3; b4; b5g. We may assume b3 = b4. Then
c3 = c4, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
(1.3.B) If a1 6= a2, since desc(C1) = desc(C2), then a3; a4; a5 2 fa1; a2g and
b3; b4; b5 2 fb1; b2g. Without loss of generality, we may assume that a3 = a4 = a1 and
a5 = a2. Then b3 6= b4, otherwise, c3 = c4, a contradiction. Since b3; b4 2 fb1; b2g,
then b1 6= b2 and we may assume that b3 = b1 and b4 = b2.
c1 c2
 c3 c4 c5 
a1 a2 a1 a1 a2
b1 b2 b1 b2
!
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If b5 = b1, then b1; b2 2 A1a1
TA1a2 , that is, jA1a1 TA1a2 j  2, a contradiction to
condition (I). So this case is impossible.
If b5 = b2, then
c1 c2
 c3 c4 c5 
a1 a2 a1 a1 a2
b1 b2 b1 b2 b2
!
;
that is,
c1(c3) c2(c5) c4 
a1 a2 a1
b1 b2 b2
!
:
So C1 and C2 are of type I.
(1.4) Consider the case jC1j = 3, jC2j = 3. Let C1 = fc1; c2; c3g, C2 = fc4; c5; c6g,
where ci = (ai; bi)
T , 1  i  6.
(1.4.A) If a1 = a2 = a3 or b1 = b2 = b3, then C1 = C2, a contradiction. So this
case is impossible.
(1.4.B) Consider the case a1 = a2 and a3 6= a1. Then b1 6= b2, otherwise, c1 = c2,
a contradiction.
(1.4.B.a) Suppose b1 = b3. Since a3 2 fa4; a5; a6g, we may assume a4 = a3.
Then b4 = b1, otherwise, b4 = b2, which implies b1; b2 2 A1a1
TA1a3 , a contradiction
to condition (I).
c1 c2 c3
 c4 c5 c6 
a1 a1 a3 a3
b1 b2 b1 b1
!
Now we consider c5 and c6. If a5 = a3 or a6 = a3, similarly, we can show that
b5 = b1 or b6 = b1, respectively, which implies c5 = c4 or c6 = c4, respectively, a
contradiction. So a5 = a6 = a1. Then b5 6= b6, otherwise, c5 = c6, a contradiction.
Since b5; b6 2 fb1; b2g, we may assume that b5 = b1, b6 = b2.
c1 c2 c3
 c4 c5 c6 
a1 a1 a3 a3 a1 a1
b1 b2 b1 b1 b1 b2
!
Then C1 = C2, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
(1.4.B.b) Suppose bi 6= bj , 1  i < j  3. Since fb1; b2; b3g = fb4; b5; b6g, we
may assume that b4 = b1; b5 = b2; b6 = b3.
c1 c2 c3
 c4 c5 c6 
a1 a1 a3
b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
!
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It is impossible that (a4; a5) = (a1; a1). Otherwise, a6 = a3, which implies
C1 = C2, a contradiction.
It is not possible either that (a4; a5) = (a3; a3). Otherwise, b1; b2 2 A1a1
TA1a3 ,
a contradiction to condition (I).
If (a4; a5) = (a1; a3), then
c1 c2 c3
 c4 c5 c6 
a1 a1 a3 a1 a3
b1 b2 b3 b1 b2 b3
!
:
We should have a6 = a3. Otherwise, a6 = a1, then b2; b3 2 A1a1
TA1a3 , a contradic-
tion to condition (I). So
c2 c1(c4) c3(c6) c5 
a1 a1 a3 a3
b2 b1 b3 b2
!
;
and therefore, C1 and C2 are of type III.
Similarly, if (a4; a5) = (a3; a1), we can show that C1 and C2 are of type III.
(1.4.C) Consider the case ai 6= aj , 1  i < j  3. Since fa1; a2; a3g =
fa4; a5; a6g, we may assume that a4 = a1; a5 = a2; a6 = a3.
(1.4.C.a) Suppose b1 = b2 and b3 6= b1.
c1 c2 c3
 c4 c5 c6 
a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3
b1 b1 b3
!
It is impossible that (b4; b5) = (b1; b1). Otherwise, b6 = b3, which implies C1 =
C2, a contradiction.
It is not possible either that (b4; b5) = (b3; b3). Otherwise, b1; b3 2 A1a1
TA1a2 , a
contradiction to condition (I).
Suppose (b4; b5) = (b1; b3).
c1 c2 c3
 c4 c5 c6 
a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3
b1 b1 b3 b1 b3
!
Then b6 = b3. Otherwise, b6 = b1, then b1; b3 2 A1a2
TA1a3 , a contradiction to
condition (I). So
c2 c1(c4) c3(c6) c5 
a2 a1 a3 a2
b1 b1 b3 b3
!
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and thus C1 and C2 are of type II.
Similarly, if (b4; b5) = (b3; b1), we can derive that C1 and C2 are of type II.
(1.4.C.b) Suppose bi 6= bj , 1  i < j  3.
c1 c2 c3
 c4 c5 c6 
a1 a2 a3 a1 a2 a3
b1 b2 b3
!
It is impossible that (b4; b5; b6) = (b1; b2; b3). Otherwise, C1 = C2, a contradic-
tion.
It is impossible that (b4; b5; b6) = (b1; b3; b2). Otherwise, b2; b3 2 A1a2
TA1a3 , a
contradiction to condition (I).
It is impossible that (b4; b5; b6) = (b2; b1; b3). Otherwise, b1; b2 2 A1a1
TA1a2 , a
contradiction to condition (I).
It is impossible that (b4; b5; b6) = (b2; b3; b1). Otherwise, b1; b2 2 A1a1 , b2; b3 2
A1a2 , b1; b3 2 A1a3 , a contradiction to condition (II).
It is impossible that (b4; b5; b6) = (b3; b1; b2). Otherwise, b1; b3 2 A1a1 , b1; b2 2
A1a2 , b2; b3 2 A1a3 , a contradiction to condition (II).
Finally, it is not possible either that (b4; b5; b6) = (b3; b2; b1). Otherwise, b1; b3 2
A1a1
TA1a3 , a contradiction to condition (I).
(2) Now we prove that jP3(R)j  2 for any R  C(1)C(2). Assume that there
exists R  C(1)  C(2) such that jP3(R)j  3. Let C1; C2; C3 2 P3(R) be three
distinct sub-codes of C. According to (1), desc(Ci) = desc(Cj) implies Ci and Cj are
of one of the three types described in (1), where 1  i < j  3.
(2.1) If there exists an index i, 1  i  3, such that jCij = 2, without loss of
generality, we may assume jC1j = 2. Then C1 and C2 are of type I, C1 and C3 are of
type I. We may assume that C1 = fc1; c2g, C2 = fc1; c2; c3g, and C3 = fc1; c2; c4g,
where ci = (ai; bi)
T , 1  i  4. According to type I, c3; c4 2 f(a1; b2)T ; (a2; b1)T g.
Clearly c3 6= c4, otherwise C2 = C3, a contradiction. Therefore, b1; b2 2 A1a1
TA1a2 ,
which implies jA1a1
TA1a2 j  2, a contradiction to condition (I). So this case is
impossible.
(2.2) Consider the case jCij = 3 for all 1  i  3.
(2.2.A) Suppose C1 and C2 are of type II, C1 and C3 are of type II. Let C1 =
fc1; c2; c3g, C2 = fc2; c3; c4g, and C3 = fc5; c6; c7g, where ci = (ai; bi)T , 1  i  7.
According to type II, ak1 6= ak2 , 1  k1 < k2  3, b1 6= b3.
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 
a1 a2 a3 a1
b1 b1 b3 b3
!
Since C1 and C3 are of type II, we have jC1
T C3j = 2. Furthermore, because we
require b1 6= b3, we know C1
T C3 6= fc1; c2g.
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If C1
T C3 = fc1; c3g, we may assume c5 = c1; c6 = c3. Then we should have
c7 = (a2; b3)
T , and
c2 c1(c5) c3(c6) c7 c4 
a2 a1 a3 a2 a1
b1 b1 b3 b3 b3
!
;
which implies b1; b3 2 A1a1
TA1a2 , i.e., jA1a1 TA1a2 j  2, a contradiction to condition
(I). So this case is impossible.
If C1
T C3 = fc2; c3g, we may assume c5 = c2; c6 = c3. Then c7 = (a1; b3)T = c4,
which implies C2 = C3, a contradiction. So this case is not possible either.
(2.2.B) Suppose C1 and C2 are of type III, C1 and C3 are of type III. Similar to
(2.2.A), we can prove this case is impossible.
(2.2.C) Suppose C1 and C2 are of type II, C1 and C3 are of type III. Let C1 =
fc1; c2; c3g, C2 = fc2; c3; c4g.
c1 c2 c3 c4 
a1 a2 a3 a1
b1 b1 b3 b3
!
Since ak1 6= ak2 , 1  k1 < k2  3, it is impossible that C1 and C3 are of type III. So
this case is not possible either.
Therefore, as we claimed earlier, jP3(R)j  2 for any R  C(1) C(2).
(3) Finally, the conclusion comes from (1), (2), and the fact that C1
T C2 6= ;
whenever C1 and C2 are of type I, II, or III. 
Combining Lemma 4.2.4 with Lemma 4.2.5, we derive an important result as
follows.
Theorem 4.2.6 Let C be a (2;M; q) code dened on Q. Then C is a 3-MIPPC(2;M;
q) if and only if it satises the following two conditions:
(I) jA1a1
TA1a2 j  1 always holds for any distinct elements a1; a2 2 Q;
(II) There do not exist distinct elements a1; a2; a3 2 Q and distinct elements
b1; b2; b3 2 Q such that b1; b2 2 A1a1, b2; b3 2 A1a2, b1; b3 2 A1a3.
Now, we are going to derive a tight upper bound on the size of a 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)
based on Theorem 4:2:6.
Lemma 4.2.7 There exists a 3-MIPPC(2;M; q) if and only if there exists a bipartite
graph G(q; q) of girth at least 8 with e(G) = M .
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Proof: Suppose that there exists a 3-MIPPC(2;M; q), C, dened on Q. We con-
struct a bipartite graph G(q; q) as follows. Let X = Q  f1g and Y = Q  f2g.
An edge is incident to (a; 1) 2 X and (b; 2) 2 Y if and only if (a; b)T 2 C. Then
e(G) = M . We are going to show that G has girth at least 8.
Assume G(q; q) contains a 4-cycle, say ((a1; 1), (b1; 2), (a2; 1), (b2; 2)), where
(ai; 1), 1  i  2, are distinct elements of X, and (bi; 2), 1  i  2, are distinct
elements of Y . Then (a1; b1)
T ; (a2; b1)
T ; (a2; b2)
T ; (a1; b2)
T 2 C, and thus b1; b2 2
A1a1
TA1a2 , a contradiction to Theorem 4.2.6. So this case is impossible.
Assume G(q; q) contains a 6-cycle, say ((a1; 1), (b1; 2), (a2; 1), (b2; 2), (a3; 1),
(b3; 2)), where (ai; 1), 1  i  3, are distinct elements of X, and (bi; 2), 1  i  3,
are distinct elements of Y . Then (a1; b1)
T , (a2; b1)
T , (a2; b2)
T , (a3; b2)
T , (a3; b3)
T ,
(a1; b3)
T 2 C, and thus b1; b3 2 A1a1 , b1; b1 2 A1a2 , b2; b3 2 A1a3 , a contradiction to
Theorem 4.2.6. So this case is not possible either.
Therefore, the bipartite graph G(q; q) constructed above has girth at least 8,
with e(G) = M .
Conversely, for any bipartite graph G(q; q) = GX;Y with girth at least 8, we
construct a (2;M; q) code C. Let Q = X and f : Y  ! X be a bijective mapping.
A vector (x; f(y))T 2 C if and only if fx; yg is an edge of G, where x 2 X and
y 2 Y . Obviously, C is a (2;M; q) code dened on Q and M = e(G). Suppose that
C is not a 3-MIPPC(2;M; q). Then by Theorem 4.2.6, at least one of the following
cases should happen.
(1) There exist distinct elements x1; x2 2 Q such that jA1x1
TA1x2 j  2. In this
case, we may assume f(y1) 6= f(y2) 2 A1x1
TA1x2 . Then y1 6= y2, and (x1; f(y1))T ,
(x1; f(y2))
T , (x2; f(y1))
T ; (x2; f(y2))
T 2 C. Hence fx1; y1g, fx1; y2g, fx2; y1g,
fx2; y2g are edges of G forming a 4-cycle, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
(2) There exist distinct elements x1; x2; x3 2 Q and distinct elements f(y1); f(y2);
f(y3) 2 Q such that f(y1), f(y2) 2 A1x1 , f(y2), f(y3) 2 A1x2 , f(y1); f(y3) 2 A1x3 . In
this case, yi, 1  i  3, are all distinct, and (x1; f(y1))T , (x1; f(y2))T , (x2; f(y2))T ,
(x2; f(y3))
T , (x3; f(y3))
T , (x3; f(y1))
T 2 C. Hence fx1; y1g, fx1; y2g, fx2; y2g,
fx2; y3g, fx3; y3g, fx3, y1g are edges of G forming a 6-cycle, a contradiction. So this
case is not possible either.
Therefore, the (2;M; q) code C constructed above is a 3-MIPPC(2;M; q) with
M = e(G).
This completes the proof. 
García-Vázquez et al. [28] stated that any maximum bipartite graph G(q; q)
with size MMIPPC(3; 2; q) must have girth 8, for q  6 or q = 4. Therefore, we have
the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2.8 Let q  6 or q = 4. There exists a 3-MIPPC(2;M; q) if and only
if there exists a bipartite graph G(q; q) of girth 8 with e(G) = M .
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Lemma 4.2.9 ([42]) If G(u; v) contains no cycle of length 4 and 6, then its size e
satises the following inequality
e3   (u+ v)e2 + 2uve  u2v2  0:
Then the size of a 3-MIPPC(2;M; q) can be derived from Lemmas 4.2.7 and
4.2.9.
Corollary 4.2.10 For any 3-MIPPC(2;M; q), M3   2qM2 + 2q2M   q4  0.
4.3 Constructions for 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s
In this section, an innite series of optimal 3-MIPPCs of length 2 are derived by
generalized quadrangles. Several innite series of asymptotically optimal 3-MIPPCs
of length 2 are also constructed by deleting suitable points and lines from generalized
quadrangles.
4.3.1 Optimal 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s
MIPPCs are also closely related with generalized packings dened in Denition
2.2.1. A generalized packing (X;B) is called 4-free if for any three distinct elements
P1; P2; P3 2 X, if there are two blocks containing P1, P2 and P1, P3 respectively,
then there is no block containing P2, P3.
Theorem 4.3.1 There exists a 3-MIPPC(2;M; q) dened on Q = f0; 1; : : : ; q 1g if
and only if there exists a 4-free generalized (q; q;K; 1) packing (Q; fA10; : : : ;A1q 1g)
with K = fjA10j; : : : ; jA1q 1jg, and M = jA10j+   + jA1q 1j.
Proof: Suppose C is a 3-MIPPC(2;M; q) dened on Q, and A1i = fb 2 Q j (i; b)T 2
Cg for any i 2 Q. Then by Theorem 4.2.6, we know that (Q; fA10; : : : ;A1q 1g) is a
4-free generalized (q; q; fjA10j; : : :, jA1q 1jg; 1) packing, and M = jA10j+   + jA1q 1j.
Conversely, for any 4-free generalized (q; q;K; 1) packing (Q;B) with B =
fB0; : : : ; Bq 1g and M = jB0j +    + jBq 1j, we dene a set of vectors B1 =
fB10 ; : : : ; B1q 1g, with B1i = f(i; b)T j b 2 Big if Bi 6= ; and B1i = ; if Bi = ;,
0  i  q 1. By Theorem 4.2.6, it is readily checked that B1 is a 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)
dened on Q and A1i = Bi for any i 2 Q.
This completes the proof. 
Corollary 4.3.2 There exists an optimal 3-MIPPC(2;M; q) on Q = f0; 1; : : : ; q 1g
if and only if there exists a 4-free generalized (q; q;K; 1) packing with maximum
M = jA10j+   + jA1q 1j, where K = fjA10j; : : : ; jA1q 1jg,
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Now we show that some optimal 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s can be constructed by means
of generalized quadrangles.
Denition 4.3.3 A nite generalized quadrangle (GQ) is an incidence structure
S = (X;B; I) with point-set X and line-set B satisfying the following conditions:
(1) Each point is incident with 1 + t lines (t  1) and two distinct points are
incident with at most one line;
(2) Each line is incident with 1 + s points (s  1) and two distinct lines are
incident with at most one point;
(3) If x is a point and L is a line not incident with x, then there is a unique pair
(y;N) 2 X  B for which xINIyIL.
The integers s and t are the parameters of the GQ and S has order (s; t); if s = t,
S has order s.
From the denition, any generalized quadrangle has no triangles. It is known
(see [19]) that in a generalized quadrangle, jXj = (1+s)(1+st); jBj = (1+t)(1+st),
and s+ t divides st(1 + s)(1 + t).
Lemma 4.3.4 If there exits a GQ(s; t), then there exists a 4-free generalized (v; b;
f1 + sg; 1) packing, where v = (1 + s)(1 + st); b = (1 + t)(1 + st).
Proof: Suppose S = (X;B; I) is a GQ(s; t). By regarding the lines of S as blocks
and the points of S as elements, we easily obtain a4-free generalized (v; b; f1+sg; 1)
packing (X;B). 
Lemma 4.3.5 ([19]) Let k be a prime power and s  t be two positive integers.
Then there exist GQ(s; t)s for (s; t) 2 f(k   1; k + 1); (k; k); (k; k2); (k2; k3)g.
If there exists a GQ(s; t) with s  t, then Lemma 4.3.4 gives a4-free generalized
(v; b; f1 + sg; 1) packing with v = (1 + s)(1 + st)  (1 + t)(1 + st) = b. Deleting
b  v blocks, we obtain a 4-free generalized (v; v; f1 + sg; 1) packing.
Corollary 4.3.6 For any prime power k, there exist 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s for (M; q) 2
f(k4; k3); ((k2+1)(k+1)2; (k2+1)(k+1)); ((k3+1)(k+1)2; (k3+1)(k+1)); ((k5+
1)(k2 + 1)2; (k5 + 1)(k2 + 1))g.
Proof: Apply Theorem 4.3.1 with Lemmas 4.3.4, 4.3.5. 
Lemma 4.3.7 Let a; d be two positive integers with d2   2d+ 2  a = 0. Then for
any 3-MIPPC(2;M; ad), we have M  ad2.
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Proof: For any 3-MIPPC(2;M; q), by Corollary 4.2.10, we know thatM3 2qM2+
2q2M   q4  0. Let f(M) = M3  2qM2+2q2M   q4, then the derivative of f(M)
is
df
dM
(M) = 3M2   4qM + 2q2 = 3(M   2q
3
)2 +
2q2
3
> 0:
Therefore, f is a strictly increasing function on M . Let q = ad, where a and d are
positive integers such that d2   2d+ 2  a = 0. Then
f(ad2) = (ad2)3   2(ad)(ad2)2 + 2(ad)2(ad2)  (ad)4
= a3d6   2a3d5 + 2a3d4   a4d4
= a3d4(d2   2d+ 2  a)
= 0:
For anyM
0
> ad2, we have f(M
0
) > 0. So ad2 is the greatest integer which satises
the inequality M3   2qM2 + 2q2M   q4  0. This completes the proof. 
Therefore, we can derive optimal 3-MIPPCs.
Theorem 4.3.8 There exists an optimal 3-MIPPC(2; (k2+1)(k+1)2; (k2+1)(k+1))
for any prime power k.
Proof: A 3-MIPPC(2; (k2+1)(k+1)2; (k2+1)(k+1)) exists from Corollary 4.3.6.
Let a = k2 + 1; d = k + 1, then d2   2d+ 2  a = 0. Apply Lemma 4.3.7. 
4.3.2 Asymptotically optimal 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s
Corollaries 4.2.8 and 4.3.2 inspire us to construct optimal 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s via
bipartite graphs with girth 8 or maximum 4-free generalized (q; q;K; 1) packings.
Unfortunately, except for the result in Theorem 4.3.8, we do not know other innite
families of optimal 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s. However, we can construct several innite
families of asymptotically optimal 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s by deleting points and lines
from generalized quadrangles.
Theorem 4.3.9 There exists a 3-MIPPC(2; k4 + 2k3 + 2k2 + 2k   2sk; k3 + k2 +
k + 1  s) for every prime power k, where 1  s  k2 + k + 1.
Proof: If we can construct a 4-free generalized (k3 + k2 + k+ 1  s; k3 + k2 + k+
1  s; fk; k+1g; 1) packing with k3+ k2+ k  sk blocks of size k+1 and sk  s+1
blocks of size k, then the conclusion would follow from Theorem 4.3.1. According to
Lemma 4.3.5, there exists a GQ(k; k), say S = (X;B; I), for every prime power k.
Choose an arbitrary point x0;0 2 X. Let L0;j = fx0;0; x1;j ; : : : ; xk;jg, 0  j  k, be
the k+1 distinct lines incident with x0;0, and Li;1; : : : ; Li;k, 1  i  k, be the other
k distinct lines incident with xi;0 2 X. Let s1 = b s 1k c and s2 = s  1  ks1. Then
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the desired 4-free generalized packing can be constructed by deleting s points x0;0,
x1;0, : : :, xk;0, x1;1, : : :, xk;1, : : :, x1;s1 1, : : :, xk;s1 1, x1;s1 , : : :, xs2;s1 and s lines
L0;0; L0;1; : : : ; L0;k; L1;1, : : :, L1;k, : : :, Ls1 1;1, : : :, Ls1 1;k, Ls1;1, : : :, Ls1;s2 , where
the size of each line after deletion is k+1 or k because of the 4-freeness of the GQ.

Theorem 4.3.10 There exists a 3-MIPPC(2; k4 sk; k3 s) for every prime power
k, where 0  s  2k   1.
Proof: Similar to Theorem 4.3.9, we want to construct a 4-free generalized (k3  
s; k3 s; fkg; 1) packing. According to Lemma 4.3.5, there exists a GQ(k 1; k+1),
say S = (X;B; I), for any prime power k. Then jXj = k3 and jBj = k3 + 2k2.
Let x0 2 X and X0 = fx 2 X n fx0g j x0 and x are incident with a lineg. Then
jX0j = k2 + k   2. Let Xs = fx0; x1; : : : ; xs 1g  fx0g [ X0 and Bs = fL 2
B j L is incident with a point x 2 Xsg. By a simple counting argument, we know
that jBsj = (k + 2) + (s   1)(k + 1) = s + sk + 1. Then we can obtain a 4-free
generalized (v; b; k; 1) packing by deleting the s points in Xs and the s+sk+1 lines
in Bs from the GQ(k 1; k+1), S, where v = k3 s and b = k3 s+(2k2 sk 1).
Since 0  s  2k   1, we have b  v. Therefore the desired 4-free generalized
packing exists by further deleting b   v blocks of the 4-free generalized (v; b; k; 1)
packing. 
Theorem 4.3.11 There exists a 3-MIPPC(2; k4+2k3+2k2  sk  s+ b s 1k+1c; k3+
2k2   s) for every prime power k, where 1  s  k2 + k + 1.
Proof: According to Lemma 4.3.5 and the point-line duality of GQs (see, for ex-
ample, [19]), there exists a GQ(k + 1; k   1) for any prime power k. Suppose that
S is a GQ(k+1; k  1). Then jXj = k3+2k2 and jBj = k3. Pick an arbitrary point
x 2 X. Suppose Li = fx; xi;1; : : : ; xi;k+1g, 1  i  k, are k distinct lines containing
x, and each Pi is the point-set of Li. Let s1 = b s 1k+1c, s2 = s  1  s1(k + 1), and
Ps =
8>>>><>>>>:
fxg; if s = 1;
fxgS( s1S
i=1
Pi); if s 6= 1 and s  1 (mod k + 1);
fxgS( s1S
i=1
Pi)
Sfxs1+1;1;    ; xs1+1;s2g; otherwise:
For a given s, we can delete the point-set Ps and derive a 4-free generalized
(v; b; fk+1  s2; k+1; k+2g; 1) packing with (s  1)(k  1)+ k  s1  h(s2) blocks
of size k + 1, k3   k   (s   1)(k   1) blocks of size k + 2, and h(s2) block of size
k + 1  s2, where v = k3 + 2k2   s, b = k3   s1, and
h(s2) =
(
0; if s2 = 0;
1; otherwise:
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Then v b = 2k2 s+s1 > 0. So, the desired generalized packing can be constructed
by adding v   b blocks containing exactly one point belonging to X n Ps. Now we
compute the value M .
M = [(s  1)(k   1) + k   s1   h(s2)](k + 1)
+ [k3   k   (s  1)(k   1)](k + 2)
+ h(s2)(k + 1  s2) + 2k2   s+ s1
= k4 + 2k3 + 2k2   sk   s1k   1  h(s2)s2:
If s2 6= 0, then h(s2)s2 = s2; if s2 = 0, then h(s2)s2 = 0 = s2. So
M = k4 + 2k3 + 2k2   sk   s1k   1  s2
= k4 + 2k3 + 2k2   sk   s1k   1  (s  1  s1(k + 1))
= k4 + 2k3 + 2k2   sk   s  s1
= k4 + 2k3 + 2k2   sk   s  b s  1
k + 1
c:
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 4.3.12 The 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s constructed in Theorems 4.3.9, 4.3.10
and 4.3.11 are asymptotically optimal.
Proof: Here, we only prove that the 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s constructed in Theorem
4.3.10 are asymptotically optimal. The other two cases can be proved in a similar
way. Note that in Theorem 4.3.10, q = k3   s, M = k4   sk, where k is a prime
power and 0  s  2k   1.
Just as in the proof of Lemma 4.3.7, we consider the strictly increasing function
f(M) = M3   2qM2 + 2q2M   q4, and also the cubic equation f(M) = 0. Let
a = 1; b =  2q; c = 2q2; d =  q4. Then the discriminant of the above-mentioned
cubic equation is D = 18abcd  4b3d+ b2c2  4ac3  27a2d2 = q6(40q  16  27q2) <
0, which implies that this cubic equation has one real root M0 and two complex
conjugate roots (see, for example, [34], and also [42]), where
M0 =   b
3a
  1
3a
3
r
1
2
[2b3   9abc+ 27a2d+
p
 27a2D]
  1
3a
3
r
1
2
[2b3   9abc+ 27a2d 
p
 27a2D]
=
2q
3
  q
3
3
r
1
2
[20  27q +
p
27(27q2   40q + 16)]
  q
3
3
r
1
2
[20  27q  
p
27(27q2   40q + 16)]:
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Noting that f(0) =  q4 < 0, we haveM0 > 0. By Corollary 4.2.10,MMIPPC(3; 2; q)
M0, and then 0 < MM0  MMMIPPC(3;2;q)  1. Therefore it is sucient to prove that
lim
q!1
M
M0
= 1 holds.
Since q = k3   s, we have
lim
q!1
M0
k4
= lim
k!1
M0
k4
= lim
k!1
2q
3k4
  lim
k!1
q
3k4
3
r
1
2
[20  27q +
p
27(27q2   40q + 16)]
  lim
k!1
q
3k4
3
r
1
2
[20  27q  
p
27(27q2   40q + 16)]
= 0  0  ( 1)
= 1;
then
lim
q!1
M
M0
= lim
k!1
M
M0
=
lim
k!1
M
k4
lim
k!1
M0
k4
=
1
1
= 1:
This completes the proof. 
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Chapter 5
Strong Multimedia Identiable
Parent Property Codes
From what has been discussed in Chapter 4, we know that any binary t-MIPPC can
capture at least one colluder by applying Algorithm 4.1 if the number of colluders is
less than or equal to t with computational complexity O(nM t), where n is the length
of the code and M is the number of authorized users. Obviously, the computational
complexity O(nM t) is not ecient for practical use. Therefore, we introduce the
notion of a strong multimedia identiable parent property code (t-SMIPPC) in this
chapter. We show that any binary t-SMIPPC can be used to identify at least
one colluder in the averaging attack by applying Algorithm 3.1 with computational
complexity O(nM), which is clearly more ecient than that of a t-MIPPC.
In Section 5.1, we introduce the notion of an SMIPPC, describe a colluder trac-
ing algorithm based on a binary SMIPPC, and present a concatenation construction
for binary SMIPPCs from q-ary SMIPPCs. In Section 5.2, we discuss the relation-
ships between t-SMIPPCs and other ngerprinting codes, and derive several innite
series of optimal q-ary t-SMIPPCs of length 2 with t = 2; 3. In Section 5.3, we
investigate combinatorial properties of q-ary 2-SMIPPCs of length 3, and optimal
q-ary 2-SMIPPCs of length 3 with q  0; 1; 2; 5 (mod 6) are constructed by means
of dierence matrices.
5.1 Tracing algorithm for strong multimedia identiable
parent property codes
In this section, we introduce a notion of an SMIPPC, describe a tracing algorith-
m based on a binary SMIPPC, and show a concatenation construction for binary
SMIPPCs from q-ary SMIPPCs.
Denition 5.1.1 Let C be an (n;M; q) code, and t  2 be an integer. C is a
strong multimedia identiable parent property code, or t-SMIPPC(n;M; q), if for any
C0  C, 1  jC0j  t, we have
T
C02S(C0) C
0 6= ;, where S(C0) = fC0  C j desc(C0) =
desc(C0)g.
Example 5.1.2 Consider the following (3; 4; 2) code C:
c1 c2 c3 c4
C =
0B@ 1 0 0 00 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1CA
Then
desc(fc1g) = f1g  f0g  f0g;
desc(fc2g) = f0g  f1g  f1g;
desc(fc3g) = f0g  f0g  f1g;
desc(fc4g) = f0g  f1g  f0g;
desc(fc1; c2g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc1; c3g) = f0; 1g  f0g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc1; c4g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0g;
desc(fc2; c3g) = f0g  f0; 1g  f1g;
desc(fc2; c4g) = f0g  f1g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc3; c4g) = f0g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc1; c2; c3g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc1; c2; c4g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc1; c3; c4g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc2; c3; c4g) = f0g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g;
desc(fc1; c2; c3; c4g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g:
It is easy to check that
S(fc1g) = ffc1gg and
T
C02S(fc1g) C
0
= fc1g 6= ;;
S(fc2g) = ffc2gg and
T
C02S(fc2g) C
0
= fc2g 6= ;;
S(fc3g) = ffc3gg and
T
C02S(fc3g) C
0
= fc3g 6= ;;
S(fc4g) = ffc4gg and
T
C02S(fc4g) C
0
= fc4g 6= ;;
S(fc1; c2g) = ffc1; c2g; fc1; c2; c3g; fc1; c2; c4g; fc1; c3; c4g; fc1; c2; c3; c4gg andT
C02S(fc1;c2g) C
0
= fc1g 6= ;;
S(fc1; c3g) = ffc1; c3gg and
T
C02S(fc1;c3g) C
0
= fc1; c3g 6= ;;
S(fc1; c4g) = ffc1; c4gg and
T
C02S(fc1;c4g) C
0
= fc1; c4g 6= ;;
S(fc2; c3g) = ffc2; c3gg and
T
C02S(fc2;c3g) C
0
= fc2; c3g 6= ;;
S(fc2; c4g) = ffc2; c4gg and
T
C02S(fc2;c4g) C
0
= fc2; c4g 6= ;;
S(fc3; c4g) = ffc3; c4g; fc2; c3; c4gg and
T
C02S(fc3;c4g) C
0
= fc3; c4g 6= ;:
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So the code C is a 2-SMIPPC(3; 4; 2).
The following relationship immediately comes from Denitions 3.1.1 and 5.1.1.
Lemma 5.1.3 Any t-SSC(n;M; q) is a t-SMIPPC(n;M; q).
The following is an equivalent denition of an SMIPPC.
Denition 5.1.4 Let C be an (n;M; q) code, and t  2 be an integer. For any
R  C(1)     C(n), dene the set of parent sets of R as
P(R) = fC0  C j desc(C0) = Rg:
We say C is a strong multimedia identiable parent property code, or t-SMIPPC(n;M;
q), if
T
C02P(R) C
0 6= ; is satised for all R  C(1)  C(n) with Pt(R) 6= ;, where
Pt(R) = fC0  C j jC0 j  t; desc(C0) = Rg:
We can also derive the following relationship from Denitions 4.1.1 and 5.1.4.
Lemma 5.1.5 Any t-SMIPPC(n;M; q) is a t-MIPPC(n;M; q).
The following theorem shows that a t-SMIPPC(n;M; 2) can be used to identify
at least one colluder in the averaging attack with computational complexity O(nM),
which is more ecient than that of a t-MIPPC(n;M; 2). We in fact use Algorithm
3.1 in Section 3.1.
Theorem 5.1.6 Under the assumption that the number of colluders in the averaging
attack is at most t, any t-SMIPPC(n;M; 2) can be used to identify at least one
colluder with computational complexity O(nM) by applying Algorithm 3.1.
Proof: Let C be the t-SMIPPC(n;M; 2), and R be the descendant code derived
from the detection statistics T. Then by applying Algorithm 3.1, one can identify
at least one colluder. The computational complexity is clearly O(nM).
According to Algorithm 3.1, by deleting all columns fc 2 C j 9 1  i  n;R(i) =
f1g; c(i) = 0; or R(i) = f0g; c(i) = 1g, we obtain a sub-matrix CL of C. Suppose
that C0 = fu1; u2; : : : ; urg, 1  r  t, is the set of colluders, the codeword ci
is assigned to the colluder ui, 1  i  r, and C0 = fc1; c2; : : : ; crg. It is not
dicult to see that C0  CL. According to the denition of a t-SMIPPC, we haveT
C02S(C0) C
0 6= ;, where S(C0) = fC0  C j desc(C0) = desc(C0) = Rg. We prove this
theorem in three steps.
(1) CL 2 S(C0), that is desc(CL) = R. For any 1  j  n, we consider the
following cases.
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(1.1) R(j) = f1g. For any c 2 CL, c(j) = 1 according to the processes deriving
CL. So, CL(j) = f1g = R(j).
(1.2) R(j) = f0g. For any c 2 CL, c(j) = 0 according to the processes deriving
CL. So, CL(j) = f0g = R(j).
(1.3) R(j) = f0; 1g. Since desc(C0) = R, we know that there exist c1; c2 2 C0 
CL such that c1(j) = 0 and c2(j) = 1, respectively. This implies CL(j) = f0; 1g =
R(j).
According to (1.1)-(1.3) above, for any 1  j  n, we have CL(j) = R(j), which
implies desc(CL) = R.
(2) We want to show that for any x 2 TC02S(C0) C0 , there exists 1  j  n, such
that x(j) = 1 and c(j) = 0 for any c 2 CL n fxg, or x(j) = 0 and c(j) = 1 for
any c 2 CL n fxg. Assume not. Then for any 1  j  n, x(j) = 1 implies that
there exists c1 2 CL n fxg such that c1(j) = 1, and x(j) = 0 implies that there
exists c2 2 CL n fxg such that c2(j) = 0. Then we have desc(CL) = desc(CL n fxg).
Since CL 2 S(C0) by (1), we can have CL n fxg 2 S(C0), and x =2
T
C02S(C0) C
0
, a
contradiction.
(3) At last, according to Algorithm 3.1 and (2), it suces to show that any
user u assigned with a codeword x 2 TC02S(C0) C0 is a colluder. Assume that u is
not a colluder. Then for any C0 2 S(C0), we have C0 n fxg 2 S(C0), which implies
x =2 TC02S(C0) C0 , a contradiction.
This completes the proof. 
The following is a concatenation construction for binary t-SMIPPCs from q-ary
t-SMIPPCs, which makes the research of q-ary t-SMIPPCs interesting.
Lemma 5.1.7 If there exists a t-SMIPPC(n;M; q), then there exists a t-SMIPPC(nq;
M; 2).
Proof: Let C = fc1; c2; : : : ; cMg be a t-SMIPPC(n;M; q) dened on Q = f0; 1; : : : ;
q 1g, and E = fe1; e2; : : : ; eqg, where ei is the i-th column identity vector, i.e., all its
coordinates are 0 except the i-th one being 1. Let f : Q  ! E be the bijective map-
ping such that f(i) = ei+1. For any codeword c = (c(1); c(2); : : : ; c(n))
T 2 C, we
dene f(c) = (f(c(1)); f(c(2)); : : : ; f(c(n)))T . Obviously, f(c) is a binary column
vector of length nq. We dene a new (nq;M; 2) code F = ff(c1); f(c2); : : : ; f(cM )g.
We are going to show that F is in fact a t-SMIPPC.
Consider any F0  F with jF0j  t, and S(F0) = fF 0  F j desc(F 0) =
desc(F0)g = fF0;F1; : : : ;Frg. Each Fi corresponds to a subcode Ci  C such that
jCij = jFij, where Fi = ff(c) j c 2 Cig. Since desc(F0) = desc(F1) =    =
desc(Fr), we immediately have desc(C0) = desc(C1) =    = desc(Cr). Since C is a
t-SMIPPC(n;M; q) and jC0j = jF0j  t, we have
Tr
i=0 Ci 6= ;. Let c 2
Tr
i=0 Ci, then
c 2 Ci for any 0  i  r, which implies f(c) 2 Fi for any 0  i  r, and thus
f(c) 2 Tri=0Fi. Therefore, Tri=0Fi 6= ;. This completes the proof. 
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5.2 Optimal t-SMIPPC(2;M; q)s with small t
Similar to the denition of optimal SCs, we can dene optimal t-SMIPPCs. Let
MSMIPPC(t; n; q) = maxfM j there exists a t-SMIPPC(n;M; q)g. A t-SMIPPC(n;
M; q) is said to be optimal if M = MSMIPPC(t; n; q). In this section, we establish
two equivalences in Corollary 5.2.2 and Theorem 5.2.4, respectively. Based on these
two relationships and the known results in Theorems 2.2.22 and 4.3.8, several innite
series of optimal t-SMIPPC(2;M; q)s with t = 2; 3 are derived.
Theorem 5.2.1 Let C be a (2;M; q) code. Then C is a 2-SMIPPC(2;M; q) if and
only if it is a 2-MIPPC(2;M; q).
Proof: According to Lemma 5.1.5, it suces to consider the suciency. Let C
be a 2-MIPPC(2;M; q), which implies that C is a 2-SC(2;M; q) from Lemma 4.1.4.
Assume that C is not a 2-SMIPPC(2;M; q). Then there exists C0  C, 1  jC0j  2,
such that
T
C02S(C0) C
0
= ;, where S(C0) = fC0  C j desc(C0) = desc(C0)g. If
jC0j = 1, then it is clear that S(C0) = fC0g, which implies
T
C02S(C0) C
0
= C0 6= ;,
a contradiction. So jC0j = 2. Let C0 = fc1; c2g, ci = (ai; bi)T , where i = 1; 2.
Obviously, for any C0 2 S(C0), we have C0  desc(C0)
T C. We now consider the
Hamming distance d(c1; c2) of c1 and c2.
(1) If d(c1; c2) = 1, we may assume a1 = a2, b1 6= b2. We can easily see that
S(C0) = fC0g, which implies
T
C02S(C0) C
0
= C0 6= ;, a contradiction. So this case is
impossible.
(2) If d(c1; c2) = 2, then a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and desc(C0) = fc1; c2; c3; c4g,
where c3 = (a1; b2)
T and c4 = (a2; b1)
T . Then jdesc(C0)
T Cj  3. Otherwise,
if jdesc(C0)
T Cj = 4, i.e., desc(C0)T C = fc1; c2; c3; c4g, then desc(fc1; c2g) =
desc(fc3; c4g), a contradiction to the fact that C is a 2-SC. Since C is a 2-SC(2;M; q),
for any C0 2 S(C0), C0 6= C0, we have jC0 j  3. Together with the facts C0 
desc(C0)
T C and jdesc(C0)T Cj  3, one can derive C0 = desc(C0)T C. Hence
C0  desc(C0)
T C = C0 , which implies TC02S(C0) C0 = C0 6= ;, a contradiction.
So this case is impossible.
This completes the proof. 
The following result comes from Lemma 4.1.4 and Theorem 5.2.1.
Corollary 5.2.2 Let C be an (n;M; q) code. Then C is a 2-SMIPPC(2;M; q) if and
only if it is a 2-SC(2;M; q).
Thus, according to Theorem 2.2.22 and Corollary 5.2.2, one can obtain optimal
2-SMIPPC(2;M; q)s.
Corollary 5.2.3 Let k  2 be a prime power. Then there is an optimal 2-SMIPPC(2;
M; q) for any q 2 fk2   1; k2 + k   2; k2 + k   1; k2 + k; k2 + k + 1g.
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Similarly, we also nd an equivalence between a 3-SMIPPC(2;M; q) and a 3-
MIPPC(2;M; q) as follows.
Theorem 5.2.4 Let C be an (2;M; q) code. Then C is a 3-SMIPPC(2;M; q) if and
only if it is a 3-MIPPC(2;M; q).
Proof: By Lemma 5.1.5, it suces to consider the suciency. Suppose that C is a
3-MIPPC(2;M; q). Then C is also a 2-MIPPC(2;M; q), which implies that C is a 2-
SMIPPC(2;M; q) from Theorem 5.2.1. Assume that C is not a 3-SMIPPC(2;M; q).
Then there exists C0  C, 1  jC0j  3, such that
T
C02S(C0) C
0
= ;, where S(C0) =
fC0  C j desc(C0) = desc(C0)g. Obviously, for any C0 2 S(C0), we have C0 
desc(C0)
T C. Then, at least one of the following cases should occur. However, we
can prove none of them is possible.
(1) 1  jC0j  2. Since C is a 2-SMIPPC(2;M; q),
T
C02S(C0) C
0 6= ;, a contradic-
tion. So this case is impossible.
(2) If jC0j = 3, then let C0 = fc1; c2; c3g, where ci = (ai; bi)T , 1  i  3.
(2.1) If a1 = a2 = a3, then bi 6= bj , 1  i < j  3. We can easily see that
S(C0) = fC0g, which implies
T
C02S(C0) C
0
= C0 6= ;, a contradiction. So this case is
impossible.
(2.2) If a1 = a2 6= a3, then b1 6= b2. Let C1 = (desc(C0)
T C)nC0. Then b1 =2 C1(2)
or b2 =2 C1(2). Otherwise, b1; b2 2 C1(2), which implies that (a3; b1)T ; (a3; b2)T 2 C.
Then we have desc(fc1; (a3; b2)T g) = desc(fc2; (a3; b1)T g), and fc1; (a3; b2)T g
Tfc2;
(a3; b1)
T g = ;, a contradiction to the denition of a 3-MIPPC.
(2.2.A) If b1 =2 C1(2), then c1 is the only codeword such that c1 2 desc(C0)
T C
and c1(2) = b1. Since C0  desc(C0)
T C, we should have c1 2 C0 for any C0 2
S(C0). Otherwise, if c1 =2 C0 , then b1 =2 C0(2), which implies desc(C0) 6= desc(C0)
as b1 2 C0(2), a contradiction. So, in this case, c1 2
T
C02S(C0) C
0
, which impliesT
C02S(C0) C
0 6= ;, a contradiction to the assumption. So this case is impossible.
(2.2.B) If b2 =2 C1(2), similar to (2.2.A), we can have c2 2
T
C02S(C0) C
0
, which
implies
T
C02S(C0) C
0 6= ;, a contradiction to the assumption. So this case is impos-
sible.
(2.3) If ai 6= aj , 1  i < j  3, we only need to consider the case bi 6= bj ,
1  i < j  3, because we can consider the other two cases in a similar way with
(2.1) and (2.2). In this case, we have
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 c8 c9
desc(C0) =
 
a1 a2 a3 a1 a1 a2 a2 a3 a3
b1 b2 b3 b2 b3 b1 b3 b1 b2
!
If desc(C0)
T C = C0, we can check that for any C0 2 S(C0), C0  desc(C0)T C =
desc(C0)
T C = C0, then jC0 j  jC0j = 3, and hence TC02S(C0) C0 6= ; as C is a 3-
MIPPC, a contradiction to the assumption. So desc(C0)
T C contains at least one of
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the words c4; c5; c6; c7; c8; c9. Without loss of generality, we only need to consider
the case c4 2 desc(C0)
T C. Then c6 =2 desc(C0)T C, otherwise, desc(fc1; c2g) =
desc(fc4; c6g), and fc1; c2g
Tfc4; c6g = ;, a contradiction to the denition of a
3-MIPPC. We are going to show that c7; c8 2 desc(C0)
T C. If c7 =2 desc(C0)T C
(or c8 =2 desc(C0)
T C), then for any C0 2 S(C0), we have c2 2 C0 (or c1 2 C0),
otherwise, a2 =2 C0(1) (or b1 =2 C0(2)), which implies desc(C0) 6= desc(C0) as a2 2 C0(1)
(or b1 2 C0(2)). Hence c2 2
T
C02S(C0) C
0
(or c1 2
T
C02S(C0) C
0
), which impliesT
C02S(C0) C
0 6= ;, a contradiction to the assumption. So, c4; c7; c8 2 desc(C0)
T C.
Then desc(fc1; c2; c3g) = desc(fc4; c7; c8g), while fc1; c2; c3g
Tfc4; c7; c8g = ;, a
contradiction to the denition of a 3-MIPPC. So this case is impossible.
This completes the proof. 
The above theorem shows that the optimal 3-MIPPCs of length 2 in Theorem
4.3.8 are in fact optimal 3-SMIPPCs of length 2.
Corollary 5.2.5 There exists an optimal 3-SMIPPC(2; (k2+1)(k+1)2; (k2+1)(k+
1)) for any prime power k.
5.3 Optimal 2-SMIPPC(3;M; q)s
In this section, we will investigate combinatorial properties of a 2-SMIPPC(3;M;
q), and then derive forbidden congurations of a 2-SMIPPC(3;M; q). Optimal 2-
SMIPPC(3;M; q)s are also constructed for each q  0; 1; 2; 5 (mod 6).
5.3.1 General idea
At rst, one can easily derive the following result from Lemmas 5.1.5 and 4.1.4.
Corollary 5.3.1 Any 2-SMIPPC(n;M; q) is a 2-SC(n;M; q).
Lemma 5.3.2 ([16]) For any 2-SC(3;M; q), we have M  q2 + q(q 1)2 .
Then an upper bound on the size of a 2-SMIPPC(3;M; q) can be derived by
Corollary 5.3.1 and Lemma 5.3.2.
Theorem 5.3.3 For any 2-SMIPPC(3;M; q), we have M  q2 + q(q 1)2 .
Next, we try to nd out forbidden congurations of a 2-SMIPPC(3;M; q).
Theorem 5.3.4 Let C be a 2-SC(3;M; q). Then C is a 2-SMIPPC(3;M; q) if and
only if for any C0 = fc1; c2g = f(a1; b1; e1)T ; (a2; b2; e2)T g  C, where a1 6= a2,
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b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, we have desc(C0)
T C is not of type IV mentioned in Lemma
3.3.2: 0B@ a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1
1CA
Proof: Suppose that C is a 2-SMIPPC(3;M; q). If there exists C0 = fc1; c2g =
f(a1; b1; e1)T ; (a2; b2; e2)T g  C, where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, such that
desc(C0)
T C is of type IV, then we can derive that desc(fc1; c2g) = desc(f(a1; b1; e2)T ;
(a1; b2; e1)
T ; (a2; b1; e1)
T g), while fc1; c2g
Tf(a1; b1; e2)T ; (a1; b2; e1)T ; (a2; b1; e1)T g =
;, a contradiction to the denition of a 2-SMIPPC.
Conversely, suppose that C is a 2-SC(3;M; q), and for any C0 = fc1; c2g =
f(a1; b1; e1)T ; (a2; b2; e2)T g  C, where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, we have
desc(C0)
T C is not of type IV. We will show TC02S(C0) C0 6= ;.
(1) If for any C0 2 S(C0), we have C0  C0 , then
T
C02S(C0) C
0
= C0 6= ;.
(2) If there exists C00 2 S(C0) such that C0 6 C00 , then by Lemma 3.3.2, we
know that desc(C0)
T C is of one of the four types mentioned in Lemma 3.3.2. Since
desc(C0)
T C is not of type IV, we know that desc(C0)T C is of one of the types I,
II, III.
(2.1) If desc(C0)
T C is of type I, then for any C0 2 S(C0), we have C0 
desc(C0)
T C, and thus c2 2 C0 , otherwise, a2 =2 C0(1), which implies desc(C0) 6=
desc(C0), that is C0 =2 S(C0), a contradiction. So we have c2 2
T
C02S(C0) C
0
, which
implies
T
C02S(C0) C
0 6= ;.
(2.2) If desc(C0)
T C is of type II, then for any C0 2 S(C0), we have C0 
desc(C0)
T C, and thus c2 2 C0 , otherwise, b2 =2 C0(2), which implies desc(C0) 6=
desc(C0), that is C0 =2 S(C0), a contradiction. So we have c2 2
T
C02S(C0) C
0
, which
implies
T
C02S(C0) C
0 6= ;.
(2.3) If desc(C0)
T C is of type III, then for any C0 2 S(C0), we have C0 
desc(C0)
T C, and thus c2 2 C0 , otherwise, e2 =2 C0(3), which implies desc(C0) 6=
desc(C0), that is C0 =2 S(C0), a contradiction. So we have c2 2
T
C02S(C0) C
0
, which
implies
T
C02S(C0) C
0 6= ;.
Therefore, C is a 2-SMIPPC(3;M; q). 
Now we turn our attention to the constructions of 2-SMIPPC(3;M; q)s. Let us
start from the denition of a dierence matrix.
Denition 5.3.5 A cyclic dierence matrix (q; k; 1)-CDM is a k  q matrix D =
(dij) with dij 2 Zq such that for any 1  i1 6= i2  k, the dierences di1j   di2j,
1  j  q, comprise all the elements of Zq.
Similar to [16], suppose that there exists a (q; 3; 1)-CDM D. Without loss of
generality, we may assume that
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D =
0B@ 0 0    00 1    q   1
x0 x1    xq 1
1CA : (5.1)
Let S be a 3 w matrix on Zq as follows.
S =
0B@ 0 0    0s1 s2    sw
t1 t2    tw
1CA : (5.2)
Let
CD = fc+ g j c 2 D; g 2 Zqg; CS = fc+ g j c 2 S; g 2 Zqg; C = CD
[
CS : (5.3)
Theorem 5.3.6 ([16]) Suppose that D is a (q; 3; 1)-CDM in the form (5.1) and S
is a 3  w matrix in the form (5.2), where jfs1; s2; : : : ; swgj = jft1; t2; : : : ; twgj =
jft1 s1; t2 s2; : : : ; tw swgj = w. Then, the following two statements are equivalent:
(1) C in the form (5.3) is a 2-SC(3; q(q + w); q);
(2) For any two columns (0; si; ti)
T and (0; sj ; tj)
T in S, 1  i 6= j  w, suppose
(0; y; xy)
T , (0; z; xz)
T , (0; yi; xyi)
T , (0; yj ; xyj )
T , (0; zi; xzi)
T , (0; zj ; xzj )
T 2 D,
where y; z; yi; yj ; zi; zj 2 Zq, such that8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
ti   si = xy   y;
tj   sj = xz   z;
ti = xyi ;
tj = xyj ;
si = zi;
sj = zj :
Then we have 0 =2 fti   xy; tj   xz; (ti   xy) (tj   xz); si   yi; sj   yj ; (si  
yi) (sj   yj); ti   xzi ; tj   xzj ; (ti   xzi) (tj   xzj )g.
Theorem 5.3.7 Suppose that C is a 2-SC(3; q(q + w); q) in the form (5.3) on Zq,
and E = f(y; xy) j y 2 Zqg
S f(si; ti) j 1  i  wg. Then C is a 2-SMIPPC(3; q(q+
w); q) provided that the following hold:
(I) There do not exist distinct 1  i1; i2; i3  w and y 2 Zq, such that8>>>><>>>>:
y = si1 ;
xy = ti2 ;
xy   y = ti3   si3 ;
(si2 + ti3   xy; ti1 + ti3   xy) 2 E:
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(II) There do not exist distinct y1; y2; y3 2 Zq and 1  i  w, such that8>>>><>>>>:
si = y1;
ti = xy2 ;
ti   si = xy3   y3;
(y2 + xy3   ti; xy1 + xy3   ti) 2 E:
Proof: It is not dicult to check that CD and CS are codes with minimum distance
2, where the minimum distance of a code is the smallest Hamming distance between
two distinct codewords. Assume that C is not a 2-SMIPPC. According to Theorem
5.3.4, there exists C0 = fc1; c2g = f(a1; b1; e1)T ; (a2; b2; e2)T g  C, where a1 6= a2,
b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, such that desc(C0)
T C is of the following type:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
desc(C0)
T C =
0B@ a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1
1CA
For convenience, suppose that c3 = (a1; b1; e2)
T , c4 = (a1; b2; e1)
T , c5 = (a2; b1; e1)
T .
(1) If c1 2 CD, then c1 = (k; k + y; k + xy)T , where k; y 2 Zq, and
c3 = (k; k + y; e2)
T ; c4 = (k; b2; k + xy)
T ; c5 = (a2; k + y; k + xy)
T :
It is easy to see that a2 6= k. Since CD has minimum distance 2, we have c3; c4; c5 2
CS . Then there exist 1  i1; i2; i3  w such that
c3 = (k; k+si1 ; k+ ti1)
T ; c4 = (k; k+si2 ; k+ ti2)
T ; c5 = (a2; a2+si3 ; a2+ ti3)
T :
Since CS has minimum distance 2 and c3; c4; c5 2 CS , we have8>>>><>>>>:
si1 6= si2 ;
ti1 6= ti2 ;
k + ti1 6= a2 + ti3 (note that k + si1 = k + y = a2 + si3);
k + si2 6= a2 + si3 (note that k + ti2 = k + xy = a2 + ti3):
Obviously, i1 6= i2. We can also derive i1 6= i3, otherwise, if i1 = i3, then k = a2, a
contradiction. Similarly, i2 6= i3. So i1; i2 and i3 are all distinct, and we have8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
k + y = k + si1 ;
e2 = k + ti1 ;
b2 = k + si2 ;
k + xy = k + ti2 ;
k + y = a2 + si3 ;
k + xy = a2 + ti3 ;
)
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
y = si1 ;
xy = ti2 ;
xy   y = ti3   si3 ;
a2 = k + xy   ti3 ;
b2 = k + si2 ;
e2 = k + ti1 :
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Then c2 = (a2; b2; e2)
T = (k + xy   ti3 ; k + si2 ; k + ti1)T :
(1.1) If c2 2 CD, then there exists z 2 Zq such that c2 = (k + xy   ti3 ; k + xy  
ti3 + z; k + xy   ti3 + xz)T . So we have(
k + si2 = k + xy   ti3 + z;
k + ti1 = k + xy   ti3 + xz;
)
(
z = si2 + ti3   xy;
xz = ti1 + ti3   xy;
a contradiction to condition (I). So this case is impossible.
(1.2) If c2 2 CS , then there exists 1  i4  w such that c2 = (k + xy   ti3 ; k +
xy   ti3 + si4 ; k + xy   ti3 + ti4)T . So we have(
k + si2 = k + xy   ti3 + si4 ;
k + ti1 = k + xy   ti3 + ti4 ;
)
(
si4 = si2 + ti3   xy;
ti4 = ti1 + ti3   xy;
a contradiction to condition (I). So this case is impossible.
(2) If c1 2 CS , then c1 = (k; k + si; k + ti)T , where 1  i  w, and
c3 = (k; k + si; e2)
T ; c4 = (k; b2; k + ti)
T ; c5 = (a2; k + si; k + ti)
T :
It is easy to see that a2 6= k. Since CS has minimum distance 2, we have c3; c4; c5 2
CD. Then there exist y1; y2; y3 2 Zq such that
c3 = (k; k+y1; k+xy1)
T ; c4 = (k; k+y2; k+xy2)
T ; c5 = (a2; a2+y3; a2+xy3)
T :
Since CD has minimum distance 2 and c3; c4; c5 2 CD, we have8>>>><>>>>:
y1 6= y2;
xy1 6= xy2 ;
k + xy1 6= a2 + xy3 (note that k + y1 = k + si = a2 + y3);
k + y2 6= a2 + y3 (note that k + xy2 = k + ti = a2 + xy3):
If y1 = y3, then k = a2, a contradiction. So, y1 6= y3. Similarly, y2 6= y3. So y1; y2
and y3 are all distinct, and we have8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
k + si = k + y1;
e2 = k + xy1 ;
b2 = k + y2;
k + ti = k + xy2 ;
k + si = a2 + y3;
k + ti = a2 + xy3 ;
)
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
si = y1;
ti = xy2 ;
ti   si = xy3   y3;
a2 = k + ti   xy3 ;
b2 = k + y2;
e2 = k + xy1 :
Then c2 = (a2; b2; e2)
T = (k + ti   xy3 ; k + y2; k + xy1)T :
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(2.1) If c2 2 CD, then there exists y4 2 Zq, such that c2 = (k+ ti   xy3 ; k+ ti  
xy3 + y4; k + ti   xy3 + xy4)T . So we can have(
k + y2 = k + ti   xy3 + y4;
k + xy1 = k + ti   xy3 + xy4 ;
)
(
y4 = y2 + xy3   ti;
xy4 = xy1 + xy3   ti;
a contradiction to condition (II). So this case is impossible.
(2.2) If c2 2 CS , then there exists 1  j  w, such that c2 = (k + ti   xy3 ; k +
ti   xy3 + sj ; k + ti   xy3 + tj)T . So we can have(
k + y2 = k + ti   xy3 + sj ;
k + xy1 = k + ti   xy3 + tj ;
)
(
sj = y2 + xy3   ti;
tj = xy1 + xy3   ti;
a contradiction to condition (II). So this case is impossible.
Therefore, C is a 2-SMIPPC(3; q(q + w); q). 
5.3.2 The case q  1; 5 (mod 6)
We now consider the case q  1; 5 (mod 6). To simplify our discussion, let xi = 2i,
0  i  q   1, sj1 6= sj2 , 1  j1 6= j2  w, tj = 3sj , 1  j  w, in D in the form
(5.1) and S in the form (5.2), respectively. Then we have two new matrices:
D1 =
0B@ 0 0    00 1    q   1
0 2    2(q   1)
1CA ; (5.4)
S1 =
0B@ 0 0    0s1 s2    sw
3s1 3s2    3sw
1CA : (5.5)
Let
CD1 = fc+ g j c 2 D1; g 2 Zqg; CS1 = fc+ g j c 2 S1; g 2 Zqg; C1 = CD1
[
CS1 :(5.6)
It is easy to check that D1 is a (q; 3; 1)-CDM. Let A1 = fs1; s2; : : : ; swg, A2 =
f2b j b 2 A1g, and A3 = f 3b j b 2 A1g. Then for any (a0; b0; e0)T 2 CS1 , we can
have b0   a0 2 A1, e0   b0 2 A2, and a0   e0 2 A3.
Theorem 5.3.8 Suppose q  1; 5 (mod 6). Then C1 in the form (5.6) is a 2-
SC(3; q(q + w); q) on Zq provided that the following hold:
(I) si 6= 0 for any positive integer 1  i  w.
(II) si + sj 6= 0 always holds for any positive integers 1  i < j  w.
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Proof: We apply Theorem 5.3.6. It is not dicult to check that jfs1; s2; : : : ; swgj =
jf3s1; 3s2; : : : ; 3swgj = jf2s1; 2s2; : : : ; 2swgj = w from the fact q  1; 5 (mod 6) and
sj1 6= sj2 , 1  j1 6= j2  w. For any two columns (0; si; 3si)T and (0; sj ; 3sj)T in S1,
1  i 6= j  w, suppose (0; y; 2y)T , (0; z; 2z)T , (0; yi; 2yi)T , (0; yj ; 2yj)T , (0; zi; 2zi)T ,
(0; zj ; 2zj)
T 2 D1, where y; z; yi; yj ; zi; zj 2 Zq, such that8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
2si = y;
2sj = z;
3si = 2yi;
3sj = 2yj ;
si = zi;
sj = zj :
Then
3si   2y = 3si   4si =  si 6= 0,
3sj   2z = 3sj   4sj =  sj 6= 0,
(3si   2y) (3sj   2z) =  (si  sj) 6= 0,
si   yi = si   32si =  12si 6= 0,
sj   yj = sj   32sj =  12sj 6= 0,
(si   yi) (sj   yj) =  12(si  sj) 6= 0,
3si   2zi = 3si   2si = si 6= 0,
3sj   2zj = 3sj   2sj = sj 6= 0,
(3si   2zi) (3sj   2zj) = si  sj 6= 0.
Then the conclusion comes from Theorem 5.3.6. 
Theorem 5.3.9 Suppose that q  1; 5 (mod 6). Then C1 in the form (5.6) is a
2-SMIPPC(3; q(q + w); q) on Zq provided that the following hold:
(I) si 6= 0 for any positive integer 1  i  w.
(II) si + sj 6= 0 always holds for any positive integers 1  i < j  w.
(III) There does not exist an element b 2 Zq such that b; 2b3 ; b2 2 A1 = fs1; s2; : : : ; swg
and 13b = 0.
Proof: According to Theorem 5.3.8, we know that C1 is a 2-SC. Assume that C
is not a 2-SMIPPC, then one of conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem 5.3.7 does not
hold.
(1) Assume that condition (I) of Theorem 5.3.7 does not hold. Then there exist
distinct 1  i1; i2; i3  w and y 2 Zq such that8>>>><>>>>:
y = si1 ;
2y = 3si2 ;
y = 2si3 ;
(si2 + 3si3   2y; 3si1 + 3si3   2y) 2 E;
)
8>>>><>>>>:
y = si1 ;
2
3y = si2 ;
1
2y = si3 ;
(16y;
5
2y) 2 E;
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where E = f(y0; 2y0) j y0 2 Zqg
S f(s0; 3s0) j s0 2 A1g. This means that y; 2y3 ; y2 2 A1,
and (16y;
5
2y) 2 E.
(1:1) If (16y;
5
2y) 2 f(y0; 2y0) j y0 2 Zqg, then 26y = 52y, which implies 13y = 0, a
contradiction to condition (III).
(1:2) If (16y;
5
2y) 2 f(s0; 3s0) j s0 2 A1g, then 36y = 52y, which implies y = 0, a
contradiction to 0 =2 A1.
(2) Assume that condition (II) of Theorem 5.3.7 does not hold. Then there exist
distinct y1; y2; y3 2 Zq and 1  i  w such that8>>>><>>>>:
si = y1;
3si = 2y2;
2si = y3;
(y2 + 2y3   3si; 2y1 + 2y3   3si) 2 E;
)
8>>>><>>>>:
y1 = si;
2
3y2 = si;
1
2y3 = si;
(52si; 3si) 2 E:
(2:1) If (52si; 3si) 2 f(y0; 2y0) j y0 2 Zqg, then 5si = 3si, which implies si = 0, a
contradiction to condition (I).
(2:2) If (52si; 3si) 2 f(s0; 3s0) j s0 2 A1g, then 152 si = 3si, which implies si = 0, a
contradiction to condition (I).
The above (1) and (2) show that conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem 5.3.7 always
hold, which implies that C1 is a 2-SMIPPC from Theorem 5.3.7. 
We will use Theorem 5.3.9 to construct optimal 2-SMIPPC(3;M; q)s for q  1; 5
(mod 6).
Lemma 5.3.10 If q  1; 5 (mod 6) and q 6 0 (mod 13), then there exists a 2-
SMIPPC(3; q2 + q(q 1)2 ; q).
Proof: Let C1 be in the form (5.6) and A1 = f1; 2; : : : ; q 12 g. The conclusion comes
from Theorem 5.3.9. 
Lemma 5.3.11 If q  13; 65 (mod 78), then there exists a 2-SMIPPC(3; q2 +
q(q 1)
2 ; q).
Proof: Let q = 13r. Suppose that C1 is in the form (5.6) and A1 = f1; : : : ; 4r  
1; 4r + 1; : : : ; q 12 ; 9rg. We want to show that conditions (I), (II), (III) in Theorem
5.3.9 are satised. Obviously, conditions (I) and (II) hold. Assume that there exists
an element b 2 Zq such that b; 2b3 ; b2 2 A1 and 13b = 0. Then b should be a multiple
of r and thus we have b 2 fr; 2r; 3r; 5r; 6r; 9rg. Then
b r 2r 3r 5r 6r 9r
2b
3 5r 10r 2r 12r 4r 6r
b
2 7r r 8r 9r 3r 11r
Table 5.1
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From Table 5.1, we know that for any b 2 fr; 2r; 3r; 5r; 6r; 9rg, one of the el-
ements 2b3 and
b
2 is not contained in A1, a contradiction to b;
2b
3 ;
b
2 2 A1. Hence,
condition (III) is satised.
The conclusion then comes from Theorem 5.3.9. 
Combining Theorem 5.3.3, Lemmas 5.3.10 and 5.3.11, we have
Theorem 5.3.12 There exists an optimal 2-SMIPPC(3; q2 + q(q 1)2 ; q) for any q 
1; 5 (mod 6).
5.3.3 The case q  0; 2 (mod 6)
Next, we deal with the case q  0; 2 (mod 6). Let s = q  1, then s  1; 5 (mod 6).
In order to describe our constructions, we introduce a new element1 =2 Zs, and
for any a 2 Zs, we dene
a+1 =1+ a = a  1 =1  a =1:
We now dene a code
C02 = C2
[
CT2
[
f(1;1;1)T g (5.7)
on Q = Zs
Sf1g, where s1; s2; : : : ; sw;m 2 Zs,
D2 =
0B@ 0 0    00 1    s  1
0 2    2(s  1)
1CA ; S2 =
0B@ 0 0    0s1 s2    sw
3s1 3s2    3sw
1CA ;
T2 =
0B@ 1 m 00 1 m
m 0 1
1CA ;
CD2 = fc+ g j c 2 D2; g 2 Zsg, CS2 = fc + g j c 2 S2; g 2 Zsg, CT2 = fc+ g j c 2
T2; g 2 Zsg, and C2 = CD2
S CS2 .
Theorem 5.3.13 C02 in the form (5.7) is a 2-SC(3; s(s+w+3)+1; q) provided that
the following hold:
(I) si 6= 0 for any positive integer 1  i  w.
(II) si + sj 6= 0 always holds for any positive integers 1  i < j  w.
(III) m =2 S3i=1Ai.
Proof: According to Theorem 5.3.8, we know that C2 = CD2
S CS2 is a 2-SC(3; s(s+
w); s) dened on Zs. Hence, in C2, jAjg1
TAjg2 j  1 holds for any positive integer
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1  j  3 and any distinct g1; g2 2 Zs from Lemma 3.3.4. Now we dene
Bjg =
8>>>><>>>>:
Ajg
Sf(1; g  m)T ; (g +m;1)T g; if g 2 Zs; j = 1; 3;
Ajg
Sf(1; g +m)T ; (g  m;1)T g; if g 2 Zs; j = 2;
f(i; i+m)T j i 2 Zsg
Sf(1;1)T g; if g =1; j = 1; 3;
f(i+m; i)T j i 2 Zsg
Sf(1;1)T g; if g =1; j = 2:
According to Lemma 3.3.4, in order to prove that C02 is a 2-SC, it suces to show
that jBjg1
TBjg2 j  1 holds for any positive integer 1  j  3, and any distinct
g1; g2 2 Zs
Sf1g.
Since for any distinct g1; g2 2 Zs, f(1; g1   m)T ; (g1 + m;1)T g
Tf(1; g2  
m)T ; (g2 +m;1)T g = ;, and f(1; g1 +m)T ; (g1  m;1)T g
Tf(1; g2 +m)T ; (g2  
m;1)T g = ;, we have Bjg1
TBjg2 = Ajg1 TAjg2 for any integer 1  j  3, which
implies jBjg1
TBjg2 j  1.
Next, since m =2 S3i=1Ai, we know that for any g 2 Zs,
B1g
TB11 = f(g +m; g + 2m)T g;
B2g
TB21 = f(g + m2 ; g   m2 )T g;
B3g
TB31 = f(g   2m; g  m)T g:
Then jBjg
TBj1j = 1 holds for any integer 1  j  3.
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 5.3.14 C02 in the form (5.7) is a 2-SMIPPC(3; s(s+w+3)+1; q) provided
that the following hold:
(I) si 6= 0 for any positive integer 1  i  w.
(II) si + sj 6= 0 always holds for any positive integers 1  i < j  w.
(III) There does not exist an element b 2 Zs such that b; 2b3 ; b2 2 A1 and 13b = 0.
(IV) m =2 S3i=1Ai,  m2 =2 A2,  2m =2 A3, m 6= 0.
Proof: It is clear that C02 is a 2-SC from Theorem 5.3.13. Assume that C
0
2 is not a 2-
SMIPPC. According to Theorem 5.3.4, there exists C0 = fc1; c2g = f(a1; b1; e1)T ; (a2;
b2; e2)
T g  C02, where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and e1 6= e2, such that desc(C0)
T C02 is of
the following type:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
desc(C0)
T C02 =
0B@ a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1
1CA :
For convenience, suppose that c3 = (a1; b1; e2)
T , c4 = (a1; b2; e1)
T , c5 = (a2; b1; e1)
T .
(1) If c1 2 CD2 , then c1 = (k; k + b; k + 2b)T , where k; b 2 Zs.
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(1.1) If b =2 fm; m2 g, then c3; c4; c5 2 C2 = CD2
S CS2 , and also c2 2 C2.
According to the proofs of Theorems 5.3.7 and 5.3.9, this case is impossible.
(1.2) If b = m, then c4 = (k; b2; k + 2m)
T . Since s  1; 5 (mod 6) and m 6= 0,
we have  2m 6= m, which implies c4 =2 CT2 . Since  2m =2 A3, we can derive that
c4 =2 CS2 . Hence c4 2 CD2 , which, together with the fact that CD2 has minimum
distance 2, implies c4 = c1, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
(1.3) If b =  m2 , then c5 = (a2; k   m2 ; k   m)T . Since s  1; 5 (mod 6) and
m 6= 0, we have  m2 6= m, which implies c5 =2 CT2 . Since  m2 =2 A2, we can derive
that c5 =2 CS2 . Hence c5 2 CD2 , which implies c5 = c1, a contradiction. So this case
is impossible.
(2) If c1 2 CS2 , then c1 = (k; k + b; k + 3b)T , where k 2 Zs; b 2 A1  Zs.
Since m =2 S3i=1Ai, we know that c3; c4; c5 =2 CT2 , which implies c3; c4; c5 2 C2 =
CD2
S CS2 , and also c2 2 C2. According to the proofs of Theorems 5.3.7 and 5.3.9,
this case is impossible.
(3) If c1 2 CT2 , without loss of generality, we may assume that c1 = (1; b; b +
m)T . Then c3 = c1, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
(4) If c1 = (1;1;1)T , then c3 = c1, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
According to (1)-(4), we know that C02 is a 2-SMIPPC(3; s(s+w+ 3) + 1; q). 
Lemma 5.3.15 If q  0 (mod 6)  12 and q 6 1 (mod 13), then there exists a
2-SMIPPC(3; q2 + q(q 1)2 ; q).
Proof: Let C02 be in the form (5.7), A1 = f1; 2; : : : ; s 12 g, and m =  2. Obviously,
conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem 5.3.14 are satised. Since q 6 1 (mod 13),
s = q   1 6 0 (mod 13). Then, except the element 0 2 Zs, there is no element
b 2 Zs, such that 13b = 0, but 0 =2 A1. This implies that condition (III) of Theorem
5.3.14 is satised. Now consider condition (IV) of Theorem 5.3.14. Remember that
A2 = f2b j b 2 A1g, A3 = f 3b j b 2 A1g.
(1) Obviously, m 6= 0, and  m2 = 1 =2 A2.
(2)  2m = 4 =2 A3. Assume not. Then there exists b 2 A1, such that 4 =  3b.
Then b =  43 . Since s = q   1  5 (mod 6), we write s = 6h + 5 for some integer
h  1. Then b = 4h + 2 and A1 = f1; 2; : : : ; 3h + 2g, which implies b =2 A1, a
contradiction.
(3) Obviously, m =  2 =2 A1
S
A2. It suces to show that m =  2 =2 A3.
Assume not. Then there exists b 2 A1, such that  2 =  3b. Then b = 23 = 4h+ 4,
which implies b =2 A1, a contradiction.
The conclusion then comes from Theorem 5.3.14. 
Lemma 5.3.16 If q  66 (mod 78), then there exists a 2-SMIPPC(3; q2+ q(q 1)2 ; q).
Proof: Let s = q   1 = 13r, C02 be in the form (5.7), A1 = f1; : : : ; 4r   1; 4r +
1; : : : ; s 12 ; 9rg, and m =  2. Obviously, conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem 5.3.14
81
are satised. Since q  66 (mod 78), s = q   1  65 (mod 78), then we can know
condition (III) of Theorem 5.3.14 is satised from the proof of Lemma 5.3.11. Now
consider condition (IV) of Theorem 5.3.14. Remember that A2 = f2b j b 2 A1g,
A3 = f 3b j b 2 A1g.
(1) Obviously, m 6= 0, and  m2 = 1 =2 A2.
(2)  2m = 4 =2 A3. Assume not. Then there exists b 2 A1, such that 4 =  3b.
Write s = 78h+65. Then r = 6h+5 and b =  43 = 52h+42. Since s 12 = 39h+32,
it should hold that b = 9r, that is, 2h+ 3 = 0, which is impossible.
(3) Since s  65, we have r  5. Then s   2 = 13r   2 > 9r, which implies
m =  2 =2 A1. Also, s  2 = 13r   2 6= 5r, which implies m =  2 =2 A2. It suces
to show that m =  2 =2 A3. Assume not. Then there exists b 2 A1, such that
 2 =  3b. Then b = 23 = 52h + 44. Since s 12 = 39h + 32, it should hold that
b = 9r, that is, 2h+ 1 = 0, which is impossible.
The conclusion then comes from Theorem 5.3.14. 
Lemma 5.3.17 If q  2 (mod 6)  44 and q 6 1 (mod 13), then there exists a
2-SMIPPC(3; q2 + q(q 1)2 ; q).
Proof: Let C02 be in the form (5.7), A1 = f1; 2; : : : ; s 12 g, and m =  10. Obviously,
conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem 5.3.14 are satised. Since q 6 1 (mod 13),
s = q   1 6 0 (mod 13). Then, except the element 0 2 Zs, there is no element
b 2 Zs, such that 13b = 0, but 0 =2 A1. This implies that condition (III) of Theorem
5.3.14 is satised. Now consider condition (IV) of Theorem 5.3.14. Remember that
A2 = f2b j b 2 A1g, A3 = f 3b j b 2 A1g.
(1) Obviously, m 6= 0, and  m2 = 5 =2 A2.
(2)  2m = 20 =2 A3. Assume not. Then there exists b 2 A1, such that 20 =  3b.
Then b =  203 . Write s = 6h + 1 for some integer h  7. Then b = 4h   6 and
A1 = f1; 2; : : : ; 3hg, which implies b =2 A1, a contradiction.
(3) Since s  43, we have s   10 = 6h   9, and s 12 = 3h, which implies
m =  10 =2 A1. It is also clear that m =  10 =2 A2. We show that m =  10 =2 A3.
Assume not. Then there exists b 2 A1, such that  10 =  3b. Then b = 103 = 4h+4,
which implies b =2 A1, a contradiction.
So, the conclusion comes from Theorem 5.3.14. 
Lemma 5.3.18 If q  14 (mod 78)  92, then there exists a 2-SMIPPC(3; q2 +
q(q 1)
2 ; q).
Proof: Let s = q   1 = 13r, C02 be in the form (5.7), A1 = f1; : : : ; 4r   1; 4r +
1; : : : ; s 12 ; 9rg, and m =  10. Obviously, conditions (I) and (II) of Theorem 5.3.14
are satised. Since q  14 (mod 78), s = q   1  13 (mod 78), then we can know
that condition (III) of Theorem 5.3.14 is satised from the proof of Lemma 5.3.11.
Now we consider condition (IV) of Theorem 5.3.14.
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(1) Obviously, m 6= 0, and  m2 = 5 =2 A2.
(2)  2m = 20 =2 A3. Assume not. Then there exists b 2 A1, such that 20 =  3b.
Write s = 78h+13. Then r = 6h+1, and b =  203 = 52h+2. Since s 12 = 39h+6,
it should hold that b = 9r, that is, 2h+ 7 = 0, which is impossible.
(3) Since s  91, we can have r  7. Then s 10 = 13r 10 > 9r, which implies
m =  10 =2 A1.
m =  10 =2 A2. Assume not. Then there exists b 2 A1, such that  10 = 2b,
which implies b =  5 = s   5. Since s  91, we have s   5 > s 12 , which implies
b = 9r, that is,  10 = 2  9r = 18r = 5r. Hence r =  2 = s   2  5 (mod 6), a
contradiction.
It suces to show that m =  10 =2 A3. Assume not. Then there exists b 2 A1,
such that  10 =  3b. Then b = 103 = 52h + 12. Since s 12 = 39h + 6, it should
hold that b = 9r, then  10 =  3  9r =  r, r  10 (mod s)  10 (mod 13r), and
r = 10 6 1 (mod 6), a contradiction.
So the conclusion comes from Theorem 5.3.14. 
Lemma 5.3.19 There exists a 2-SMIPPC(3; q2+ q(q 1)2 ; q) for any q 2 f20; 26; 32; 38g.
Proof: Let
A(20) = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 7; 8; 10; 13g, m(20) = 9,
A(26) = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 13g, m(26) = 24,
A(32) = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 15; 17g, m(32) = 21,
A(38) = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14; 15; 16; 17; 19g, m(38) = 27.
For any q 2 f20; 26; 32; 38g, let s = q   1, C(q) be in the form (5.7), A1 = A(q),
and m = m(q). Then the conclusion comes from Theorem 5.3.14. 
The following result comes from Lemmas 5.3.15-5.3.19 and Theorem 5.3.3.
Theorem 5.3.20 Suppose that q  0; 2 (mod 6), and q =2 f2; 6; 8; 14g, then there
exists an optimal 2-SMIPPC(3; q2 + q(q 1)2 ; q).
For each q 2 f6; 8g, we want to nd the set A1 and the element m satisfying the
conditions (I)-(IV) of Theorem 5.3.14. Unfortunately, we fail to do this. However,
we can construct a 2-SMIPPC(3; q2 + q(q 1)2 ; q) for each q 2 f6; 8g by making a
detailed analysis of the proof of Theorem 5.3.14.
Lemma 5.3.21 There exists a 2-SMIPPC(3; 51; 6).
Proof: Let s = 5, C02 be in the form (5.7), A1 = f1; 2g, and m = 3. Then A2 =
A3 = f2; 4g. It is not dicult to check that m 6= 0,  m2 = 1 =2 A2, m =2
S3
i=1Ai,
and conditions (I), (II), (III) of Theorem 5.3.14 are satised. According to the proof
of Theorem 5.3.14, it suces to prove the following assertion:
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There does not exist C0 = fc1; c2g = f(k; k + 3; k + 1)T ; (a2; b2; e2)T g  C02,
where k 2 Z5, a2; b2; e2 2 Z5
Sf1g, a2 6= k, b2 6= k + 3, and e2 6= k + 1, such that
desc(C0)
T C02 is of the following type:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
desc(C0)
T C02 =
0B@ k a2 k k a2k + 3 b2 k + 3 b2 k + 3
k + 1 e2 e2 k + 1 k + 1
1CA ;
where c3 = (k; k + 3; e2)
T , c4 = (k; b2; k + 1)
T , c5 = (a2; k + 3; k + 1)
T .
Assume not. Obviously, c3; c4; c5 =2 CD2 , because of the fact that CD2 has
minimum distance 2 and c1 2 CD2 . It is not dicult to see that c3; c5 =2 CS2 s-
ince 3 =2 A1
S
A2, which implies c3; c5 2 CT2 . Hence c3 = (k; k + 3;1)T , c5 =
(1; k+3; k+1)T , and c2 = (1;1;1)T , which implies c4 = (k;1; k+1)T . Clear-
ly, since m = 3 6=  1, we know that c4 = (k;1; k + 1)T =2 C02, a contradiction.
So, C02 is a 2-SMIPPC(3; 51; 6). 
Lemma 5.3.22 There exists a 2-SMIPPC(3; 92; 8).
Proof: Let s = 7, C02 be in the form (5.7), A1 = f1; 2; 4g, and m = 3. Then
A2 = A3 = f1; 2; 4g. It is not dicult to check that m 6= 0, m =2
S3
i=1Ai and
conditions (I), (II), (III) of Theorem 5.3.14 are satised. According to the proof of
Theorem 5.3.14, it suces to prove the following assertion:
There does not exist C0 = fc1; c2g = f(k; k + b; k + 2b)T ; (a2; b2; e2)T g  C02,
where k 2 Z7, b 2 f2; 3g, a2; b2; e2 2 Z7
Sf1g, a2 6= k, b2 6= k+ b, and e2 6= k+ 2b,
such that desc(C0)
T C02 is of the following type:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
desc(C0)
T C02 =
0B@ k a2 k k a2k + b b2 k + b b2 k + b
k + 2b e2 e2 k + 2b k + 2b
1CA ;
where c3 = (k; k + b; e2)
T , c4 = (k; b2; k + 2b)
T , c5 = (a2; k + b; k + 2b)
T .
Assume not. Since CD2 has minimum distance 2 and c1 2 CD2 , we know that
c3; c4; c5 =2 CD2 .
(1) The case b = 2. We can directly check that c3; c5 =2 CT2 and c4 =2 CS2 ,
which implies c3; c5 2 CS2 and c4 2 CT2 . Hence c3 = (k; k + 2; k + 6)T , c5 =
(k+1; k+2; k+4)T and c4 = (k;1; k+4)T , which implies c2 = (k+1;1; k+6)T .
Obviously, since m = 3 6=  5, we know that c2 = (k + 1;1; k + 6)T =2 C02, a
contradiction.
(2) The case b = 3. It is not dicult to see that c3; c5 =2 CS2 , which implies
c3; c5 2 CT2 . Hence c3 = (k; k + 3;1)T , c5 = (1; k + 3; k + 6)T , and c2 =
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(1;1;1)T , which implies c4 = (k;1; k + 6)T . Obviously, since m = 3 6= 1, we
know that c4 = (k;1; k + 6)T =2 C02, a contradiction.
So, C02 is a 2-SMIPPC(3; 92; 8). 
Lemma 5.3.23 There exists a 2-SMIPPC(3; 287; 14).
Proof: We construct a (3, 287, 14) code C03 on Z13
Sf1g as follows. Let
D3 =
0B@ 0 0    00 1    12
0 2    2 12
1CA ; S3 =
0B@ 0 0 0 0 0 01 2 3 5 6 9
3 6 9 2 5 1
1CA ;
T3 =
0B@ 1 6 00 1 4
7 0 1
1CA ;
CD3 = fc + g j c 2 D3; g 2 Z13g, CS3 = fc + g j c 2 S3; g 2 Z13g, CT3 = fc +
g j c 2 T3; g 2 Z13g, C3 = CD3
S CS3 , C03 = C3S CT3 Sf(1;1;1)T g. Let A1 =
f1; 2; 3; 5; 6; 9g, A2 = f2b j b 2 A1g, and A3 = f 3b j b 2 A1g.
According to the proof of Lemma 5.3.11, we know that C3 is a 2-SMIPPC dened
on Z13. We rst prove that C03 is a 2-SC dened on Z13
Sf1g.
According to Theorem 5.3.8, we know that C3 = CD3
S CS3 is a 2-SC(3; 247; 13)
dened on Z13. Hence, jAjg1
TAjg2 j  1 holds for any positive integers 1  j  3
and any distinct g1; g2 2 Z13 from Lemma 3.3.4. Now we dene
Bjg =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
Ajg
Sf(1; g   6)T ; (g + 4;1)T g; if g 2 Z13; j = 1;
Ajg
Sf(1; g + 7)T ; (g   4;1)T g; if g 2 Z13; j = 2;
Ajg
Sf(1; g   7)T ; (g + 6;1)T g; if g 2 Z13; j = 3;
f(i; i+ 7)T j i 2 Z13g
Sf(1;1)T g; if g =1; j = 1;
f(i+ 6; i)T j i 2 Z13g
Sf(1;1)T g; if g =1; j = 2;
f(i; i+ 4)T j i 2 Z13g
Sf(1;1)T g; if g =1; j = 3:
According to Lemma 3.3.4, in order to prove that C03 is a 2-SC, it suces to show
that jBjg1
TBjg2 j  1 holds for any positive integer 1  j  3, and any distinct
g1; g2 2 Z13
Sf1g.
For any distinct g1; g2 2 Z13, we have
f(1; g1   6)T ; (g1 + 4;1)T g
Tf(1; g2   6)T ; (g2 + 4;1)T g = ;,
f(1; g1 + 7)T ; (g1   4;1)T g
Tf(1; g2 + 7)T ; (g2   4;1)T g = ;,
f(1; g1   7)T ; (g1 + 6;1)T g
Tf(1; g2   7)T ; (g2 + 6;1)T g = ;.
Then Bjg1
TBjg2 = Ajg1 TAjg2 for any integer 1  j  3, which implies jBjg1 TBjg2 j 
1. For any g 2 Z13, we can also have
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B1g
TB11 = f(g + 7; g + 1)T g;
B2g
TB21 = f(g + 3; g   3)T g;
B3g
TB31 = f(g   8; g   4)T g:
Then jBjg
TBj1j = 1 for any integer 1  j  3. This implies C03 is a 2-SC.
Now assume that C03 is not a 2-SMIPPC. According to Theorem 5.3.4, there
exists C0 = fc1; c2g = f(a1; b1; e1)T ; (a2; b2; e2)T g  C03, where a1 6= a2, b1 6= b2, and
e1 6= e2, such that desc(C0)
T C03 is of the following type:
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
desc(C0)
T C03 =
0B@ a1 a2 a1 a1 a2b1 b2 b1 b2 b1
e1 e2 e2 e1 e1
1CA ;
where c3 = (a1; b1; e2)
T , c4 = (a1; b2; e1)
T , c5 = (a2; b1; e1)
T .
(1) If c1 2 CD3 , then c1 = (k; k + b; k + 2b)T , where k; b 2 Z13. Since CD3 has
minimum distance 2, we have c3; c4; c5 =2 CD3 .
(1.1) If b =2 f4; 7; 10g, then c3; c4; c5 2 C3, and also c2 2 C3, which contradict to
the fact that C3 is a 2-SMIPPC. So this case is impossible.
(1.2) If b = 4, noting that  2b = 5 =2 A3
Sf6g, we have c4 =2 CS3 S CT3 , which
implies c4 =2 C03, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
(1.3) If b = 7 or 10, noting that b =2 A1
Sf4g, we have c3 =2 CS3 S CT3 , which
implies c3 =2 C03, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
(2) If c1 2 CS3 , then c1 = (k; k + b; k + 3b)T , where k 2 Z13; b 2 f1; 2; 3; 5; 6; 9g.
We can check that c3; c4; c5 =2 CT3 , which implies c3; c4; c5 2 C3 and also c2 2 C3.
This is a contradiction to the fact that C3 is a 2-SMIPPC. So this case is impossible.
(3) c1 2 CT3 . If c1 = (1; k; k + 7)T (or c1 = (k;1; k   6)T ), k 2 Z13, then
c3 = c1, a contradiction. Similarly, if c1 = (k; k + 4;1)T , k 2 Z13, then c4 = c1, a
contradiction. So this case is impossible.
(4) If c1 = (1;1;1)T , then c3 = c1, a contradiction. So this case is impossible.
According to (1)-(4), we know that c1 =2 C03, a contradiction.
So, C03 is a 2-SMIPPC(3; 287; 14). 
Finally, we can also construct an optimal binary 2-SMIPPC of length 3.
Lemma 5.3.24 There exists an optimal 2-SMIPPC(3; 4; 2).
Proof: The following code C is a 2-SMIPPC(3; 4; 2) from Example 5.1.2.
C =
0B@ 1 0 0 00 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
1CA
In order to show that the code C above is optimal, we only need to prove
that there is no 2-SMIPPC(3;M; 2) for M  5. Assume not. Suppose C0 is a
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2-SMIPPC(3;M; 2) with M  5. Noting that q = 2, we know that M  8. Choose
arbitrary 5 codewords ci = (ai; bi; ei) 2 C0 , 1  i  5. Then there must be two
codewords ci and cj , 1  i 6= j  5, such that d(ci; cj) = 3. We may assume that
d(c1; c2) = 3, a1 = 0 and a2 = 1. Hence desc(fc1; c2g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g.
Now, we are going to show that desc(fc3; c4; c5g) = f0; 1gf0; 1gf0; 1g. If a3 =
a4 = a5 = 0, then fc1; c3; c4; c5g = f(0; 0; 0)T ; (0; 0; 1)T ; (0; 1; 0)T ; (0; 1; 1)T g. Hence
desc(f(0; 0; 0)T ; (0; 1; 1)T g)= desc(f(0; 0; 1)T ; (0; 1; 0)T g), while f(0; 0; 0)T ; (0; 1; 1)T gTf(0; 0; 1)T ; (0; 1; 0)T g = ;, a contradiction to the denition of a 2-SMIPPC. So, it is
impossible that a3 = a4 = a5 = 0. Similarly, it is impossible that a3 = a4 = a5 = 1.
This means that fa3; a4; a5g = f0; 1g. Similarly, we can prove that fb3; b4; b5g =
f0; 1g and fe3; e4; e5g = f0; 1g. So, desc(fc3; c4; c5g) = f0; 1g  f0; 1g  f0; 1g,
which implies desc(fc3; c4; c5g) = desc(fc1; c2g), while fc3; c4; c5g
Tfc1; c2g = ;, a
contradiction to the denition of a 2-SMIPPC.
So, there does not exist a 2-SMIPPC(3;M; 2) with M  5. 
According to Theorems 5.3.3 and 5.3.20, and Lemmas 5.3.21-5.3.24, we can
derive the following result.
Theorem 5.3.25 There exists an optimal q-ary 2-SMIPPC of length 3 for any
positive integer q  0; 2 (mod 6).
We would like to make some remarks here. Although the values of parameter
n of the codes in this thesis are small, these codes are of practical use because
of the concatenation constructions. For example, in the famous Baboon picture,
n = 19497. We constructed a 2-SMIPPC(3; q2+ q(q 1)2 ; q) for any positive integer q 
0; 1; 2; 5 (mod 6) and q 6= 2 in Section 5.3. Then, by using the concatenation con-
struction (Lemma 5.1.7), we can derive a 2-SMIPPC(19497; 63352252; 2) from a 2-
SMIPPC(3; 63352252; 6499). Now, the codewords of the 2-SMIPPC(19497; 63352252;
2) can be embedded into the Baboon picture, and, in this case, we can identify at
least one colluder when the number of colluders in the averaging attack is at most
2.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Open Problems
We now give a brief summary of new results obtained in this thesis, and some
interesting open problems.
6.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, we introduced three new types of anti-collusion codes to construct
ngerprints resistant to the averaging collusion attack on multimedia contents. We
also designed the colluder tracing algorithms for these codes. Moreover, we paid
much attention to the constructions of four types of anti-collusion codes including
separable codes and our new codes. We briey list the main results of these codes
in this thesis as follows.
Traceability of dierent types of codes
Catch Colluders Complexity
t-SC(n;M; 2) all O(nM t)
t-SSC(n;M; 2) all O(nM)
t-MIPPC(n;M; 2) at least one O(nM t)
t-SMIPPC(n;M; 2) at least one O(nM)
Relationships among dierent types of codes and hash families
Relationships among dierent types of codes and hash families were summarized
by Stinson et al. [46], and was extended by Cheng and Miao [17]. Now it can be
extended again to include the newly introduced SSCs, MIPPCs and SMIPPCs. The
relationships among FPCs, SCs, SSCs, MIPPCs and SMIPPCs come from Lemmas
3.2.1, 3.2.7, 4.1.3, 5.1.3 and 5.1.5. Here we omit the denitions of dierent types
of codes and hash families. The interested reader is referred to [17], [46] for more
details.
PHF(n;M; q; b (t+2)24 c) =)
SHF(n;M; q; ft; tg) ()
=) PHF(n;M; q; t+ 1)
+
() SHF(n;M; q; ft; 1g)t-CFF(nq;M) (=
t-SMIPPC(n;M; q) (=
+
t-MIPPC(n;M; q) (= q=2() t-LACC(n;M; 2)
(n;M; q) code with dmin > n(1  1=t2)
+
(t; 1  1=t)-CFC(n;M; q)
+
t-TAC(n;M; q)
+
t-IPPC(n;M; q)
+
t-SFPC(n;M; q)
+
t-FPC(n;M; q)
+
t-SSC(n;M; q)
+
t-SC(n;M; q)
+ q = 2
t-AND-ACC(2n;M; 2)
+
t-LACC(2n;M; 2)
Key
dmin minimum distance of the code
CFC cover-free code
TAC traceability code
IPPC identiable parent property code
SFPC secure frameproof code
FPC frameproof code
SSC strong separable code
SMIPPC strong multimedia identiable parent property code
SC separable code
MIPPC multimedia identiable parent property code
AND-ACC AND anti-collusion code
LACC logical anti-collusion code
PHF perfect hash family
SHF separating hash family
CFF cover-free family
Figure 6.1: Relationships among dierent types of codes and hash families
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Separable codes
 We gave an upper bound for 2-SC(2;M; q)s by a graph theoretical approach,
and constructed such codes from projective planes, some of which are in fact
optimal.
 We derived asymptotically optimal 2-SC(4;M; q)s for any prime power q > 2.
Strong separable codes
 We derived optimal 2-SSC(2;M; q)s for any q 2 fk2   1; k2 + k   2; k2 + k  
1; k2 + k; k2 + k + 1g, where k  2 is a prime power.
 We presented a construction of 2-SSC(3;M; q)s.
Multimedia identiable parent property codes
 We gave an upper bound for t-MIPPC(n;M; q)s.
 We derived a tight upper bound for 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s by using bipartite
graphs.
 We constructed optimal 3-MIPPC(2; (k2 + 1)(k + 1)2; (k2 + 1)(k + 1))s for
any prime power k, and several innite series of asymptotically optimal 3-
MIPPC(2;M; q)s by using generalized quadrangles.
Strong multimedia identiable parent property codes
 We derived optimal 2-SMIPPC(2;M; q)s for any q 2 fk2   1; k2 + k   2; k2 +
k   1; k2 + k; k2 + k + 1g, where k  2 is a prime power.
 We derived optimal 3-SMIPPC(2; (k2 + 1)(k + 1)2; (k2 + 1)(k + 1))s for any
prime power k.
 We constructed optimal 2-SMIPPC(3;M; q)s for each q  0; 1; 2; 5 (mod 6)
by using cyclic dierence matrices.
6.2 Open problems
Now, we gather some open problems arising from this thesis.
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1. As we mentioned, in order to reduce the computational complexity of the
tracing algorithm based on a t-SC (or a t-MIPPC, respectively), we intro-
duced the notion of a t-SSC (or a t-SMIPPC, respectively). Can we nd some
other kinds of codes with more ecient tracing algorithm, for example, with
computational complexity O(tn logM)?
2. We only derived asymptotically optimal 2-SC(4;M; q)s for any prime power
q > 2 in Section 2.3. Can we give a tight bound on such codes? Furthermore,
how to construct optimal 2-SC(4;M; q)s for each positive integer q?
3. In Section 3.3, we gave a construction for 2-SSC(3;M; q)s. We do not know
whether these 2-SSC(3;M; q)s are optimal, even asymptotically optimal. So,
it is desired to derive an upper bound for 2-SSC(3;M; q)s.
4. We derived a tight upper bound for 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s by considering bipar-
tite graphs with girth at least 8. However, we only constructed an innite
series of optimal 3-MIPPC(2;M; q)s. Is it possible to consider such codes in a
way similar to the way used in Section 2.2?
5. How can one construct optimal 2-SMIPPC(3;M; q)s for q  3; 4 (mod 6).
6. It would be of interest to characterize and construct these four types of codes
with large parameters, that is,
(1) t-SC(n;M; q)s
(i) t = 2; n  5.
(ii) t  3; n  t.
(2) t-SSC(n;M; q)s
(i) t = 2; n  4.
(ii) t  3; n  t.
(3) t-MIPPC(n;M; q)s
(i) t = 3; n  3.
(ii) t  4; n  2.
(4) t-SMIPPC(n;M; q)s
(i) t = 2; n  3.
(ii) t = 3; n  3.
(iii) t  4; n  2.
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